האם יוצא י"ח ברהמ"ז בברכת על המחיה?

Does One Fulfill the Obligation of Birkas HaMazon with the Bracha of Al HaMichyah? (Continued)

In the last issue (1256), the great Rav, HaRav HaGaon R' Halevitcher shlit"a wrote regarding a case of one who ate a full [meal] of bread and mistakenly recited Me'ein Shalosh — what should he do? And it is astonishing that it escaped a great man such as him that this very question was placed on the table of the King in the Igros Kodesh of the Rebbe shlit"a, vol. 4 p. 24, letter 785 (brought in Shulchan Menachem vol. 1 §122):

"Regarding what he asks concerning Birkas HaMazon, it is brought in the sefer Likutei Meir and in the sefer Birkas Yaakov from the Ikarei HaDaT 9:16, and from the responsa Teshuras Shai §571, that if one recited Al HaMichyah in place of Birkas HaMazon he has not fulfilled [his obligation] and must recite Birkas HaMazon. The above seforim are not before me, but, apparently, their reasoning is because it lacks bris and Torah, and see Shulchan Aruch OC §187." End of his holy words. And after the words of the King there is nothing [to add].

The words of the Rebbe shlit"a were well explained by HaGaon R' A.Y. Gu"a shlit"a in Ohalei Shem vol. 4 p. 60, with the added flavor of the words of the poskim who incline this way and that, and with the ruling of the Rebbe shlit"a that one must go back and recite [the bracha]; and likewise HaGaon R' Y.Y. Broin shlit"a expanded on this matter on the website ^[1]Halacha2Go with a multitude of sources, as the good hand of Hashem was upon him, and we will not repeat their instructive words, but rather come with a few brief comments; but first we will note, with Hashem's help, on the words of R' Halevitcher in his comment:

R' Halevitcher stood at the beginning of his words on what is written at the end of Kuntres Acharon 168:1 in parentheses "and according to the Siddur it works out better." Now it is obvious that these words did not come from the Alter Rebbe, and they are also not in the style of the Maharil, but rather an addition by the printers on their own initiative; and therefore even though "it is a mitzvah to reconcile" — as R' Halevitcher wrote, nevertheless we are not responsible for these words, and likewise the comment in the Ketzos HaAryeh which is based on this comment. (And see this wonder, that in the new edition of Shulchan Aruch HaRav they omitted many comments of the printers that are not in the manuscript, yet specifically this comment, which is difficult to understand, they left in. Once I raised this with HaGaon R' A. Alashvili shlit"a, and he showed me that in his edition of Shulchan Aruch HaRav HaMevo'ar he omitted the above.)

In any case, one can explain the intent of the comment, that according to the reasoning in Birchos HaNehenin — that for bread which one is not accustomed to they did not institute Birkas HaMazon with a kezayis — it works out better than according to the reasoning in Shulchan Aruch HaRav alone, because without the reasoning of the Siddur it would be difficult: why did Chazal not establish Birkas HaMazon for this bread at least when one is satiated? And in particular, that even though one fulfills [the obligation] from the Torah with Me'ein Shalosh, it does not mention bris and Torah, which are indispensable (at least Rabbinically, and see Igros Kodesh vol. 3 p. 137, which proves like those who say it is from the Torah)? And according to the [reasoning of the] Siddur, it is understood that Chazal did not establish, l'chatchilah, to recite Me'ein Shalosh over bread which one is not accustomed to when one is obligated in Birkas HaMazon from the Torah (except that since the essence is that in the concluding of a seudah we follow the way of most people, then only in a case where one is satiated in a manner in which most people are not satiated would one need to recite Me'ein Shalosh from the Torah (and in any case, l'chatchilah we are concerned for the opinion of the Raavad to require other bread first when satiated), and therefore it works out well.

But in the He'oros U'Biurim of Tzemach Tzedek, in the Biurim section, they cited what our teacher HaGaon R' Ch.Sh. Deutsch shlit"a wrote in the notes there, note 32, that according to the approach of Rabbeinu in the Siddur, the difficulty of the Dagul Meirvavah on the Magen Avraham — that he contradicted himself, which is where this Kuntres Acharon opened — falls away. But seemingly it requires examination, for even according to the Siddur, one cannot recite Birkas HaMazon out of doubt, so how shall we reconcile the words of the Magen Avraham in 134? (And with this, seemingly, the puzzlement of our teacher there on the Dagul Meirvavah falls away, that he should have noted already at 125, where the Magen Avraham also wrote that this is a doubt of Torah [law] — except that indeed this is not so difficult, for even though the count of brochos is not from the Torah, nevertheless they instituted to fulfill the mitzvos of the Torah through Birkas HaMazon specifically with four brochos, and in particular according to Rabbeinu's reasoning in Birchos HaNehenin that one must be stringent in Birkas HaZan as [in a matter] of Torah, and therefore the Dagul Meirvavah did not raise a difficulty there; but in 131 the Magen Avraham wrote that one must recite Birkas HaMazon out of a Torah doubt, and this can no longer be reconciled in the above manners, and it is clear that it contradicts what is written in Ketzos HaAryeh without a doubt). (And it has not escaped me what HaRav Sh.D.B.L. shlit"a wrote in He'oros U'Biurim issue 790 to explain in another manner, but with the great pardon of his honor, his words are astonishing, that he builds mounds upon mounds on the basis of flimsy inferences, while contradicting explicit statements, and this is not the place to elaborate.)

And the Aruch HaShulchan already noted (§168:15) that the reasonings in Shulchan Aruch HaRav and in the Siddur complement one another, and both are needed.

However, R' Halevitcher proposes to reconcile the above comments with the novel point that the Alter Rebbe introduced in Birchos HaNehenin — that even though we hold the count of brochos is Rabbinic, nevertheless it is proper to be stringent in its doubt like a doubt of Torah [law], because it was instituted by Moshe Rabbeinu. And he explains with this the apparent contradiction in the Magen Avraham, but his words are beyond me, for in practice the Magen Avraham is not stringent in its doubt like [a matter] of Torah — which is a novel point of the Alter Rebbe!

And in practice, R' Halevitcher concludes that "one has fulfilled the obligation from the Torah in that he recited Me'ein Shalosh, but he still must endeavor to fulfill the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu and recite Birkas HaZan properly. And this is the intent of the ruling of the Acharonim in such a case that he should go back and wash his hands and eat a kezayis of full bread and then recite Birkas HaMazon also on the bread he ate initially." But, with the great pardon of his honor, his words are puzzling — for what do we care if he has fulfilled [the obligation] from the Torah? For here we are not speaking of a doubt, where it would depend on whether we say a Rabbinic doubt is [treated] leniently or — like the novel point of the Alter Rebbe — we are stringent in it like [a matter] of Torah, but rather of a certainty, that he became obligated in Birkas HaMazon and did not fulfill the Rabbinic institution properly. And what he brings as "the ruling of the Acharonim," he does not bring even a single source in the Acharonim for this approach, and only cites in a note to two contemporary compilers.

Indeed, the source of this proposal is in the Kaf HaChaim §187:1, after that for him it is a doubt in law, and therefore he proposes such, or to hear from another, and if impossible, then to recite by way of thought (according to his approach in several places to recite by way of thought in a place of doubt, which is effective according to the Raavad).

But for us, where there is no doubt in law here, it is not understood at all what he would gain by this counsel according to his reasoning — for either way, if one fulfilled the obligation of Birkas HaMazon with Me'ein Shalosh, what would it help that he washes his hands and eats more bread? For he has already nullified the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu with the first eating over which he recited [the bracha] and which counted for him b'dieved — and that he recites Birkas HaMazon over another eating is no different from reciting it tomorrow or the day after. And on the other hand, if he did not fulfill [the obligation], why does he need to eat more bread? And as above, there is room for this proposal as a compromise for one who is in doubt whether he fulfills the obligation of Birkas HaMazon with Me'ein Shalosh, in the manner of the Kaf HaChaim, in which case he fulfills [the obligation] according to all opinions without entering into a concern of a bracha in vain, but it is not relevant to our case if we accept the premises that R' Halevitcher assumed, that the entire problem here is because he did not fulfill the stringency of the Alter Rebbe to be stringent in the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu.

(And one should not raise a difficulty from Seder Birchos HaNehenin ch. 1:14-15 that one does not fulfill [the obligation] as long as one did not have intent on the bread, in the manner that the Me'ein Shalosh bracha over wine exempts grapes only when one intended to exempt them, for there the bracha has something on which to take effect even without exempting the grapes. This is not so in our case, for even though he also ate a snack whose bracha is Al HaMichyah, it comes on account of the seudah and loses its individual bracha, and consequently the Me'ein Shalosh bracha has nothing on which to take effect except the bread, and he fulfills the obligation from the Torah.)

However, in Piskei Teshuvos §187:2 (which was cited in the above note) he brought two of the great contemporary poskim who hold that b'dieved one has fulfilled [the obligation], namely the Be'er Moshe vol. 4 §23, and the Yabia Omer vol. 2 §12, but with the great pardon of his honor, their words are very puzzling. The Be'er Moshe rested his foundations on the words of Rishonim who are like angels — the Ra'ah and his student the Ritva in his chidushim (except that their attribution to the Ritva is in doubt, and this has already been discussed in several places, and this is not the place, and in Hilchos Brochos of the Ritva ch. 2 §21 it is explicit the opposite), except that the Ra'ah is almost a lone [opinion] in this, and several Rishonim and a long list of the great Acharonim from whose mouths we live dispute his conclusion, whether explicitly or from what emerges from their words. And it is a lofty wonder on the Rav Be'er Moshe, for he himself holds in his responsum vol. 3 §34 §7 that in bris [the parts of] Birkas HaMazon are indispensable to one another, and how did it arise in his broad mind to introduce a novel law that one has fulfilled the obligation with Me'ein Shalosh against all the Acharonim.

And HaGaon R' O.Y. shlit"a went to introduce a novel point, that this that one who deviated from the formulation which Chazal coined has not fulfilled [the obligation] — that is [only] in Birkas HaMazon itself, but if one recited Me'ein Shalosh, which is also a formulation which Chazal coined, it is fine. But even though his words are sharp, they are difficult to accept from reasoning, for by reciting an incorrect bracha he comes out gaining, and in particular they have no solid foundation and are merely words of prophecy. And they have already written at length to refute them in the above articles.

And now we return to explain the matter according to the words of the Alter Rebbe and the Rebbe shlit"a, that there is no doubt that one is obligated to go back and recite [the bracha], and there is no need at all to eat more bread (and on the contrary, one could say that he detracts by this, as below).

Whoever will open Shulchan Aruch HaRav will immediately become convinced that the Alter Rebbe writes only that one fulfills [the obligation] from the Torah with the bracha of Me'ein Shalosh, and there is no proof at all from this that b'dieved one fulfills the obligation of Birkas HaMazon which Chazal instituted with this bracha. And on the contrary, there are many proofs to bring from the words of Rabbeinu that he does not hold so, foremost among them all the indispensable elements that he enumerates in §187.

And greater than this we find in Darkei Moshe at the beginning of 191, who brings the text of the short Birkas HaMazon from the Kolbo, which has four abbreviated brochos, and wonders how one fulfills the obligation with this, for "it was already explained above at the end of §187 that anyone who deviates from the formulation which Chazal coined has not fulfilled the obligation? And it is possible that even the Kolbo did not write it to fulfill [the obligation] with it, but rather it is like a form of a short tefillah that one prays who is going in a place of packs of wild beasts and robbers, and when he comes to his home he goes back and prays, as was explained above §110, and it is possible that so too with a short bracha like this he recites it in a place of duress and afterward recites Birkas HaMazon properly to fulfill the obligation with it and this requires examination."

That is to say, the Rema inclines that even one who recited all four brochos and even mentioned bris, Torah, and malchus, only that he did not do so in the formulation which Chazal coined, would be obligated to recite again in the usual formulation when it becomes possible for him. (And in truth the words of the Rema require study, for regarding tefillah one may pray several times, and would that a person pray all day long, and there is no concern of a bracha in vain in this, but how do we permit reciting four brochos of Birkas HaMazon in an abbreviated formulation, and then to recite them again after the duress passes, and why do we not have concern for four brochos in vain? And to note that according to the words of the Alter Rebbe in 187:4, if he adds to the above formulation "a land desirable, good, and spacious" he fulfills the obligation b'dieved, and this is not the place.)

And furthermore, there is one who wanted to say that at least one has fulfilled the obligation of Birkas HaZan with the Me'ein Shalosh bracha, and would continue with Nodeh Lecha, but this too is not so, according to the words of the Alter Rebbe in Seder Birchos HaNehenin ch. 2:12 — that it is proper to be stringent in a doubt of bread like a doubt of Torah [law] "since Moshe Rabbeinu instituted Birkas HaZan as a bracha unto itself, to open with baruch and to close with baruch" — it is understood that even the institution of Birkas HaZan is not fulfilled with the Me'ein Shalosh bracha, for otherwise, why should he be stringent in a doubt on account of Birkas HaZan when he recites Me'ein Shalosh in any case? Rather, seemingly, whenever one includes all three brochos as one, one has not fulfilled the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu at all, even if one goes back and recites the brochos of the Land and Yerushalayim, for his entire institution was to separate Birkas HaZan into a bracha unto itself, for before his institution (or at least by Torah law), plainly (according to the approach of the Rishonim that the count of the brochos is not from the Torah, as we hold like them) they would include everything together, including land, Torah, and bris (at least according to the one who holds they are from the Torah) and malchus in one bracha of Me'ein Shalosh, and close with the Land, and when the manna descended, Moshe Rabbeinu instituted to recite Birkas HaZan as a bracha unto itself, and then they would include the rest in this bracha (Likutei Torah parshas Eikev in the d"h VeAchalta VeSavata, 14d, and it is explained there why then the essence was in Birkas HaZan which refers to the bread from heaven), until Yehoshua arose and instituted Birkas Ha'Aretz as a bracha unto itself, and Dovid and Shlomo arose and instituted the formulation of the third bracha (and I recall having seen one who says that the text of Birkas Ha'Aretz was instituted by Yehoshua immediately when Hashem commanded regarding Birkas HaMazon, for they had already conquered the land of Sichon and Og, but in any case, they certainly recited Birkas Ha'Aretz immediately, whether in the formulation that Yehoshua instituted or in another formulation).

And one could say that this is the reason why they instituted for workers to recite Birkas HaZan and to include the second and third brochos together, for then they fulfill the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu in which it is proper to be stringent as [in a matter] of Torah, and in order to prevent nullification of their work, Chazal were lenient that they should recite as they recited in the generation of the desert, for otherwise, why did they not institute for workers one bracha like Havineinu for tefillah? Rather, only in a place of doubt whether one became obligated in Birkas HaMazon at all were they even more lenient to place it upon Torah law, and to fulfill [the obligation] with the Me'ein Shalosh bracha, and so it is implied from that which the Ra'ah, the Ritva, and the Shitah Mekubetzes wrote on our sugya (Brochos 16a), that the workers do not include Birkas HaZan because Moshe instituted it.
And see in Sha'arei Tefillah U'Minhag (Ashkenazi — in the margin of vol. 1 in the new edition and at the end of vol. 2 in the third edition) which explains well the text of the Me'ein Shalosh bracha and its connection to the mitzvah of bikkurim, which applies specifically with the seven species, but that which he concluded that in Seder Birchos HaNehenin [Rabbeinu] holds that Me'ein Shalosh is always Rabbinic, and its essential institution is for the seven species — in my humble opinion and with the great pardon of his honor, it is puzzling, for Rabbeinu holds that from the Torah one fulfills the mitzvah of Birkas HaMazon with Me'ein Shalosh, and even after the institution of the three brochos, there are cases in which one becomes obligated in Me'ein Shalosh from the Torah when satiated (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 168:1 — and even though in Seder Birchos HaNehenin he was stringent like the opinion of the Raavad to require him to recite over other bread, that is only for stringency, and all the more so when he is stringent regarding frying according to the approach that its law is like baking (or according to the Tehilah L'Dovid, who is stringent according to the approach of Rabbeinu Tam, but see in He'oros U'Biurim Tzemach Tzedek vol. 2 §33, that our teacher HaGaon R' Ch.Sh.D. shlit"a rejected his words) — as the wording in ch. 2:12, "it is proper to be stringent in its doubt like a doubt of Torah [law] — one should be stringent," and see in Klalei HaPoskim VeHora'ah (Farkash) that the wording 'one should be stringent' is not from the essence of the law), that is to say that in truth there is an obligation of Me'ein Shalosh from the Torah upon him as written in Shulchan Aruch HaRav, only that he was stringent to be concerned also for the above approaches to recite Birkas HaMazon, and therefore it is clear that what Chazal instituted — the Me'ein Shalosh bracha over the seven species — is in addition to the essential obligation to recite one bracha of Me'ein Shalosh, which is over the bread from the Torah (and there is no contradiction in this to the words of HaGaon R' M.Sh.A. above, that in practice Chazal instituted its text according to the mitzvah of bikkurim, for after they instituted Birkas HaMazon over the bread, the essence of the Me'ein Shalosh bracha remained regarding the seven species, and only in a case that is not common at all, that one eats pas haba'ah b'kisnin — for all that removed it from the category of ordinary bread is in that it is not the way of people to establish their seudah upon it — to the point of satiation, one recites this bracha from the Torah (according to the approach of the Rambam and those who agree with him) on account of the mitzvah of VeAchalta VeSavata U'Verachta).

That is to say that the entire difference between Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Siddur is in this, that he is stringent to be concerned for the approaches that we do not hold like them from the essence of the law, on account of the stringency of Birkas HaZan which is like [a matter] of Torah, and consequently it is proper to be stringent in it in a doubt toward stringency (but not literally, for one cannot recite Birkas HaMazon out of doubt without other bread (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 168:12, and see similarly in 167:12 that one is not permitted to be stringent and recite in a place of doubt), and he recites Me'ein Shalosh from the Torah.

And one should raise a difficulty: granted that we do not skip or abbreviate Birkas HaZan on account of the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu, but what is the flaw if he adds to it to include Birkas Ha'Aretz and Yerushalayim? But according to our words, it is well understood that there is in this a considerable detraction — for by this he nullifies the essential institution of Moshe Rabbeinu to recite this bracha unto itself; but in Shulchan Aruch HaRav he brought only the [explanation of] Rashi that one includes the second and third brochos since they are similar, and this still requires examination, and see in Magen Avraham 191:1, that according to Rashi the difficulty of Tosafos (Brochos 16a in the d"h VeChosem) is not difficult — how did Chazal uproot a Torah obligation of Birkas HaMazon — for Rashi holds that only the essentials of the brochos are from the Torah, but not the text and their division into separate brochos that one closes with the Land and with Yerushalayim, and therefore for workers they placed them on Torah [law] with the joining of the brochos of the Land and Yerushalayim which are similar to one another (this is not so for Tosafos, from whom it is proven that he holds like the Rashba and others that the count of the brochos is from the Torah), and it is proven that the Alter Rebbe follows the approach of Rashi that only the content of the brochos is from the Torah, and not like the approach of Tosafos there and the Rashba that the count of the brochos is also from the Torah.

And there is one who wanted to bring a proof from the fact that one fulfills at least the obligation of Birkas HaZan with Brich Rachamana, and why should Me'ein Shalosh be inferior? But in my humble opinion there is no proof at all from this, for one can easily distinguish between Brich Rachamana and Me'ein Shalosh, for "the essential formulation that is indispensable in Birkas HaZan is the opening of the bracha and its closing alone" (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 187:4), and in Me'ein Shalosh one closes also with the Land (and see, we hold that even in order to fulfill the obligation of Birkas HaZan, one must close with Brich Rachamana d'zan kola (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 187:4), like the approach of the Rashba, which was brought in the Shulchan Aruch as a "yesh omrim" (187:1), but the Bach and the Magen Avraham hold like the Rashba that if he did not say the closing he goes back and recites, and so the Shulchan Aruch HaRav concludes (there §4) — but even according to the approach of the Tur and the Mechaber, that one need not close with baruch, that is when he does not close at all, but if he closes with Birkas Ha'Aretz seemingly according to all he has not fulfilled [the obligation], for the one who adds detracts), and see also Shulchan Aruch HaRav 59:1 that even if one "said the entire bracha properly until the closing, he has not fulfilled [the obligation], for the entire bracha must have its opening and its closing properly even b'dieved," and it is not similar to one who eats to the point of satiation from a fried dough, for there his entire obligation in three brochos is out of doubt, and [in a Rabbinic doubt] we are lenient, and they placed him upon Torah law that he fulfills [the obligation] with Me'ein Shalosh.

Therefore we have nothing but the words of the son of Amram, that the Rebbe shlit"a did not mention at all a thought that one fulfills Birkas HaZan and continues with Birkas Ha'Aretz, and so it is in Seder Birchos HaNehenin — that the plain meaning of his words is that with Me'ein Shalosh one does not fulfill even Birkas HaZan — even if he continues to recite Nodeh Lecha.

Indeed, I cannot restrain myself from wondering greatly at the words of those great ones who held plainly that one has certainly fulfilled at least Birkas HaZan — for with the great pardon of his honor, their words are very puzzling. For the essence of the Me'ein Shalosh bracha is corresponding to Birkas Ha'Aretz — which is the essential bracha from the Torah, for a full verse spoke Scripture: "וְאָכַלְתָּ וְשָׂבַעְתָּ וּבֵרַכְתָּ אֶת ה' אֱלֹקֶיךָ עַל הָאָרֶץ הַטֹּבָה אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לָךְ" ("And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless Hashem your G-d for the good land which He gave you") (and even though we derive "u'verachta" — this is Birkas HaZan (Brochos 48b), a verse does not depart from its plain meaning (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 197:7)), only that it includes within it a semblance of the other brochos, and one closes it essentially and initially with Birkas Ha'Aretz (and it is obvious that before the institution of Moshe Rabbeinu, they closed with Birkas Ha'Aretz which is the essence and included also sustenance (the land which brings forth sustenance, Brochos 41a), as is explicit in the Yerushalmi ch. 6:1 (41a)^[2], which is in the manner of the workers' bracha, and like the well-known words of the Rashba, brought in the Beis Yosef 187:2, [that] Yehoshua came and instituted its formulation etc., and so it is proven from the Likutei Torah there, and this is precisely what the Alter Rebbe emphasizes, that Moshe instituted HaZan as a bracha unto itself — that until then, it was included in Birkas Ha'Aretz — which brings forth sustenance), until the manna descended and Moshe Rabbeinu arose and instituted Birkas HaZan (as explained in the Likutei Torah there the need for this bracha in our times). And it is explicit in the Likutei Torah there that after the institution of Birkas Ha'Aretz, the essential drawing-down of Birkas HaZan is for the sake of Birkas Ha'Aretz: "And this is that we say this verse of VeAchalta VeSavata U'Verachta in Birkas Ha'Aretz, for the essential drawing-down of Birkas HaZan is also for the sake of Birkas Ha'Aretz, that is, that from the Upper Wisdom is drawn the power and might to the Lower Wisdom that there be nullification of the yesh, and behold even in the days of Moshe before they entered the land they mentioned Birkas Ha'Aretz upon the aspect of nullification of the yesh, except that then it was in another formulation and also included within Birkas HaZan which was over the manna, and as the Magen Avraham (§191) wrote that from the Torah it suffices when one recites over all three of them one bracha etc., only that afterward when the descent of the manna ceased and they entered the land, Yehoshua instituted Birkas Ha'Aretz to be a bracha unto itself etc. And the difficulty of the Rashba is resolved." That is to say that today the essential bracha is specifically Birkas Ha'Aretz, and consequently in Me'ein Shalosh one includes within it the other brochos, but plainly one who would do in our times as they did in the generation of the desert when they recited after the manna, to include the other brochos in Birkas HaZan, has not fulfilled the obligation at all (at least Rabbinically), and it is a deviation from the formulation which Chazal coined.

Behold it emerges that after one recited [the bracha], even though he still did not complete his obligation (according to many opinions, even from the Torah), for he lacked bris and Torah (and it is the very greatest wonder, why did they not institute bris and Torah in Me'ein Shalosh, and in particular according to most Rishonim that one fulfills the obligation of Birkas HaMazon from the Torah with it when satiated from pas haba'ah b'kisnin without the measure by which others establish their seudah, and why did Chazal coin a formulation with which (even from the Torah) one fulfills [the obligation] only b'dieved (at least according to the one who holds bris and Torah are from the Torah) — and in truth the Or Zarua and the Rokeach and the Mordechai in the name of the Avi Ezri had the reading of bris and Torah also in Me'ein Shalosh, and this only increases the wonder on our formulation in which we do not mention them, and several great ones discussed this and did not bring a remedy (see in Eretz Tzvi (Fromer) who discussed this with the Admor of Ger, the Imrei Emes, but he only came to reconcile it regarding Me'ein Shalosh on the seven species according to the approach that it is from the Torah, and not regarding Me'ein Shalosh over bread upon which it is not the way of people to establish [a seudah]), and also the reasonings they proposed do not at all fit the approach of the Alter Rebbe, and seemingly there is no explanation for this matter except by way of the esoteric [teaching], as explained in the Likutei Torah there, that one cannot mention bris and Torah without the preface of Birkas HaZan over the bread from heaven in the greatness of the intellect etc., and according to this one could say that in a place where Chazal did not institute Birkas HaMazon, the Rabbis removed [the obligation] from the mitzvah of mentioning bris and Torah, which is not indispensable), and why would it enter the mind that he thereby fulfilled the obligation of Birkas HaZan?!

And one should not raise a difficulty on the above from the words of the Alter Rebbe that it is proper to be concerned in Birkas HaZan specifically like a doubt of Torah [law], and he did not write that it is proper to be concerned in Birkas Ha'Aretz which is the essence that grasps Birkas HaMazon, for he recites Me'ein Shalosh in any case, which is (also) Birkas Ha'Aretz, and consequently he does not lack it at all, but only Birkas HaZan — whose entire matter is to make it a bracha unto itself, and on the contrary, this accords well with our words.

And likewise one should not raise a difficulty from that which, in halacha, Birkas HaZan is more stringent (regarding intent, and being occupied with other matters, etc.), for in practice, in the order in which we recite (that we precede Birkas HaZan because Moshe Rabbeinu instituted it (Bach 187:2) and by way of the esoteric [teaching], because one must precede the bracha of the manna, as explained in the Likutei Torah there), after one recited Birkas HaZan, he fulfills the essence of the mitzvah of Birkas HaMazon from the Torah (at least b'dieved, for if he does not continue to recite the other brochos, he did not nullify the positive commandment.

And the discussion is well-known that even in a Torah [matter] there applies l'chatchilah and b'dieved, and the famous [treatment is] in the sefer Lekach Tov of R' Y. Engel, and in truth the matter is explicit in Shulchan Aruch HaRav at the beginning of Hilchos Gezeilah VaAveidah, and so it is in the Tzemach Tzedek Chidushei HaShas Pesachim 23, and so it is proven from Igros Kodesh vol. 3 p. 137 that bris and Torah are from the Torah — even though in Shulchan Aruch HaRav 168 [it says] that one fulfills Birkas HaMazon from the Torah with Me'ein Shalosh — and plainly the intent is that the obligation is from the Torah, even though it is not indispensable b'dieved.

And it is obvious that there is no proof to the contrary from that which one who recited Birkas HaZan in place of Me'ein Shalosh over mezonos items, dates, and wine, has fulfilled [the obligation], for it is a matter that sustains, for in practice he recited a concluding bracha in the formulation which Chazal coined (for bread — but it is also relevant to the above, for it is a matter that sustains), and the rest of the formulation is not indispensable. But this is not so regarding one who is obligated to recite Birkas HaZan (within the rest of Birkas HaMazon) and recited in its place Me'ein Shalosh, which includes within it a semblance of the other brochos and closes (also) with the Land.

In any case, let us return to the beginning of our words, that according to all the above it is well understood why the Rebbe shlit"a, may he speedily be revealed amen ken yehi ratzon, cited specifically these three seforim which followed the path of the Ikarei HaDaT, that one has not fulfilled [the obligation] because he did not mention bris and Torah, and did not cite all the great Acharonim who held plainly that one has not fulfilled [the obligation], because [they did so] on the basis that the count of brochos is from the Torah, and this is not according to the Alter Rebbe; and although in truth he could have said that one has not fulfilled [the obligation] Rabbinically as long as one did not recite three brochos in the formulation which Chazal coined (or at least the abbreviated formulation for workers, and this is not the place to discuss whether one fulfills [the obligation] with it b'dieved in our times, when the leniency of the workers has departed), but perhaps he wanted to teach us a greater novelty, that even from the Torah one fulfills [the obligation] only b'dieved and not l'chatchilah, and all the more so Rabbinically one has not fulfilled [the obligation] at all.