Bishul Akum
[1] (Halacha 562)
Question: What is the source of the prohibition of bishul akum, and what is the reason for the prohibition?
Answer: The Mishnah in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 says: 'Mishnah: And these are items of akum that are forbidden, and their prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit .. and cooked foods'. And it is explained in the Gemara2: 'And cooked foods. From where are these matters [derived]? R' Chiya bar Abba said in the name of R' Yochanan, the verse says: אוכל בכסף תשבירני ואכלתי ומים בכסף תתן לי ושתיתי ("You shall sell me food for money that I may eat, and you shall give me water for money that I may drink") - like water: just as water has not been changed, so too food that has not been changed .. rather it is mid'rabbanan, and the verse is a mere asmachta'.
Accordingly, according to the conclusion of the Gemara this prohibition is not mid'oraisa but rather mid'rabbanan, and the pasuk is an asmachta; but the Ritva already wrote3: 'That everything which has an asmachta from a pasuk - the Holy One, blessed be He, gave notice that it is fitting to act so, only that He did not establish it as an obligation and handed it over to the Chachomim; and this is a clear and true matter, and not like the words of those who explain the asmachtos as being in the manner of a mnemonic that the Chachomim gave, and that the Torah did not intend this - chas v'shalom, let the matter be uprooted and not be said, for that is a view of heresy; rather, the Torah gave notice of it and handed the obligation of the matter over to the Chachomim to establish it if they wish, as it says ועשית על פי הדבר אשר יגידו לך ("and you shall do according to the word that they tell you"); and therefore you will find the Chachomim giving everywhere a proof or a remembrance or an asmachta for their words from the Torah - that is to say, that they are not innovating anything of their own, and the whole of Torah shebe'al peh is hinted at in the Torah shebiksav, which is complete, and chas v'shalom that it should be lacking anything'.
And wondrous words were written on this by the Mahara"l of Prague in Be'er HaGolah4: 'The second - these are the mitzvos which are themselves divrei sofrim, and they brought a proof and a derashah from the Torah. And they said about this that the mitzvah is from their words, and the verse is a mere asmachta. And many err, who think to say that that mitzvah truly has no connection whatsoever to the Torah, but that they made a derashah from the Torah for the mitzvah as though this were mere rhetoric. And those who say so have erred; they did not understand their words. For chas v'shalom that a single one of their statements should be said for the sake of expansive language and the beautifying of rhetoric - rather, all their words are truth. And when they said "from where is this matter", and brought a proof from Scripture, there truly is a proof from Scripture for their words .. And so in perek Ein Ma'amidin: cooked foods and pickled foods are forbidden. From where are these matters? For the verse says: 'אוכל בכסף תשבירני ואכלתי ומים שתיתי' - just as water is not changed by fire, so too cooked foods that are not changed by fire. And it says: is 'fire' written [at all]? Rather it is mid'rabbanan, and the verse is a mere asmachta - end of quote. The meaning is not that the verse is a mere remembrance and rhetoric, but that they learned the decree of the Chachomim from Scripture. For this is why it is written 'אוכל בכסף תשבירני ומים ושתיתי' - that this food resembles water: like fruits and vegetables that have not been changed, like water that has not been changed. And the verse speaks of the ordinary way of the matter: that a nation which is separated from another nation - as Yisroel are separated from all the nations - it is not their way to have connection and partnership with the nation from which it is separated. And they buy from one another only something that has not been changed. And therefore the verse mentioned 'מים' ("water"), which is not changed, and likewise food that resembles it. And certainly it speaks of the ordinary way of the matter and not of a mitzvah. Nevertheless they learned that it is the way of a nation to be separated from another in the preparation of food. And from this they learned this decree, that they decreed upon bishul goyim, so that there should be a separation of one nation from another. Particularly with food that requires man's preparation, for food is the life of man, since food sustains the man himself. And behold this nation is itself separated from the other nation. And therefore food that was made into food by one of another nation - Yisroel must distance it, since food sustains the man himself. Certainly, if it was not made into food by another nation, then the food does not belong to him, for they did not make it into food. But food that was made by another nation - Yisroel must distance it; and if he does not distance it, they have closeness and connection. And behold this matter has great support from the verse, only that the verse speaks of the ordinary [way of the matter]. And this is a support for bishul goyim being forbidden, because it is closeness to them'.
And with regard to the reason for the prohibition, the Rishonim wrote that it is on account of the prohibition of intermarriage, as the Rambam wrote5: 'And there are other matters there which the Chachomim forbade; and even though their prohibition has no root from the Torah, they decreed upon them in order to keep far from the akum, so that Yisroel should not mingle with them and come to intermarriage, and these are they .. and they forbade eating their bread or their cooked foods, even in a place where there is no concern for their gi'ulin'. And so wrote the Rashba6, and the Rosh7.
And so wrote Rashi in his explanation of the words of the Mishnah8: 'And cooked foods - anything that an akum cooked, even in a tahor vessel, and all of them are on account of intermarriage'.
However, further on in the Gemara9 Rashi wrote a further reason: 'Mid'rabbanan - so that a Yisroel should not be regularly with him in eating and in drinking and he feed him something tomei10. And so wrote further Rishonim11.
The author of the Levush wrote12 both of the reasons: 'Something that a non-Jew cooked, even in the house of a Yisroel and in a vessel of a Yisroel, Chazal likewise forbade: firstly on account of intermarriage, and further, so that the Yisroel should not be regularly with the non-Jew in eating and in drinking and he feed him something tomei'.
And so wrote the Aruch HaShulchan13: 'Most of the poskim wrote as the reason for the prohibition of cooked foods that it is on account of intermarriage, and there are among our teachers one who wrote the reason that he should not feed him something forbidden .. And Rashi z"l in the Mishnah there wrote that it is on account of intermarriage, and in the Gemara there he wrote that he should not feed him something forbidden - see there. And it is possible that his reason is for why they were lenient with bread and not with cooked foods: because with cooked foods there are two reasons, whereas with bread the second concern, of eating something forbidden, is not applicable, since with bread what is in it is plainly visible, which is not so with cooked foods; and therefore they were stringent with cooked foods and not with bread ..'.
Accordingly, we have seen that the reason to forbid bishul akum is on account of the prohibition of intermarriage, and there are those who wrote a further reason, that he should not stumble in forbidden foods; and b'ezras Hashem in what follows the halachic implication that this has will be explained.
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Notes:
1 35b ↩
2 37b ↩
3 Rosh Hashanah 16a ↩
4 the first be'er, perek 1 ↩
5 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros ch. 17 halacha 9 ↩
6 Toras HaBayis, bayis 3 sha'ar 7 ↩
7 Shu"t klal 19 siman 22 ↩
8 35b ↩
9 38a ↩
10 And see Tosafos Avodah Zarah 38a d"h אלא מדרבנן. And in the Bach YD siman 112 ↩
11 And see Sefer HaOrah vol. 1 siman 111* 'the psak of Rabbeinu Gershom'. And in the Or Zarua, Avodah Zarah siman 191, and the Hagahos Ashri, Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 28, in the name of the Rashbam ↩
12 YD siman 113 se'if 1 ↩
13 YD siman 113 se'if 2 ↩
[2] (Halacha 563)
In the previous halacha we learned that it is forbidden to eat a food that was cooked by a non-Jew [even though we clarified that it has no problem of non-kosher ingredients], and that the reason for the prohibition is on account of intermarriage, and there are those who added that perhaps this will lead to his feeding him something non-kosher.
Question: Does the prohibition of bishul akum exist even where the non-Jew who cooks has no concern of intermarriage with him - such as where he has no daughter?
Answer: Behold this din is discussed in the poskim with regard to the prohibition of pas akum, which is explained in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in YD siman 112; and the prohibition of pas akum has more leniencies in it than bishul akum (as is explained in halacha number 374), since from the outset, at the time when the Chachomim decreed upon it, it was not so widely accepted (as the Taz wrote1: 'There are places that are lenient, etc. - because the decree of bread did not spread in all places at the time when they decreed upon it, in the days of the Tannaim'. And the Shach2 there added: 'And it is not comparable to shelakos [=cooked foods] in siman 113, with which they did not practise leniency in any place; for by bread does man live, and the reasoning of the Yerushalmi of chayei nefesh applies to it, and for this reason they were also lenient with bread regarding the throwing in of a wood chip, and likewise a number of matters that are of no avail with shelakos ..').
Accordingly, since these two prohibitions [pas akum and bishul akum] are on account of the same concern of intermarriage, only that the prohibition of cooking is more severe, therefore the words of the poskim that will be cited below, even though they were written with regard to pas akum, apply all the more so to bishul akum.
The Rashba wrote in a teshuvah3: 'You asked about the bread of the priests [=and of course we know that it has no non-kosher ingredients], who have neither sons nor daughters - whether it is permitted, since there is nothing to decree on account of their daughters. And you said that you already asked us on another occasion and I forbade it, and I said that they forbade it as a general rule, for even though this one does not have, that one does have. And you said that now a proof to permit has newly occurred to you, from that which is in perek HaMotzei Tefillin (folio 104), where we learn there: Ameimar permitted filling with a wheel in Mechoza. And he said the reason: on what account did the Rabbanan decree? On account of his garden and his ruin. Here there is neither garden nor ruin4. And you said that in truth this proof is a proof to permit the bread of the priests. Answer. This proof I do not recognise, from several sides. Firstly, that not all the prohibitions and the decrees are alike, and one does not learn from this one to that one. And you should know that with this shevus of the Rabbanan they are sometimes lenient in the case of a minor mitzvah .. and sometimes they were stringent and upheld it even in the case of a mitzvah that involves kares, as with the izmel and haza'ah. And further, consider for yourself: carrying on Shabbos is on account of hotzaah .. and if so, on Yom Tov it would be permitted according to the one who says that there is no eiruv and no hotzaah on Yom Tov. And even on Shabbos we would permit it in a city that is entirely within an eiruv, and to an elderly person and a sick person who cannot go out on their feet, and to one who travels in a ship or who is imprisoned in a jail. And just as they permitted some of the shevusin in the Mikdash, so in the Mikdash itself they would permit all the shevusin equally. And you have already seen there in perek HaMotzei Tefillin (102, 103) that there are shevusin that they permitted and there are those that they did not permit. And further, if you come to permit the bread of the priests because they have no sons, you would likewise permit the bread of one who has no sons, such as the bread of unmarried young men, and of youths, and of eunuchs, and likewise on a ship where there are no women there. And likewise this Jew would buy it and bring it into a company of Jews, and those invited would eat it - for the buyer does not eat, and those invited did not buy from a non-Jew, and there is nothing of "on account of their daughters" in that company. And Rebbi - why did he permit it on account of pas dechukah? A broad place I see for him here, and they ate and were satisfied. And I blow the proof away with my hand and it is gone. Also the priests sometimes have sons and daughters from the outset, before their entry into the priesthood, and the great ones among them do have. Also the others have no guardian. And further, "on account of their daughters" that they said is not specifically on account of the daughter of the seller or of the giver that they said it, but on account of the daughters of the non-Jews - that if this one does not have, that one does have. And they made a distancing on account of the daughters of the non-Jews, just as with their oil on account of their wine; for even though the owner of the oil has no wine, we do not say that the oil should be permitted - and the ordinances would turn out to be according to the seller, this one forbidden and that one permitted, and you would make the words of the Rabbanan and their ordinances into a mockery. In short, to these words of yours there is no end, and to these permissions there is no number. Draw a pen over the proof and it is undone. And I stand in my place to forbid, and there is no aspect of doubt in this ..'.
And the Knesses HaGedolah wrote5: 'In my youth I heard that there were those who would permit the פודולא"ש, which is the bread made in the house of the king and the viceroys, because since the reason is only on account of intermarriage, here there is nothing to be concerned about in this regard, for certainly the king and the ministers will not intermarry with us. And that teshuvah of the Rashba is a refutation of them, for even though with these there is no concern of intermarriage, nevertheless it is forbidden .. From this, in our case too there is no argument on the grounds that the king and the ministers will intermarry with us, for they said it as a general rule, on account of their daughters; and likewise I have also seen that those who fear G-d, the modest ones, withdraw their hands from it'6.
And the Knesses HaGedolah further wrote there that so it is explained in Rabbeinu Yerucham7, who wrote: 'The lechem oni that they give to the priests is permitted for benefit but not for eating, for it is bread of non-Jews'.
And so wrote the Rema in halacha8: 'And even in a place where there is nothing on account of intermarriage, it is forbidden'.
Accordingly, in practice there is no leniency in bishul akum even where there is no concern of intermarriage with the one who cooks. In the next halacha we will discuss a case in which there is only a concern that perhaps he will feed him something tomei, such as cooking by a Jewish mumar.
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Notes:
1 YD siman 112 s"k 4 ↩
2 s"k 6 ↩
3 Shu"t vol. 1 siman 248 ↩
4 The Gemara says that it is forbidden on Shabbos to draw water from a cistern by means of a wheel, since this causes the drawing to be done easily and he will then also water the ruin and the garden and transgress the prohibition of sowing. Ameimar at first permitted the residents of Mechoza to draw with a wheel, since there was there neither garden nor ruin; and from this the questioner proved that where there is no concern one may permit something upon which they decreed ↩
5 Hagahos HaTur, YD siman 112 ↩
6 And see what the Beis Hillel wrote, s"k 1. And the Chida in Shiyurei Berachah, os 6, in the name of the Maharika"sh ↩
7 Toldos Adam V'Chavah, nesiv 17 vol. 4, 157d ↩
8 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 112 se'if 1 in the Hagahah ↩
[3] (Halacha 564)
Question: When the cooking is not that of a private person, but rather cooking in a factory - is there a side to be lenient?
Answer: With regard to the prohibition of pas akum we find that there are those who distinguished between the bread of a palter, that is to say, of a baker, and the bread of a ba'al habayis; and their reasoning is as the Rashba wrote1: 'And the reason that a palter is permitted is that since it is made to be sold to everyone, there is not so much closeness of mind in purchasing from him; but with a ba'al habayis there is more closeness of mind in it, and there is more to decree upon it on account of intermarriage, but even so, in a place where there is a Jewish palter, even from a non-Jewish palter it is forbidden, for they permitted it only in a place where bread of a Yisroel is not available, and on account of chayei nefesh, as it is in the Yerushalmi'.
In the past there was not always a household oven; rather, there was a central oven to which they would bring the dough, and the baker would bake for them. And the Rishonim discussed what the permission is for this bread, and from their words one can seemingly learn for our case, as follows:
The Ra'ah wrote that not only is the bread of a palter, which stands to be sold to everyone, permitted, but rather anything that the non-Jew does not bake for a particular person but bakes for everyone - this is permitted; and these are his words in Bedek HaBayis there: 'And further, that the baker bakes in a house designated for this, and he does not intend to cook for himself, nor for any particular person, but rather for his work, since he is hired to bake and to cook for all who come, in a house designated for this, in which people do not eat and do not drink, and it is a reshus harabim for the whole world - in this it is possible to judge in favour, for such as this is not considered bishulei nochrim, since closeness of mind is not applicable in this; and all the more so with regard to bread, with which they were lenient'.
But the Rashba in Mishmeres HaBayis there wondered that according to his words, this permission would have to apply to cooking as well: 'And if the essential reason is because he bakes in a designated house and does not intend to cook for himself nor for any particular person but rather for his work, since he is hired to bake and to cook for all - if so, the cooked foods of a shopkeeper, who does not intend for a particular person but rather for his work, to cook and to sell, and it is for his work that he intends, would be permitted .. And as for that which he also said as a reason, that the purni is a designated house and they do not eat in it and do not drink in it and it is a reshus harabim for all, and that for this reason it is not considered bishulei nochrim - if so, a designated house, and one in which a person would be ashamed to eat, would have nothing of bishulei nochrim in it. And if so, the bread of non-Jewish ba'alei habatim should be permitted, for there is nothing here of bishul akum by all those reasons that he said; and likewise the cooked foods that are boiled in the marketplace would have nothing of bishulei akum in them. In short, there is not in all his reasons a whiff of anything that has substance. And as for the fact that he concluded his words "and all the more so bread, with which they were lenient" - what did he see, that he retracted and conceded on it after he saw it as the authors stated it'.
And in truth the Rivash2 wrote that the Ra'ah permitted specifically bread, and not bishul nochri; and these are his words: 'And the reason upon which the one who permits relied - that since in the purni they bake for hire for all who come, there is nothing here of intermarriage - this reason is correct to say with regard to bread. For so did the Ra'ah z"l say, to permit our bread in a purni that is made for hire even without the throwing in of a wood chip, just as they permitted the bread of a palter for this reason; but with regard to the other cooked items this reason is nothing, for it was on account of chayei nefesh that they were lenient with bread, and in a place where there is no Jewish palter'.
Accordingly, we have seen that they were lenient with the bread of a palter, and the Rishonim explained that it is a special permission in bread because it is chayei nefesh, [and there are those who wrote this permission also with regard to a public oven, but only with bread3].
However, there are those who wrote to be lenient also with the cooking of a craftsman with various foods, as the Mahari"t Tzahalon wrote4: 'All my days I was distressed about the בישקוג"וש that the non-Jews sell, because I am careful about the bread of non-Jews unless it is by way of a wood chip; and as for these בישקוגוש, I was distressed, since there is no way or place to throw in a wood chip .. And I found a permission for them .. that the reason for the prohibition is on account of intermarriage; therefore with a palter, where this concern is absent, there are those who permit. And we have practised the prohibition even with a palter, in accordance with the words of those who are stringent; nevertheless, with בישקוגוש it appears in my humble opinion that according to all it is permitted .. For with bread there are those who dispute and hold that even from the palter it is forbidden - specifically bread, which is significant; but with kelayos, certainly, where one makes them to sell in the marketplace, all agree that there is no prohibition, since the reason of intermarriage is absent. And it is specifically with bread that they forbade, for even with a palter there is a concern of intermarriage, since it is significant and one invites others over it; but with kelayos, even one who is stringent with the bread of a palter would concede with regard to kelayos that are made to sell in the marketplace, similar to a palter, that it is permitted. And the reason that the Ran and the Rambam zlh"h wrote with regard to kelayos, they needed to write in order to permit even kelayos of a ba'al habayis; but with the kelayos of a palter, even without these reasons they are permitted, since with a palter intermarriage is not applicable, for he is engaged in his craft; and even one who is stringent with the bread of a palter concedes with regard to the kelayos of a palter ..'.
But the Chida rejected his words: 'And I, in my poverty, do not see a proof to permit. And behold, that which the Rav wrote, that with bishulei goyim too there is a permission with a palter - this we have not heard; for it is specifically with bread that the palter was permitted, and not with bishulei goyim - for it is specifically with bread, because it is the life of the soul, and it is a decree that most of the community cannot stand up under, that they left them to practise a permission with a palter. And as is explained from the words of the Rashba and the Ritva .. And this is what was said in the Yerushalmi, that they mitigated and permitted a palter on account of chayei nefesh; and that is specifically with bread, but with bishulei goyim there is no permission of a palter at all. And so wrote the Rashbatz in a teshuvah, vol. 1 siman 89.. And so it is proven and implied from the words of all the poskim ..'
And also from the words of the Mechaber and the Rema it appears that the whole permission of a palter is only with bread, for they wrote5: 'In a place where they practised a permission with the bread of a palter, even if it is kneaded with eggs, or if eggs are smeared on its surface, it is permitted. But an אינפנד"ה that an akum baked - it is forbidden to eat of its bread'. And the Rema wrote in a Hagahah: 'And there are those who forbid bread that has eggs smeared on its surface, because they are present in their own form and are not batel with respect to the bread, and there is in them the matter of bishulei akum; and so is the practice'.
And in practice the poskim held that one may not be lenient at all with the cooking of a non-Jew in a factory, [but there are those who at times combined this as a subsidiary ground to be lenient]6.
Notes:
1 Toras HaBayis, bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 92b ↩
2 Shu"t siman 514 ↩
3 And see in the Beis Yosef YD siman 112, who wrote: 'And they did not practise to rely on this; rather, even where they bake for hire they require the throwing in of a piece of wood l'chatchilah, and so it is proper, for even the Ra'ah said it only under pressing circumstances ..' ↩
4 Shu"t siman 161 ↩
5 Shiyurei Berachah YD siman 112 s"k 9 ↩
6 YD siman 112 se'if 6, and see also siman 113 se'if 3, and in the Pri Chodosh s"k 8 ↩
7 See in the Sdei Chemed, Asifas Dinim, bishulei akum, os 4. Shu"t Minchas Yitzchak vol. 3 siman 26 os 6, vol. 10 siman 67, vol. 7 siman 62. Shu"t Chesev HaEifod vol. 3 siman 29, Shu"t Igros Moshe YD vol. 4 siman 48. Shu"t Yabia Omer vol. 10 YD siman 7. Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 2 siman 45, and vol. 9 siman 23. Shu"t Tzitz Eliezer vol. 9 siman 41 os 14. Teshuvos V'Hanhagos vol. 3 siman 247, and vol. 5 siman 249 os 8. But see in Shu"t Hisorerus Teshuvah vol. 4 YD siman 60, and what Ikvei Sofer noted upon it, note 4 ↩
[4] (Halacha 565)
Question: What is the law with regard to the cooking of a Jewish mumar - is that also forbidden under the decree of bishulei goyim?
Answer: We learned in halacha (562) that there are two reasons for this decree: a) on account of intermarriage. b) that perhaps he will feed him something forbidden. And there are among the poskim who wrote that the law of the cooking of a mumar depends on these reasons, as follows1:
It is written in the Tiferes L'Moshe2: 'See the Beis Yosef, the reasons for the prohibition of bishulei goyim: there are those who say that it is lest he feed him forbidden items, and there are those who say that it is on account of intermarriage; and it appears to me that a practical difference follows, as to whether the cooking of a mumar to avodah zarah is forbidden - for he is a mumar to the entire Torah: according to the one who holds that it is on account of intermarriage it is permitted, for in any case his slaughtering is that of a Yisroel, and it is permitted to marry the daughter of a mumar; and according to the one who holds that it is lest he feed him forbidden items it is forbidden. And according to this, the bread of a mumar is permitted, for bread is only on account of intermarriage'.
But there are those who wrote3 that from the Chiddushei HaRan, Chullin 4b, it is implied that with a mumar too there is a prohibition of intermarriage mid'rabbanan.
And there are those who wrote that even apart from the prohibition of intermarriage, nevertheless, since they decreed that they are like non-Jews, they are included in the decree; as Harav S. Kluger wrote4: 'But in my view there is no need for the words of the Ran; rather, since with the Kusim they decreed upon them to be like complete non-Jews, it is obvious that all the more so mumarim, who are included in this decree - for a mumar to the entire Torah is worse than a Kusi; and shall the native be on the ground, etc.? Therefore a mumar is included in the decrees of the Kusim all the more so. And although with regard to kiddushin the law of a mumar is not like the law of a Kusi, that is with regard to abrogating the prohibition of ervah - Chazal did not abrogate it with a mumar leniently; but with the other matters, which are a stringency, they certainly penalised him with a mumar just as with the Kusim, and he is included among the Kusim and is worse than them, and he is included in the decree of the Kusim'5.
And Harav S. Kluger further wrote there also from the side of the reasons for the decree: 'Since with a mumar there is a concern that he will feed him tomei items, it is somewhat similar to the decree of akum on account of intermarriage - for with an akum, who is not likely to cause one to stumble, and the concern of eating tomei items is not applicable, therefore with him they decreed on account of intermarriage; but with a mumar the prohibition of intermarriage is not applicable from the Torah. But a mumar is likely to cause a Yisroel to stumble with tomei items; therefore he is not excluded from their ordinance'.
[And there are those who wrote that from the side of the prohibition of intermarriage too, such is the law also with one who desecrates Shabbos in public, and even if he is in the category of a 'tinok shenishba'. As is written in Teshuvos V'Hanhagos6: 'It appears that even according to the reasoning that they forbade their bread on account of intermarriage, there is reason to forbid in this case; for the essence of the prohibition of intermarriage is closeness between us and them, which brings one to distance himself, chas v'shalom, from a life of Torah - if so, with one who desecrates Shabbos in public too there is reason to forbid. And see further in Shu"t Avnei Nezer, who inclines to this, that with them too the prohibition on account of their daughters applies - see there. However, with a tinok shenishba we find in YD (159) that his law is not like that of an akum, for he is like one who is compelled; and according to this, here too, with a tinok shenishba he is not like an akum, so as to forbid his bread and his cooking. But it appears that even if he is compelled and is like a tinok shenishba, and is not culpable for his desecrating Shabbos, drawing close to them is harmful to us; and therefore they decreed upon his bread and his wine, so as not to draw close with them - and even though he is not like an akum, closeness with him brings us to act as he acts'.]
On the other hand there are those who wrote7, a) that the reason Rashi wrote, lest he feed him something forbidden, is not the essential reason in halacha; and also 'according to Rashi, who explains that it is on account of lest he feed him something tomei, this is not applicable with a mumar, and all the more so with one who desecrates Shabbos in public - since that which Rashi wrote, this reasoning of "lest he feed him", is only an additional reason on top of the reasoning of intermarriage, and to say that both of them together are required, and one without the other is of no avail'. b) There is no prohibition of intermarriage with a mumar at all, even mid'rabbanan: 'behold, according to the Chasam Sofer z"l it was clear to him that a mumar, so long as he has not become assimilated among the non-Jews - even though he is a mumar to desecrate Shabbos or to avodah zarah, nevertheless there is no decree at all upon his daughters, and it is permitted to marry them'. And one may not learn from the words of the Ran in Chullin that this prohibition exists mid'rabbanan. c) The 'tinokos shenishbu' are not like mumarim, rachmana litzlan. And therefore [although certainly one must be careful and supervise, and it is possible that they are not trustworthy, etc., but] they are not included in the decree of Chazal in the prohibition of bishul akum.
And the Tzitz Eliezer wrote in the conclusion of his words: 'This is the teaching that emerges from our clarification in this matter: that there is no room for concern on account of bishulei akum with the preserved goods that are made and cooked in factories whose owners cast off the yoke and desecrate Shabbos Kodesh in public, rachmana litzlan, when there is an appointee over them, a ben Torah and G-d-fearing, who stands over them and inspects and supervises with an open eye over all that is done there from its beginning to its end, that everything be done in the purity of halacha, according to law and rule'.
And the Gaon R' Ovadia Yosef wrote in Yabia Omer, in practice: 'You have been shown to know that there is a great dispute in the sefarim of the Acharonim, battle line against battle line; and in my humble opinion the main view is like the opinion of those who hold to be lenient with the cooking of a mumar to desecrate Shabbos in public, and a tanna who supports them is the Rivash z"l - and particularly since we hold (in siman 113 se'if 11) that in a doubt regarding bishulei akum we follow the lenient view. And nevertheless I say that, since many Acharonim are stringent in the matter, it is good to arrange the matter in accordance with all opinions, that the supervisor over the kashrus at the place where these preserved goods are made should light the fire (by pressing the electrical button), so that the act of cooking should be through him'.
Accordingly, we have seen that the Acharonim differed with regard to the cooking of a mumar and the like: there are those who were stringent in this, and there are those who were stringent also with one who desecrates Shabbos and a tinok shenishba; and on the other hand there are those who permitted even with a mumar or an apikores. Therefore8 it is proper to be stringent, unless there are further sides to be lenient9.
--------------
Notes:
1 This matter is discussed in many Acharonim, and some of them are cited below; and see further those referenced in the Yabia Omer below, and in Pesakim U'Teshuvos siman 112 os 2, and siman 113 os 2 ↩
2 YD siman 113 se'if 9. And see also the Darkei Teshuvah YD siman 113 s"k 15 in the name of the sefer Shibolei David and others ↩
3 Shu"t Mahara"m Schick Even HaEzer siman 14. Shu"t Yehuda Yaaleh (Assad) vol. 1 YD siman 31, and see also Shu"t Minchas Yitzchak vol. 1 siman 10. (But see Shu"t Tzitz Eliezer, and Yabia Omer, below) ↩
4 Shu"t Tuv Ta'am VaDaas, mahadura telisai vol. 2 siman 16 ↩
5 And see also in the Pri Megadim OC, Eishel Avraham, siman 325 s"k 22, who wrote: 'And with regard to bishulei akum, with a mumar to akum it can be said that his law is like that of an akum'. And so it is ruled in the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch siman 72 se'if 2 ↩
6 vol. 1 siman 470 ↩
7 Tzitz Eliezer Shu"t vol. 9 siman 41. And see also in Shu"t Yabia Omer vol. 5 YD siman 10 ↩
8 See in the Kaf HaChaim YD s"k 1, who wrote in the conclusion of his words: 'It emerges that this matter is subject to dispute according to the reasons; and if so, since it is a matter mid'rabbanan, it appears that b'dieved one should not forbid' ↩
9 See also Nesivim BiSdeh HaShlichus vol. 3 p. 46 ↩
[5] (Halacha 566)
Question: What are the items that become forbidden on account of bishul akum?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 says: 'R' Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that is eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to bishulei akum - in Sura they taught thus. In Pumbedisa they taught thus: R' Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that is not eaten on the table of kings to eat bread with it - is not subject to bishulei akum. What is the difference between them? The difference between them is: small fish, and ardei, and daisa. R' Asi said in the name of Rav: small salted fish are not subject to bishulei akum'.
And Rashi wrote: 'Small fish and ardei and daisei - they are not eaten raw and they do not come up on the table of kings; according to the first lishna [=Sura] they are subject to bishulei akum, according to the latter lishna [=Pumbedisa] they are permitted'.
And most of the Rishonim held that the second lishna comes to add a leniency, that even if it is not eaten raw, but it does not come up on the table of kings, it is permitted2. But there are those who wrote that the second lishna disagrees, and holds that the only permission is that it comes up on the table of kings; and if so, there is a stringency in the second lishna, that in the event that it does come up on the table of kings, even if it is eaten raw, it is forbidden3.
And in halacha the Rishonim differed, as follows:
a. There are Rishonim who ruled stringently, that only with something that has both conditions in it - that it is both eaten as it is, raw, and also does not come up on the table of kings - is there no prohibition of bishulei goyim in it; as Rabbeinu Chananel wrote4: 'And since we see in most of the Talmud that it establishes them as "anything eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to bishulei akum" - learn from this that this lishna is precise. However, since we see in the other perek that R' Yochanan explains and says like the other lishna, holding that anything which does not come up on the table of kings to eat bread with it - therefore we require both lishnos'. And there are those who understood in his words that he ruled stringently5, that it is permitted only when the item is eaten raw and comes up on the table of kings. And so it is written in his name in the Mordechai6: 'And there are those who ruled like both lishnos and stringently, and so did Rabbeinu Chananel explain'.
The Raavyah too7 wrote: 'And there are those who ruled like both lishnos, and stringently'.
b. There are those who wrote that the halacha is only like the first lishna, as the Ramban wrote8: 'And to my mind the clearest ruling is like the lishna of the people of Sura, for they asked and resolved regarding boiled dates in accordance with them; and so appear the words of Rabbeinu HaGadol z"l'.
And the Raavyah wrote: 'And Rabbeinu Tam ruled like the latter lishna .. and it does not appear correct to me, for our sugya is like the first lishna'. But the Raavyah concludes: 'However, according to the latter lishna too it can be said that he concedes to the first lishna with regard to something that is eaten as it is, raw; and therefore with cooked wine they were not concerned about bishulei goyim according to all'.
c. And there are those who wrote that the halacha is to be lenient, and it is permitted if it is eaten raw, or if it does not come up on the table of kings. As the Tosafos wrote9: 'Rabbeinu Tam ruled that the halacha is like both of these lishnos, and if there is one of them - either it is eaten raw or it does not come up - it is not subject to bishulei akum, for in a matter of divrei sofrim one follows the lenient view'.
And so ruled the Rambam10: 'An akum who cooked for us wine or milk or honey or perishin and the like of these, (of any) item that is eaten as it is, raw - these are permitted; and they decreed only upon an item that is not eaten as it is, raw, such as meat and unsalted fish and an egg and vegetables: if the akum cooked them from beginning to end and a Yisroel did not participate with him in their cooking, these are forbidden on account of bishulei akum. In what case is this said? With an item that comes up on the table of kings to eat bread with it, such as meat and eggs and fish and the like of them; but an item that does not come up on the table of kings to eat bread with it, such as turmusin that an akum boiled - even though they are not eaten raw, these are permitted, and likewise all that is similar to them; for the essence of the decree is on account of intermarriage, so that the akum should not invite him to a seudah, and an item that does not come up on the table of kings to eat bread with it - a person does not invite his fellow over it'.
These three approaches are cited in the Agudah11, and these are his words: 'Rabbeinu Tam ruled like the latter lishna, and Rabbeinu אבי"ה like the first lishna. Rabbeinu Chananel ruled like both of them, stringently'.
In halacha the Mechaber wrote12: 'Something that is not eaten as it is, raw, and also comes up on the table of kings to eat bread with it or as a parpares, which an akum cooked - even in a vessel of a Yisroel and in the house of a Yisroel, it is forbidden on account of bishulei akum'.
Accordingly, in halacha it is ruled that the prohibition of bishul nochri applies only to a food that is not eaten raw and that comes up on the table of kings.
In the coming days we will learn what is called eaten raw, and what is considered as coming up on the table of kings.
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Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Tosafos d"h איכא בינייהו, and see the Raavyah. Tosafos HaRosh, the Ritva, the Nimukei Yosef on the sugya there. Or Zarua, Piskei Avodah Zarah siman 192. Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hil' Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17 os 200 ↩
3 The implication of Sefer HaYashar of Rabbeinu Tam (the chiddushim section) siman 721. The Raavyah in the name of "there is one who ruled". The Ramban and the Rashba on the sugya there (except that afterwards he brings the words of Rabbeinu Tam, who holds that the lishnos do not differ), and so it is with the rest of the Rishonim who explained the words of the Gemara, that the practical difference is also with something eaten raw that comes up on the table of kings; and see Knesses HaGedolah siman 113 os 14, who wrote that it can be said that so held R' Ami, who was particular with R' Nachman for drinking water that a non-Jew had heated ↩
4 Avodah Zarah 39b ↩
5 But see the Rashba there, who understood in Rabbeinu Chananel that his intent was to be lenient; and see also the Hagahos Mahara"m on the Mordechai: 'It requires examination in the explanation of the Ran, for there he wrote that Rabbeinu Chananel rules like both of the lishnos and leniently; and in the Hagahos Maimoniyos, perek 17 of Hil' Ma'achalos Asuros, it is written in the name of אבי"ה that he rules like both of the lishnos leniently, and he wrote that there are those who rule like both lishnos stringently - end of quote - and he did not mention it in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel. Mahara"m'. But to note from the commentary of Rabbeinu Chananel and the variant readings in his words with regard to the practical difference of ardei and daisei, and see the end of note 3 ↩
6 Avodah Zarah remez 830 ↩
7 Teshuvos U'Bei'urei Sugyos siman 1065. Cited in the Hagahos Maimoniyos there ↩
8 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
9 Avodah Zarah ibid. d"h איכא בינייהו. And so wrote the Rosh, Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 28 ↩
10 Hil' Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17, 14-15 ↩
11 Avodah Zarah perek 2, Ein Ma'amidin, siman 29 ↩
12 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 1 ↩
[6] (Halacha 567)
In the previous halacha we learned that something which is eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum.
Question: What is the law of something that most of the time is eaten cooked and only occasionally raw?
Answer: The Ritva wrote1: 'Anything that is eaten as it is, raw. The meaning is that it is fit to be eaten as it is, raw, even though it is not customary to eat it other than cooked, and so runs the whole of our perek'.
And the Meiri2 wrote: 'And since this is so, anything that is eaten as it is, raw, in the ordinary manner of eating, even though this is not its primary manner of consumption, is not subject to bishul goyim, even though it comes up on the table of kings'.
And so it is implied in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch3 (cited by the Shach4), who wrote: 'However, these hard pears — even though most of their consumption is by way of roasting and cooking, if a non-Jew roasted or cooked them they are permitted, since in any case they are also eaten raw, and furthermore, most of their kind have their primary consumption raw'.
The Chida5 cited the Ritva and wrote: 'And according to his words, that which he proved from the Maharika"sh — from the fact that it states "eaten as it is, raw" and does not state "anything that this one eats as it is, raw", as above — falls away from the outset. And we do not need the refutation that we wrote; for he employed this wording in order to teach us this ruling of the Ritva, that it is fit to be eaten as it is, raw, even though they are accustomed to eat it cooked'.
And the Chida further cited there6 the words of the Radak: 'Chestnuts that a non-Jew peeled are permitted, for they are eaten as they are, raw, even though most of their consumption is by way of roasting and cooking. The Radak, in his glosses, in manuscript.
Accordingly, in practice the Rishonim and the Acharonim wrote that anything which is fit to be eaten raw — even though most of the time it is cooked — is nevertheless considered as eaten raw, and it is not subject to bishul akum.
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the law of something that is eaten raw only together with another food, such as oil, whose manner of consumption is with bread — is the oil considered as eaten raw?
Answer: The Meiri wrote7: 'Oil of non-Jews, since it has been permitted, its cooking does not render it forbidden; for if it were on account of bishul goyim — it is eaten as it is, raw, by way of hot bread and the like'.
And so too the Magen Avraham wrote8 with regard to ginger: 'With regard to bishul akum there is no distinction, for the dry [ginger] too is eaten as it is, raw, with bread and salt; for if it were not so, salted fish would likewise be forbidden on account of bishul akum, and likewise vinegar and oil, which are not eaten raw on their own — rather, perforce, anything that is eaten raw is fine'9.
Accordingly, even something whose manner of being eaten raw is by way of another item is considered as eaten raw10.
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the law of something that is eaten raw only after salting or processing, but also without cooking — is it considered as eaten raw, such that even if the non-Jew cooked it without the prior salting it would not become forbidden on account of the non-Jew's cooking?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah11 states: 'Rav Asi said in the name of Rav: small salted fish — they are not subject to bishul ovdei kochavim'.
And it is proven from the words of the Gemara and the Rishonim that it is permitted only if the non-Jew cooked them after the salting (when they were already fit to be eaten). But if the non-Jew were to cook them before the salting, then even though by means of the salting it would have been fit to eat it, this is not considered as eaten as it is, raw.
Accordingly, something that at present is not eaten raw — even if there is a manner of preparation whereby it could be eaten without cooking — is not considered something that is fit to be eaten raw12.
Notes:
1 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
2 Avodah Zarah ibid. ↩
3 Shaar 43 siman 4 ↩
4 siman 113 s"k 19 ↩
5 Shiyurei Berachah YD siman 113 s"k 1 ↩
6 Shiyurei Berachah ibid. s"k 8 ↩
7 Avodah Zarah 38b ↩
8 siman 203 s"k 4 ↩
9 But see the Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham s"k 3, who cited that the Taz in siman 204 s"k 14 disagrees with regard to ginger. (But it is possible that they differ only with regard to ginger, because of its manner of consumption, and the Taz agrees to the principle cited above, also in the Meiri with regard to oil.) And see the Chayei Adam klal 53 se'if 9, who ruled like the Magen Avraham. And on this basis it is written in the Kaf HaChaim OC siman 203 s"k 24, and in YD siman 113 s"k 27, in the name of the Acharonim, that since bishul akum is mid'rabbanan there is room to be lenient ↩
10 What is spoken of here is where this is the manner of eating the food in which one is interested (for example, the eating of ginger, which is eaten with bread) — and not where the food is an ingredient in another food, in which case it is possible that its being eaten within another food as an ingredient does not render the food considered as something eaten raw. (For example, the eating of raw garlic in a salad as a seasoning — it is possible that this would not render the garlic considered as something eaten raw) ↩
11 38a ↩
12 In Shu"t Machazeh Eliyahu vol. 2 siman 42 it is written that where the preparation is only to cut it very finely, and there is no need to salt it for the purpose of eating it, nor to leave the pieces to stand, then this food is considered as eaten raw. But it requires further examination whether one may rely on this in practice ↩
[7] (Halacha 568)
In the previous halacha we learned that something which is eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum, even where most of its consumption is by way of cooking.
Question: What is the law regarding a food that can be eaten raw only b'shaas hadchak?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'Salted fish — Chizkiyah permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade. A roasted egg — Bar Kappara permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade. When Rav Dimi came, he said: with regard to both salted fish and a roasted egg — Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara permitted, and Rabbi Yochanan forbade. R' Chiya Parva'ah happened to come to the house of the Reish Galusa. They said to him: what is the law of a roasted egg? He said to them: Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade, and the words of one do not stand in the place of two. Rav Zvid said to them: do not listen to him; thus said Abaye: the halacha is like Rabbi Yochanan. They gave him a draught of vinegar to drink and he passed away .. The Rabbanan taught .. a roasted egg — it is forbidden'.
And there are among the Rishonim who wrote that all agree that the fish does not become forbidden through the salting, and that Chizkiyah and Rav Yochanan differed in a case where, after this salting, the non-Jew cooked the fish — whether, after this salting, in which the fish is fit to be eaten only on account of dchak, this is considered fit for eating or not.
And as the Ramban wrote there: 'And that which Chizkiyah and R' Yochanan differed with regard to salted fish .. rather, they differed with regard to a large salted fish that a non-Jew roasted: R' Yochanan forbade, since it comes up on the table of kings and it is also not eaten as it is, salted; and Chizkiyah permitted, since it is eaten b'shaas hadchak. And such is the reason with regard to a roasted egg, since it is fit to be supped raw. And even though they belong to one reason, Rabbeinu z"l said in the name of the Gaon z"l that the halacha is like R' Yochanan with regard to the egg and like Chizkiyah with regard to the fish — and the reason is that this one has already been cooked somewhat, and it is a case of "its beginning was in permission and its completion in prohibition", which is permitted, as above'.
And so too the Ritva wrote there: And the correct [understanding] is that they differed with regard to that which a non-Jew subsequently cooked or roasted; for Chizkiyah permitted, since with its salting it was eaten as it is, raw, somewhat, and R' Yochanan forbade, since it was not eaten as it is, salted, other than b'shaas hadchak, it is subject to bishul goyim. And this is similar to that which they differed with regard to an egg that a non-Jew roasted, since it is not eaten raw other than b'shaas hadchak, and they juxtaposed the matter to it. And so they explained in Tosafos z"l, and also the Raavad and the Ramban z"l'. And in this manner the students of Rabbeinu Yonah, and the Ra'ah, also wrote.
Further on, the Gemara brings: 'They asked of Rabbi Asi: these boiled dates of Arameans [= cooked dates of non-Jews] — what is the law? The sweet ones you need not ask about, for they are certainly permitted [= sweet ones are certainly permitted, for they are indeed eaten raw]; the bitter ones you need not ask about, for they are certainly forbidden [= bitter ones are certainly forbidden, for they are not eaten [raw] and their cooking sweetens them]; where you should ask is — the middling ones [= eaten raw only b'shaas hadchak — Rashi] — what is the law? He said to them: what is there to ask about them? For Rabbi forbade — and who is he? Levi'.
And the Rishonim also differed as to the ruling, how to decide in practice, as follows:
The Rif distinguished between fish and an egg, and wrote and the Gaon said that the halacha was decided like R' Yochanan only with regard to a roasted egg, but with regard to salted fish the halacha is like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara, who permitted, for they constitute a majority against an individual'. [Except that the Rif did not explain their dispute as being about something eaten b'shaas hadchak2].
But the Rashba there cited the words of his teacher — Rabbeinu Yonah, who wrote with regard to fish like Rav Yochanan, that it is forbidden: 'And my teacher the Rav z"l says that after we have proved and explained that it speaks of salted fish that a non-Jew roasted, the halacha is like R' Yochanan, who forbids, from that [teaching] of Rav Asi in the name of Rav, which implies that large ones are subject to bishul nochrim'.
Except that the Rashba raised a difficulty against him and wrote 'And I wonder how it is possible to rule like R' Yochanan, for Chizkiyah is the teacher of R' Yochanan, and the halacha is not like the student in the place of the teacher, and all the more so that the halacha is not like Rav in the place of Chizkiyah — for now, with regard to R' Yochanan the halacha is not like him, [while] with regard to Chizkiyah, who is the teacher of R' Yochanan, the halacha is like him. And therefore, even if R' Asi said explicitly in the name of Rav that small salted fish are not subject to bishul nochrim but large ones are subject to bishul nochrim, even so we would have had to rule like Chizkiyah, as I wrote; and all the more so, since Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara permitted; and all the more so, since R' Asi did not state it explicitly. And therefore both small fish and large fish are permitted. And so the Ramban z"l ruled with regard to large fish that a non-Jew roasted, to permit, like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara'.
But despite what he wrote in the Chiddushim and also in Toras HaBayis HaAruch3, nevertheless in Toras HaBayis HaKatzar4 he ruled stringently: 'If he cooked large salted fish — even though there are some people who eat them raw on account of their salting, this eating is very much an eating of dchak and is not [considered] eating; therefore, if a non-Jew cooked them, these are forbidden. And there are some of the Chachamim who permitted, but the first [view] appears to be the primary one'.
Accordingly, we have seen that the Rishonim differed as to what is ruled as the halacha with regard to salted fish (which, by means of the salting, is eaten b'shaas hadchak) that a non-Jew afterwards roasted.
And as the halacha, the Mechaber5 cited both views, but the view that forbids he wrote anonymously, and these are his words: 'But large salted fish are not eaten other than b'shaas hadchak; therefore, if a non-Jew roasted them, they are forbidden — and there are those who permit'. [And the Maharika"sh wrote in Erech Lechem: And so was the practice, for in a matter of the Sofrim one follows the lenient view; and such is the law of everything that is eaten raw somewhat b'shaas hadchak'].
And the Rema wrote in his gloss: 'And likewise anything that is eaten raw b'shaas hadchak, and non-Jews cooked it, its law is like that of large fish'.
Accordingly, the Rishonim differed as to the law regarding something that is eaten raw b'shaas hadchak — whether this is considered 'fit to be eaten raw', such that it would not be subject to the prohibition of bishul goy. The Mechaber wrote anonymously [= he decided] like those who forbid, and added that there are those who permit.
In the next halacha, b'ezras Hashem, we will learn further details in this law, and what the law is with regard to an egg and with regard to dates.
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Notes:
1 38b ↩
2 But rather with regard to a fish that was salted without cooking, like Rashi. And see the Rashba ↩
3 Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 95b ↩
4 ibid. daf 94b. The Pri Chodosh s"k 21 wondered: 'And there is room to wonder at him, that in Toras HaBayis HaKatzar he ruled the opposite of what he concluded in Toras HaBayis HaAruch'. However, the Pri Megadim wrote in the Klallim, in Hora'as Issur V'Heter, os 9: *'Behold, the Rashba z"l composed the Chiddushei HaRashba on Chullin, and the sefer Toras HaBayis HaAruch, and the sefer Toras HaBayis HaKatzar, and Shu"t. And it is obvious that from the Chiddushei HaRashba to Toras HaBayis HaAruch — we listen to Toras HaBayis HaAruch; from Toras HaBayis HaAruch to Toras HaBayis HaKatzar — we listen to Toras HaBayis HaKatzar, for there he is in accordance with the halacha'*. And in Sifsei Daas siman 92 s"k 11 he wrote: 'And we adopt the words of the Katzar as the halacha, for he retracted from the Aruch, since it is the later one; and see the Beis Yosef siman 106 and you will understand that it is as his words are' ↩
5 YD siman 113 se'if 12 ↩
[8] (Halacha 569)
In the previous halacha we saw that the Amoraim differed with regard to the prohibition of bishul nochri in the case of an egg1, and [we saw] the words of the beraisa, that there is a prohibition of bishul in the case of an egg. Likewise we saw the words of the Gemara with regard to dates.
Question: What is the halacha regarding the cooking of an egg and of dates that are somewhat bitter — are they subject to the prohibition of bishul akum?
Answer: The Rif wrote2: 'And the Gaon said that the halacha was decided like R' Yochanan only with regard to a roasted egg, but with regard to salted fish the halacha is like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara, who permitted, for they constitute a majority against an individual'.
And so the Mechaber ruled in Shulchan Aruch3: 'An egg — even though it is fit to be supped raw, if a non-Jew cooked it, it is forbidden'.
And so he ruled with regard to dates4: 'Dates that are somewhat bitter, which are not eaten other than b'shaas hadchak, if a non-Jew cooked them, they are forbidden'.
Accordingly, with regard to an egg and dates, even though it is possible to eat them b'shaas hadchak, there is a prohibition of bishul akum.
★ ★ ★
Question: In the previous halacha we learned that there are Rishonim who wrote that something eaten b'shaas hadchak, such as a large salted fish, is not subject to bishul akum; and the Mechaber, although he decided like those who forbid, nevertheless cited this view in the name of "there are those who say" — and it requires explanation why, in the law of an egg and a date, which can also be eaten raw b'shaas hadchak, he did not likewise cite that there are those who permit?
Answer: As to the reason for the distinction between an egg and a date, and fish, we find a number of explanations, as follows:
a) The Ritva5 wrote: 'And the matter is difficult, for according to the correct explanation there is one reason for both disputes — whether eating [it] as it is, b'shaas hadchak, is called eating or not. And it may be said that one can answer that even so an egg is more stringent, since all of its preparation is by the hand of a non-Jew; whereas salted fish has already had the salting done to it permissibly, which rendered it fit to be eaten as it is, salted, b'shaas hadchak at any rate — and even if a non-Jew salted it, since its salting is not subject to bishul, its cooking is permissible'.
b) The Beis Yosef6 wrote: 'And even though an egg is fit to be supped raw, it is not called "eaten as it is, raw", for this is not a significant eating. And so too Tosafos wrote in perek HaCholetz (Yevamos 46a, s.v. Rabbi Yochanan)'. And so too the Levush wrote7.
c) The Bach8 wrote: 'And in what way does this differ from an egg and bitter dates, which — even though these too are eaten by some people by way of great dchak — are forbidden according to all, and none dispute this? And it may be said that anything which is raw, if it is not eaten as it is, raw, without dchak, is not called "eaten as it is, raw" plainly, and it is subject to bishul goyim; but when it is cooked, even though it is not eaten other than by some people by way of great dchak, it is not subject to bishul goyim, for it is no worse than something cooked to the extent of ma'achal ben Drusai, which is not eaten other than by some people by way of great dchak, and even so it is not subject to bishul goyim, since it has been cooked and is eaten by some people, as above'.
d) The Taz9 wrote: '"An egg" etc. The reason is that it is an eating by way of dchak; and even according to those who permit in se'if 12 with regard to large fish, they concede here and with regard to the bitter dates of se'if 15, for here they are not eaten other than by way of great dchak — and so the Tur concluded explicitly, "by way of great dchak"'.
Accordingly, we have seen various reasons why with an egg we are more stringent, even though it is eaten raw b'shaas hadchak: a) all the preparation of the egg was by the non-Jew. b) the eating of a raw egg is not a significant eating. c) that the grounds for leniency in something eaten by way of dchak apply only to something that is somewhat cooked or processed. d) that a raw egg is eaten only by way of great dchak.
And from these reasons there emerge practical ramifications with regard to various foods10.
Notes:
1 To note from the Ra'ah in his Chiddushim on the Gemara in Avodah Zarah there, from which it appears that he explained the dispute of the Amoraim with regard to an egg as being about 'a roasted egg that he roasted' ↩
2 Avodah Zarah 15b ↩
3 YD siman 113 se'if 14 ↩
4 se'if 15 ↩
5 Avodah Zarah 38b, and in this manner the Ramban also wrote ↩
6 YD siman 113 ↩
7 ibid. se'if 14 ↩
8 YD siman 113 ↩
9 YD siman 113 s"k 14; and see also the language of the Rashba in Toras HaBayis HaKatzar, Shaar 7, with regard to dates: 'And the middling ones, which some people eat when they are raw — these too are forbidden, since they are not eaten other than by way of great dchak'. (Except that the Rashba wrote 'great dchak' also with regard to fish) ↩
10 Although the Mechaber ruled anonymously like those who are stringent, that what is eaten by way of dchak is forbidden since it is not considered as eaten raw. But in any case, since he also mentioned the view of those who permit, and there are those who say (see Halacha 457) that the reason he mentioned them is because one can rely on them at least in a case of hefsed merubeh or a shaas hadchak. *Accordingly, upon these reasons it depends what is considered similar to an egg, in which one may not permit even in a shaas hadchak* ↩
[9] (Halacha 570)
We learned in the previous halachos that something which is eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum
Question: A person who is accustomed to eat something raw, but this is not the accepted practice — with regard to him, is this food considered as eaten as it is, raw, so that it would not become forbidden for him through the cooking of the non-Jew?
Answer: The Raavan wrote1: 'And salted fish that a non-Jew cooked, and an egg that a non-Jew roasted — even though there are people who eat salted fish raw and who sup a raw egg, nevertheless, since most of the world do not eat thus, R' Yochanan forbade them, and the halacha is like him. But a small salted fish, such as herring, that a non-Jew cooked — it is not subject to bishul goyim, since most of the world eat it [raw] when it is dry; and anything that people — the majority of them — eat as it is, raw, if a non-Jew cooked it, it is not subject to bishul goyim, for Rav said: anything that is eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to bishul goyim'.
There are Acharonim who derived from his words2 that the definition of something eaten raw goes according to the practice of most people, and that the practice of the individual is not taken into account; and even if an individual eats it raw, it is still subject to bishul akum.
And we find in Hagahos Ashri, who wrote3: 'The Rashbam ruled like R' Yochanan, that its salting is its cooking, since it is eaten as it is, raw; and herring is permitted to us, because they are not eaten raw in our places, for we cook them and eat them — and for one whose way it is to eat them raw, they are forbidden'.
And it would seem from his words, in that he wrote 'and for one whose way it is to eat them', that his intention is that the individual is not drawn after the majority4. But there are those who wrote5 that his intention is not with regard to an individual; rather, it is a continuation of his words, in which he was discussing a place (and his intention in what he wrote, 'one whose way it is', is to a place — whose way it is thus, that is to say, that such is the practice of the people in that place), and not with regard to an individual person.
And we find in a number of poskim who discussed this question directly, and as the Maharika"sh wrote in his sefer Shu"t Ohalei Yaakov6: 'We read .. anything that is eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to bishul akum .. If you should think that we follow each individual according to his own view, Rav should have said "anything that this one eats when it is raw" etc.; from the fact that he said "anything that is eaten" etc., the matter is clear, that we follow the way of people and we are not concerned for the view of this one .. [and he brings further proofs and concludes] and we have arrived at [the conclusion] that in this we follow the way of the world and we are not concerned for the view of this one, for from the outset such was the decree of Chazal when they decreed to forbid, to make their decree uniform for all — and may the Rock of Yisroel save us from errors'.
In this manner it is written in the Pri Chodosh7: 'And there is room to examine closely, in the law of something eaten as it is, raw, that if a person does not eat it other than roasted or cooked while the world eats it as it is, raw, or the reverse — whether we follow him or whether we follow the world .. And if so, here too it certainly implies that if most of the world eat it when it is raw, it is called something eaten as it is, raw, and we pay no regard to the minority, and they are as though they do not exist; and even for them it is not subject to bishul goyim'.
And so too the Minchas Yaakov wrote in Soles L'Mincha8: 'And this is specifically where it is eaten thus by most people; for even if one person ate it raw, his view is nullified in relation to all people. And so too the Pri Chodosh wrote, siman 113 s"k 3'.
But the Gaon R' Ch. Algazi, in his sefer Bnei Chayei9, disagreed with the Pri Chodosh and wrote: 'And it appears to me that for each and every one we follow his own [practice]. And the reason is that since bishul goyim was forbidden on account of a decree lest he be drawn after the non-Jew and he feed him something impure, if so, it is not applicable to say here "his view is nullified", for with something that is eaten raw this decree is applicable; and if so, if this one does not eat it raw, it is not applicable to say "his view is nullified", since there is room to be concerned that he may be drawn after him — and likewise the reverse'.
And in accordance with his words, the Gaon R' Refael Yaakov Menashe also wrote in Ein HaMayim10: 'For since the decree of the Chachamim was lest the people come to draw close with the non-Jews and to intermarry with them by way of bishul goyim, if so, everyone for whom there is room to be concerned in this concern — we forbid it to him; and would we, because most of the world do not come through this to intermarriage, permit it to this one, for whom there is room to be concerned that he will come to intermarriage by way of bishul goyim?..'.
The Chida11 discussed this at length, and at first he inclined like the view of those who hold that the individual is not drawn after all of them and that we do not say "his view is nullified", like the view of the Bnei Chayei; but he concludes that from the words of the Raavan cited above it appears to be like the Pri Chodosh, that the individual's view is nullified.
And in practice it appears that the Acharonim ruled that we follow the majority of the people of the place, and the individual need not be stringent in the matter when for him it is not eaten raw; and certainly the individual may not be lenient when for him it is eaten raw12.
And as the Chochmas Adam wrote13: 'The general rule of the matter: everything follows the place — that which is the way to eat in that place for most people when it is raw, or that does not come up on the table of kings, is permitted; and if not, it is forbidden. But if he eats it when it is raw, we do not follow him, for his view is nullified'.
And the Aruch HaShulchan wrote14: 'It is a simple matter that with regard to something that is not eaten as it is, raw, we follow the majority of people: for if the majority do not eat this food as it is, raw, then even though the individual eats it, it is in any case forbidden even for that individual to eat it cooked; and if the majority eat it when it is raw, then even though the individual can eat it only cooked, it is in any case permitted to him, for his view is nullified in relation to all people. And so ruled one of the great Acharonim [Pri Chodosh s"k 3]'.15
Accordingly, we have learned that with regard to the definition of "eaten raw", the Acharonim held that the practice of the individual is not taken into account — whether he eats it raw or not — but rather what the ordinary and prevalent practice is. Tomorrow we will see what the law is when there are differences from place to place.
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Notes:
1 Avodah Zarah siman 303 ↩
2 See Shiyurei Berachah YD siman 113 os 1. But it would seem possible to explain the Raavan as intending to clarify what the law is for most of the world, that they need not be concerned for the minority; but perhaps he holds that the individual himself must be concerned ↩
3 Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 34 ↩
4 See the words of the Bnei Chayei in the following note ↩
5 Pri Chodosh: 'And that Hagahos Ashri which I cited is [a matter of] localities'. But the Bnei Chayei wrote: 'That which the Pri Chodosh wrote, that that [statement] of Hagahos Ashri is [a matter of] localities — this is not implied from the words of Hagahos Ashri, from the wording in which he wrote "and for one whose way it is to eat it as it is, raw", which implies that he is not speaking of localities, but rather that for each and every one we follow his own [practice]' ↩
6 siman 58 ↩
7 YD siman 113 s"k 3 ↩
8 klal 75 se'if 16 ↩
9 YD siman 113 ↩
10 siman 113, end of os 1 ↩
11 Shiyurei Berachah ibid. ↩
12 However, it is possible that some of the poskim who wrote that we do not say of the individual "his view is nullified" intended only to be stringent upon the individual if for him it is not eaten raw, and not to be lenient upon him if for him it is eaten raw. And it is possible that some of the poskim who wrote that the view of the individual is nullified intended to permit only in that he may not be lenient when he eats it raw; but in practice it appears that the Acharonim held that we say "his view is nullified" even to be lenient ↩
13 Shaar Issur V'Heter klal 66 se'if 4 ↩
14 YD siman 113 se'if 12 ↩
15 And see Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 5 siman 93: 'The truth is that most of the poskim decided like the Pri Chodosh' ↩
[10] (Halacha 571)
In the previous halacha we learned that in the definition of something eaten raw, we do not take into account the practice of a private individual, but rather go according to the general practice.
Question: A food item which in most of the world is not eaten raw, but in a certain place it is — in that place, is it not subject to bishul akum?
Answer: The Pri Chodosh wrote1: '.. And I saw in Hagahos Ashri, who wrote in perek Ein Ma'amidin [AZ perek 2 siman 34], and these are his words: The Rashbam ruled like R' Yochanan [ibid. 38b], that its salting is its cooking, since it is eaten as it is, raw; and herring is permitted to us, because they are not eaten raw in our places, for we cook them and eat them, and for one whose way it is to eat them raw they are forbidden — end of his words .. And that Hagahos Ashri which I brought is a matter of locality, and if the matter were clear that in the places where herring is common most of them eat them when they are raw, one would have to follow the majority of the world, for even with regard to a locality we say that his view is nullified relative to the majority of the world, as it appears in perek HaMatzni'a [ibid. 92b] regarding the people of Hutzal. And at the beginning of perek B'chol Me'arvin [Eruvin 29b] too we ask: and were the Persians the majority of the world? and Bavel is the majority of the world [ibid. 28a], which shows that even with regard to localities we say that their view is nullified. But the author of Hagahos Ashri did not establish the matter properly, which of them is the majority; and since there are places where they are not eaten raw and there are places where their way is to eat them raw, each and every one according to his locality and his place shall stand, and they are not nullified one to the other, since it is not known which of them is the majority'. And a number of the Acharonim cited the Pri Chodosh as the halacha2.
Accordingly, according to the view of the Pri Chodosh and those who follow him, not only is an individual nullified relative to the practice of the general public, but more than that: even the practice of a certain place is nullified relative to the practice of most places — unless there is no majority, or it is not known which is the majority but rather each place practises differently, in which case each place follows its own minhag.
However, a number of the Acharonim disagreed with the Pri Chodosh regarding what he wrote, that even the practice of all the inhabitants of one city is nullified to the practice of most of the world; rather, each and every city is judged on its own, as the Chida wrote3, raising a difficulty against the Pri Chodosh from the words of the Ritva: 'Indeed, from what the Ritva wrote in his novellae on Eruvin on daf 28a, it appears in a certain respect to be the opposite of the words of the Rav Pri Chodosh, for there the Ritva concluded that if the minhag is anomalous, even if they practised it in one place their view is nullified, and if the minhag is not anomalous and they could have practised it in the other places, then where it is practised it is practised, if it is a locality. And if the minhag is proper and fitting — that place is the majority of the world. And the minhag of an individual and of a family is of no consequence, etc. And he wrote on this: that which was raised as a pure terumah from the words of his teachers z"l. This is the substance of his words; see there at length. And in Tosafos in Shabbos daf 92 (b, d"h ואת"ל). And according to this, with a minhag that is not anomalous, we say "where it is practised". And this appears not to be like the conclusion of the Rav Pri Chodosh4, who forces and explains the words of Hagahos Ashri as [a case] where it was not established to him which minhag is the majority. And as [written] above'.
And so wrote the Aruch HaShulchan5: 'But if one country eats it when it is raw and another country does not eat it except cooked, they are not nullified one to the other [see Tosafos Shabbos 92b d"h ואת"ל, and Eruvin 28 d"h U'Bavel, and examine this well]'.
★ ★ ★
Question: One in whose place the food is not eaten raw, but he travelled to a country in which it is eaten raw — while he is in that country, will it be permitted?
Answer: It is written in Shevet HaLevi6: 'And that which he asked regarding a merchant who travels regularly to the country of Japan, to places where the residents eat raw fish, and he asks whether, while he is there, it is permitted for him to eat fish cooked by a non-Jew, since in that place it is eaten as it is, raw; or whether he is judged according to the place he came out from, and in our place there is bishul akum with fish. In my poverty, this matter inclines to prohibition. For it is not only according to the view of the Gaon Bnei Chayei, in Darkei Teshuvah YD siman 113 s"k 3, who disagrees with the Pri Chodosh — for his view was that we follow the majority of the world and one place does not determine, whereas the view of the Bnei Chayei is that we follow each man with regard to himself, whether his way is to eat it raw; if so, this traveller — his way is not to eat it raw, and there is bishul goy. Rather, even according to the Pri Chodosh, in any event we follow the majority of the world, and the majority of the world do not eat it raw. And even if we were to say to distinguish between a locality and a country, and that with a country we do not follow the majority of the world, as is written in the sefer Aruch HaShulchan there siman 12, and see Tosafos Shabbos 92b and more — that means that the country of Japan is not nullified to the majority of the world, since an entire country eats it when it is raw; but this still does not say that if the great majority of the world do not eat it raw and one comes temporarily to a country where they eat it raw, it is obvious that he has no permission of bishul goy — first, because he himself does not eat it raw, and further, the majority of the world; apart from the reasoning of the stringency of the place he came out from, and my heart also tells me that in Japan too this is not the whole country, and perhaps only a locality; and also, presumably there are some who practise this way and some who practise that way — such that I have seen no room to permit'.
Accordingly, in a city in which there is a clear minhag with regard to a certain food that it is eaten raw, it is not subject to bishul akum in that place, even though in other places it is not eaten raw, even if they are the majority. But a guest, in whose city it is not eaten raw — even when he arrives in a city where it is eaten raw, he should not be lenient and eat that which is bishul akum.
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Notes:
1 YD siman 113 s"k 3 ↩
2 See Lechem HaPanim (by Harav Moshe Yekusiel Kopman Katz) siman 113 s"k 2. Beis Lechem Yehudah (by Harav Tzvi Hirsch ben Azriel) s"k 2. And more. And see what Harav Naftali Hertz Landau wrote in Chakor Halacha os 2, dinei bishulei akum s"k 2. Pesakim U'Teshuvos siman 113 note 12 ↩
3 Shiyurei Bracha YD siman 113 s"k 1 ↩
4 And see in Soles LaMinchah on the Toras Chatas (klal 75 se'if 16): '.. and if there are two places, in one of which they eat them raw and in one of which they do not eat them, the law in each one is according to its minhag; and see in Shabbos daf 92 in Tosafos there d"h V'Anshei Hutzal, and examine this well', and he did not distinguish where there is a minhag which is that of most of the world. And see also Chochmas Adam Shaar Issur V'Heter klal 66 se'if 4. Shu"t Minchas Yitzchak vol. 10 siman 67. And see also in Shevet HaLevi below ↩
5 YD siman 113 se'if 12 ↩
6 Vol. 9 siman 163 ↩
[11] (Halacha 572)
Question: Must an important person be stringent even with something that is 'eaten as it is, raw'?
Answer: The Gemara in maseches Shabbos1 says: 'Rav Nachman said to Daru his servant: insulate something cold for me, and bring me water that an Aramean cook heated. Rabbi Ami heard and was displeased. Rav Yosef said: what is the reason he was displeased? He acted like his teachers — one like Rav and one like Shmuel. Like Shmuel — for ר"י said in the name of Shmuel: it is permitted to insulate that which is cold. Like Rav — for Rav Shmuel bar ר"י said in the name of Rav: anything that is eaten as it is, raw — is not subject to bishul nochrim. And he held: an important person is different [for one who sees him being lenient stands and is more lenient. Rashi]2'.
And in maseches Moed Katan3 it is stated: 'Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah .. and he drank water that an Aramean cook heated. Rabbi Ami heard and was displeased. Rav Yosef said: what is the reason he was displeased? .. If because he drank water that an Aramean cook heated — but Shmuel bar ר"י said in the name of Rav: anything that is eaten as it is, raw — is not subject to bishul nochrim! — an important person is different'.
And Rabbeinu Chananel wrote in Shabbos there: 'And we concluded: even though we hold that it is permitted to insulate that which is cold, and that anything eaten as it is, raw, is not subject to bishul nochrim — an important person should not have acted thus'.
And the Rif4 and the Rosh5 brought this Gemara, and it would appear that they held that this is the halacha.
And so it appears from the words of the Tashbetz6, who wrote: 'But although they are entirely permitted, my heart did not fill me to eat of them, because we find in perek Bameh Tomnin, where we say there .. and he held: an important person is different, end of quote .. that in all these matters of non-Jews, in order to distance oneself from their deeds and their customs, it is fitting for every important person to sanctify himself in that which is permitted to him, and all the more so with things that are not eaten other than for pleasure; and he should be lenient for others and stringent for himself'.
However, the Rambam, the Tur and the Mechaber in Shulchan Aruch omitted this statement, and the commentators disagreed as to how to rule, and as to the reason for the omission:
a) There are those who held that this is the halacha, and therefore wondered why it was not brought, as the Bach wondered7: '.. and the Rif and the Rosh bring it there .. and it is astonishing why our teacher did not write it'.
The Shach8 wrote in explanation of the Bach's difficulty: 'And to me it appears that they did not need to write it, since it is an obvious matter that an important person should distance himself in whatever he can; and so it must be said according to the view of the Rambam and the ט"ו in siman 113, who did not write that which appears in the Shas, that an important person is forbidden bishul akum even with something that is eaten as it is, raw ..'9.
b) On the other hand, there are those who wrote that the reason for the omission is that this Gemara is not the halacha, as the Korban Nesanel wrote on the Rosh there10: 'The Shas resolves the view of R' Ami, as to why he was displeased at first. But after Rav Yosef said to him that with both of them he acted like his teachers, and they did not distinguish with regard to an important person, ר"א conceded to his words. And for this reason the Tur and the Rambam did not distinguish in this, and so it is in the Knesses HaGedolah and in the Magen Avraham11'.
And the Yad Dovid wrote12 that on the contrary, this is the reason the Rif and the Rosh brought this Gemara: 'And the poskim omitted it, את here regarding Shabbos, and in YD regarding bishul goyim; and even though the Rif and the Rosh brought it, they held that this is why they brought it, to teach us that even an important person need not be stringent, for the halacha is like Rav Nachman and like Rabbi Yosef'.
And so wrote the Pri Chodosh13: 'And in any event it is reasonable that we hold like Rav Nachman — first, that an actual deed is authoritative, and further, that we find Rabbi Yehudah Nesiah too, who drank water that an Aramean cook heated, as appears in perek 2 of Moed Katan, and Rabbi Ami is a lone [view] relative to them; and this excludes the Bach, who wondered at the Tur, why he omitted this law that an important person is different. And the Shach wrote below in siman 152 that the Rambam and the Tur did not need to write it, since it is obvious; and all this is not sound, rather the main point is that they did not write it because the matter is clear to permit even to an important person, and as we have written'14.
And the Minchas Yaakov15 wrote: 'And it may be said that the view of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is that even though in the time of the Shas it was fitting for an important person to be stringent, so that others should not be more lenient, in any event nowadays we are not concerned for this .. And if so, that which an important person needs to be stringent is specifically in the time of the Shas, when they would also be stringent in a place where they are not bnei Torah; which is not so nowadays, when we are not concerned for a mistake .. And the reason must be said that even though the generations have not improved, in any event in the time of the Shas they were more presumed to be not bnei Torah, since all their learning was oral and was not set out before them as it is now, when the sefarim have spread and have been printed before us, such as the Shulchan Aruch — as above, to resolve the view of the poskim ..'.
But we find in the words of the Arizal16 that one who wishes to be a chossid should be stringent, and he wrote this with regard to something that does not come up on the table of kings, except that he brought 'with all this, we are not less than that man to whom Eliyahu z"l did not appear, because he drank water that an Aramean cook heated for him'. And on this basis the Chida wrote that one should be stringent17.
Accordingly, we have seen that there are poskim who wrote that an important person should be careful even with something that is eaten raw, and even with water that a non-Jew boiled18.
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Notes:
1 51a ↩
2 And these are the words of the Ritva: 'An important person is different. *Meaning that he must be stringent [beyond] the letter of the law in a matter which appears to people to contain a prohibition, so that the one who sees should not come to be more lenient — and this is a great principle'*. And see also in the Meiri there. And see Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos Beis Yosef YD siman 113, that it may be said: 'that Rabbi Ami holds that these two versions [of what is forbidden through bishul akum] disagree, and that according to the latter version, anything that comes up on the table of kings, even though it is eaten as it is, raw, is subject to bishul goyim' ↩
3 12b ↩
4 Shabbos 23b ↩
5 Shabbos perek 4 siman 12 ↩
6 Vol. 1 siman 89, brought in the Beis Yosef siman 113:21. And see also vol. 3 siman 11. (And see Be'er Sheva Shu"t siman 48. Shu"t Divrei Yosef siman 45) ↩
7 YD siman 113, and see also siman 114:1 at its end ↩
8 YD siman 152 s"k 2 ↩
9 And so ruled the Maharika"sh, Erech Lechem YD siman 113 se'if 1. And so it is written in Mizmor L'Dovid 107a. And see also Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 6 siman 108 ↩
10 Os ש ↩
11 But see in Tosefes Shabbos siman 254 s"k 17, who wrote that one may not learn from the leniency of the Magen Avraham (and so it is in the Alter Rebbe) regarding insulating, with regard to bishul akum ↩
12 Mahadura Basra, Shabbos 51a ↩
13 YD siman 113 s"k 3 ↩
14 And in this vein the Dagul MeRevava wrote, YD siman 113 se'if 1. And see also Knesses HaGedolah there ↩
15 Klal 75 s"k 30. But see what the Chida wrote in Birkei Yosef CM siman 17 s"k 23 ↩
16 Shaar HaMitzvos, parshas Vayeilech ↩
17 In Shiyurei Bracha there. And see also Kaf HaChaim siman 113 s"k 12 ↩
18 And see that which is related regarding the practice of the Rebbe Rashab, who was careful not to drink water from a non-Jew's urn, and the incident with Harav HaChossid R' Itche Masmid (Horowitz), in the sefer Yiras Hashem Otzaro p. 76 ↩
[12] (Halacha 573)
Question: What is the law when a non-Jew cooked a mixed dish, part of whose items are eaten raw and part of which are not eaten raw?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'Rav Assi said in the name of Rav: small salted fish - they are not subject to bishul akum. Rav Yosef said: if an akum roasted them - a Yisroel may rely on them for eiruvei tavshilin, and if the akum made them into kasa d'harsena [=he fried them in murais, fish fat, with flour. Rashi] - it is forbidden. It is obvious! You might have said the harsena is the ikar [=and that murais is eaten as it is, raw, and is permitted. Rashi], it teaches us that the flour is the ikar [=and it is subject to bishul akum, since the flour is not eaten raw. Rashi]'.
And the Sefer HaTerumah2 wrote: 'And my rebbi says that since the eggs are nullified and are not discernible, and the dough is the ikar - for one recites over it HaMotzi Lechem Min Ha'aretz - therefore there is no prohibition of bishul akum in the eggs; and as we say in perek Ein Ma'amidin: kasa d'harsena is subject to bishul akum. It is obvious! You might have said the harsena is the ikar and it is permitted; it teaches us that the flour is the ikar and it is forbidden. Evidently, if the harsena were the ikar there would be no prohibition in the flour, since it is not the ikar'.
And so too the Rashba3 wrote: 'Something that is eaten as it is, raw, that became mixed with something that is not eaten as it is, raw, and an akum cooked them - we look: if the ikar of the dish is from the items that are subject to bishul akum, this is forbidden; and if its ikar is from the items that are not subject to bishul akum, this is permitted. One always follows the ikar and disregards the tofel, whether to be lenient or to be stringent. Therefore harsena, which is made for fish and consists of fish brine, which is eaten as it is, raw, and of flour - this is forbidden, since the brine is not the ikar but rather the flour; and so too all similar cases. And those loaves that are made with spices and whose surface is smeared with eggs for adornment - these are permitted, since the loaves are the ikar and they are permitted, being the loaves of a palter, and the egg upon them is tofel to them'.
And so too further Rishonim wrote, as is explained in the Ritva4, and the Tur5, and the Tashbetz6.
And in practice the Mechaber7 wrote: 'If one mixed something that is eaten as it is, raw, with something that is not eaten as it is, raw, and the akum cooked them: if the ikar is from something that is subject to bishul akum, it is forbidden; and if not, it is permitted'.
And the Darkei Teshuvah8 explained: 'And this is specifically where the item that is not eaten as it is, raw, is not discernible within the dish; but if the item that is not eaten raw is discernible, it is forbidden, as is written below in the se'if that follows, regarding vegetables that are eaten raw which he cooked together with meat; and this is simple'9.
[However, the Mechaber and the Rema10 differed with regard to eggs that are smeared on the challah for adornment: the Mechaber, on the basis of the Rashba cited above, permitted, while the Rema, on the basis of other Rishonim, was stringent. That is to say, in the Rema's view, in a manner in which it is discernible it will always be forbidden; but here even the Mechaber would forbid, since the discussion concerns items that are not specifically for adornment, and therefore if they are discernible they become forbidden].
And Harav Yehudah Ashkenazi wrote in Kehal Yehudah11, cited in the Darkei Teshuvah12: 'And even l'chatchilah it is permitted to mix them and nullify them13, and there is here no matter of nullifying a prohibition l'chatchilah'.
★ ★ ★
Question: How are ikar and tofel defined?
Answer: It is explained in Tosafos14, cited in the Taz and the Shach15, that the law of bishul akum in this regard is like the law of the first bracha: 'And there is a further reason to permit the beer, that it is not subject to bishul ovdei kochavim for just as the grain is nullified relative to the water with regard to the bracha of Shehakol Nihyah Bidvaro, so too it is nullified with regard to the prohibition of bishul' and so it is explained in the Pri Chodosh16.
And so too the Pri To'ar17 wrote: 'And where it is in a mixture, the five species are the ikar, as we hold with regard to brochos; and according to what we concluded, that the halacha is like the view of the Rambam and Tosafos and the Ran that wheat is not eaten as it is, raw - anything that has in it any of the five species is forbidden, even though the mixture with it is greater than it'.
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the law when the two kinds are both ikar in the dish?
Answer: The Beis Shlomo18 wrote: 'And the intent of Tosafos and the Rosh (in Avodah Zarah) with regard to the beer is simple, because it is always the case that if he cooked together items that are subject to bishul akum with items that are not subject to bishul nochrim, we follow the ikar, as is explained in the Shulchan Aruch (siman 113 se'if 2). And in all matters it is certain that the majority is the ikar'.
And his words are on the basis of the preceding rule, that we follow [the law of] the first bracha, as is explained in the Magen Avraham19: 'And whatever is the majority is the ikar'. And so too the Alter Rebbe20 wrote: 'Or even where both are ikar, but the one is plentiful and the other scant - that the majority is considered ikar and the lesser is tofel'.
However, the Aruch HaShulchan21 wrote, inferring from the words of the Mechaber: 'And from this wording it is implied that if both are equally ikar it is permitted, for since it is a light prohibition it is permitted even in a half-and-half case'.
Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Hil' Issur v'Heter siman 28 ↩
3 Toras HaBayis HaKatzar bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 95a ↩
4 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
5 YD siman 113 ↩
6 Shu"t vol. 1 siman 89 ↩
7 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 2 ↩
8 Siman 113 s"k 22 ↩
9 And to note from what the Pri To'ar wrote, siman 112 s"k 9. But see Piskim U'Teshuvos siman 113 os 10 note 122 ↩
10 Siman 112 se'if 6 ↩
11 YD siman 113 se'if 2 (44a) ↩
12 Siman 113 s"k 18 ↩
13 That is, before the non-Jew's cooking. But if he mixed it after the non-Jew cooked, that is a different law and it will be explained further on, b'ezras Hashem ↩
14 Avodah Zarah 31b ↩
15 Siman 114 s"k 1 ↩
16 Siman 112 s"k 17 ↩
17 Siman 113 s"k 4 ↩
18 Shu"t YD vol. 1 siman 178 ↩
19 OC siman 212 s"k 1 ↩
20 OC siman 212 se'if 1 ↩
21 YD siman 113 se'if 14 ↩
[13] (Halacha 574)
In halacha number 566 we learned the Gemara1 which states: 'Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that is not eaten on the table of kings to accompany bread with it - is not subject to bishul ovdei kochavim'. And we saw that so it was ruled as halacha, that the prohibition of bishul akum applies only to a food that comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it'.
Question: What is the reason for the leniency with regard to something that does not come up on the table of kings?
Answer: The Rambam2 wrote: 'To what does this apply? To something that comes up on the table of kings to eat bread with it, such as meat and eggs and fish and the like; but something that does not come up on the table of kings to eat bread with it, such as turmusin which an akum boiled - even though they are not eaten raw, these are permitted, and so too all similar cases, for the essence of the decree is on account of intermarriage, that one should not invite the akum to join him at a seudah; and something that does not come up on the table of kings to eat bread with it - a person does not invite his fellow over it'.
And these are the words of the Ra'ah3: 'The explanation: anything that is not of importance, whose kind does not come up on the table of kings, they did not decree upon it, for since it is not of importance, intermarriage and closeness of mind are not applicable to it'. And similarly further Rishonim wrote4.
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Question: What is the definition of coming up on the table of kings?
Answer: The Darkei Teshuvah5 wrote: The table of kings. Behold, in the Toras Chatas there, din 11, he wrote in his wording on the table of akum kings, and so too I saw in the מנח"י there s"k 31, who wrote, and these are his words, 'And so too I heard that nowadays ערבסי"ן comes up on the table of akum kings', and it is explained from their words that it is obvious that the essential point depends upon the table of akum kings; and if it does not come up on the table of akum kings, even though it comes up on the table of the kings of Yisroel, it is permitted; and so too the reverse: if it comes up on the table of akum kings, even though it does not come up on the table of the kings of Yisroel, it is forbidden. However, in practice it requires further examination, for I have not seen any author among the great Acharonim who writes so explicitly; and also the Rema himself in the Shulchan Aruch, and all the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, did not mention anything of this - that it must come up specifically on the table of akum kings - and it requires further examination'6.
Except that in practice there is in any case no practical difference in this matter, as will be explained in the next question.
★ ★ ★
Question: Does this mean specifically actual kings?
Answer: The Issur V'Heter HaAruch7 wrote: 'And it comes up on the table of ministers to accompany the bread with it'.
And so too R' Chaim Vital wrote in the name of the Arizal8: 'But the afunim are by law forbidden, because their kelayos come up on the table of kings, and the ministers of those places make them into kelayos; and it is not specifically kings, but rather since they come up on the table of the ministers they are forbidden'.
And the Acharonim wrote this as a practical ruling, as the Knesses HaGedolah wrote9: 'And in the minhogim of the Rav, the divine Mekubal, כמה"רר Yitzchak Ashkenazi z"l, it is written: one must be careful not to eat sweet turmusin from the non-Jews, for even though they do not come up on the table of kings, the ministers eat them. End of quote'10.
And so too the Chida wrote in the Shiyurei Berachah11: 'It is not specifically kings, but rather even if it comes up on the table of the ministers of that land it is forbidden. Rabbeinu the Ari zt"l in Sha'ar HaMitzvos, Parshas Eikev. And see what I wrote in the sefer Nagid U'Mitzvah of מהר"י Tzemach, on the secret of12 הלא שרי יחדיו מלכים ("Are not my ministers all of them kings?"). See there'.
And in Shu"t Chaim Sha'al13: 'There is room for doubt with regard to afunim roasted by a non-Jew which came from Tunis to Livorno, according to the view of Rabbeinu the Ari zt"l, who would not eat them on account of bishul goyim - for even if they do not come up on the table of kings, they come up on the table of the ministers, and the hint is הלא שרי יחדיו מלכים ("Are not my ministers all of them kings?"). And in Livorno they do not come up on the table of the ministers, and not even on the table of commoners. מספ"ל whether in Livorno they are permitted according to the view of Rabbeinu the Ari zt"l, and there is room to weigh the matter; and see what I alluded to regarding "eaten as it is, raw", whether his view is nullified, and regarding the localities, in my small work מח"ב א"א siman 254 .. And in the case before us my view inclines to forbid'.
And so too the Ben Ish Chai wrote14: 'And this that we require that it come up on the table of kings - it is not specifically kings, but rather even on the table of the ministers of that land it is likewise forbidden .. and so too Rabbeinu the Ari z"l held'.
And regarding the intent of 'ministers' the Kaf HaChaim wrote15: 'And he means to say people of importance, before whom it is fitting to set this food'.
Therefore the Chachomim forbade, on account of bishul akum, something that comes up on the table of kings; and the reason for the prohibition is on account of closeness and intermarriage, and therefore they forbade only items of importance over which people invite one another to eat. And the intent is not specifically to actual kings; rather, whatever is set before people of importance is included in this.
In the next halacha we will discuss how the items that come up on the table of kings are defined in the reality of our times.
Notes:
1 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
2 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17 halacha 15. Brought in the Beis Yosef and in the Taz siman 113 s"k 1 ↩
3 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
4 The Rashba in Toras HaBayis bayis 3 sha'ar 7. The Nimukei Yosef, and רבינו יהנותן of Lunel, and the Meiri, Avodah Zarah there ↩
5 YD siman 113 s"k 10 ↩
6 In Piskim U'Teshuvos siman 113 note 25 he wrote: And he labored needlessly, for the word akum was added by the censor, and does not appear in the Toras Chatas first edition (Krakow 5329) ↩
7 Sha'ar 43 siman 2 ↩
8 Sha'ar HaMitzvos Parshas Vayeilech ↩
9 Hagahos Beis Yosef YD siman 113 os 25 ↩
10 In Kehal Yehudah siman 113, 44a, he commented on the Knesses HaGedolah: Perhaps his intent is to say that even though the leniency of the turmusin is explicit in the Gemara, that was specifically in their times, when they did not come up on the table of kings; but in any case one must wonder at him, that even though they do come up, whatever does not come up to accompany the bread with it is permitted - and perhaps he considered them like a parperes that is brought for kinuach seudah' ↩
11 YD siman 113 s"k 2, and in this manner he wrote in s"k 6 ↩
12 Based on Yeshayahu ch. 10 v. 8 ↩
13 Vol. 1 siman 74 se'if 6 ↩
14 Year 2, Parshas Chukas se'if 9 ↩
15 YD siman 113 s"k 2 ↩
[14] (Halacha 575)
In the previous halacha we learned that items which are set before people of importance are included in the condition of coming up on the table of kings.
Question: In practice, what is considered items that are set before people of importance?
Answer: In the definition of something that comes up on the table of kings we find in several poskim who wrote that it must be something that is set out at an important seudah1; except that in this itself we find differing views among the poskim of our times, as follows:
There are poskim who explained that the intent is to items which it is customary to serve in restaurants and at seudos mitzvah, as is written in Shu"t Shevet HaKehasi2: 'And with regard to the definition of what is called "coming up on the table of kings", it appears that one should not fix the definition according to the foods that are served in a hotel, since in a hotel they also serve foods that are not so important - for whatever a person eats in his home they serve in a hotel, so that at the seudos and meals he eats he should feel as if he were at home. But one should fix the definition of "coming up on the table of kings" such as what is served in a restaurant to one who comes in to eat a meal there, or what is served at bris seudos or other seudos mitzvah to which people of importance are invited; what is served there is what determines what is called "coming up on the table of kings"'.
And he wrote in Shu"t Chevel Nachalaso3: 'In our times, everything that is served in a respectable restaurant or at large simchah seudos is in the category of "coming up on the table of kings".
And there is one who wrote4 to explain this principle: 'And simply it appears to me that an important seudah is, for example, a wedding seudah, at which items of distinction that are fit to honor others with are served, and so too at other seudos made at simchos, because the level of importance of the foods eaten there is fixed and does not change, like those eaten by kings in a fixed manner, and they do not serve there items that are not fitting'.
Therefore, according to this approach, what is served in an important restaurant or at a wedding seudah and the like is considered a food that "comes up on the table of kings"; and only something which, on account of its inferiority, is not served at an important seudah or at a wedding seudah - that is not an important food and is not forbidden on account of bishul akum.
On the other hand, there are those who wrote5 that what is commonly6 said - that items which are served at a wedding are considered as coming up on the table of kings - is a mistake: 'And I do not know who revealed this secret to them, a matter which has no source whatsoever; and on the contrary, it is explained in the Rambam to the opposite, that the definition is that what the king eats at his table for his daily seudah is on one level with what a private person "invites his fellow over", and we do not require that the food be of the utmost importance to the point that he would serve it at a wedding seudah. And therefore it is simple and clear in my humble opinion that what we eat at the Shabbos seudah .. is included in coming up on the table of kings, for certainly we invite our fellows to join with us at these seudos ..'. And he brings a proof from the words of the Issur V'Heter7, who wrote that even something which is not fit to set before distinguished guests is forbidden on account of bishul akum.
Therefore we have seen that anything of importance which a king or a distinguished person eats at his private seudah (even if this is not an important seudah for the king at which to invite his distinguished guests) is something over which a person invites his fellow, and it is forbidden on account of bishul akum - lest he invite him and dine with him and become close to him.
Notes:
1 6, 274, 4 ↩
2 Vol. 9, siman 27 ↩
3 Shulchan Melachim sha'ar 3, 7, 2 ↩
4 See Shu"t Machazeh Eliyahu vol. 2 siman 41 os 1, and see Kerem Efraim 113, 2, 2. Mishmeres HaBayis, Bishul Akum (Karp) perek 2 din 13 ↩
5 To note from what is written in the kovetz Mibeis Levi, Hilchos Bishul Akum, Klalei HaIssur 3: 'And one must know that the definition of .. a food item that comes up on the table of kings depends upon the reality, and it changes according to the place and the time. *And nowadays there is almost nothing to be found that does not come up on the table of kings*. And there are those who deal falsely with themselves and permit what is forbidden unlawfully' ↩
6 Sha'ar 43 klal 2, brought in the Shach s"k 2 ↩
[15] (Halacha 576)
Question: Does the prohibition apply to whatever comes up on the table of kings, or specifically to items with which one accompanies bread?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that does not come up on the table of kings to accompany bread with it is not subject to bishul goyim'.
And the Rashba2 wrote: 'But it is difficult for me, that in all the versions this is how it reads - anything that does not come up on the table of kings to accompany the bread - and so too in the Halachos of Harav Alfasi z"l (Avodah Zarah 14b); and if so, how is it possible to say that daisa comes up on the table of kings to accompany, when we say generally (Beitzah 16a) "these foolish Babylonians, who eat bread with bread". And I have to say that they said "to accompany the bread" only specifically with regard to kinds of liftan - that is to say, that not all kinds of liftan are subject to bishul nochrim, but only the important kinds of liftan which, on account of their importance, come up on the table of kings to accompany the bread, since closeness of mind is only through them; but foods which are eaten in the manner of a food and not in the manner of liftan - we do not require that they come up on the table of kings to accompany; rather, anything that comes up on the table of kings to be eaten is subject to bishul nochrim. And therefore daisa too properly comes up for kings, and it is forbidden according to the people of Pumbedisa, who say "anything that does not come up on the table of kings"'.
But on the other hand the Ritva on the Gemara there wrote: 'And it is very difficult: how can we say that daisa comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it, according to our version, or to eat the bread with it, according to the version of Rabbeinu Alfasi z"l - for even a commoner does not accompany with it, as we say generally (Beitzah 16a) "foolish Babylonians, who eat bread with bread". And there were those who would answer that on the contrary, since even a commoner does not accompany the bread with it [it is subject to bishul goyim; for this that we say "anything that does not come up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it"] is not subject to bishul goyim - these words apply to items with which others accompany the bread, but items which others do not use to accompany, but rather eat them on their own, such as daisa, that too comes up on the table of kings in this manner and is subject to bishul goyim. And this is not sufficient in my eyes, for after all, since the rule of Nehardea is that anything which comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it - what has daisa to do here; therefore the correct view is that daisa too is not eaten as it is, raw, and does not come up on the table of kings, and according to the first lishna it is subject to bishul goyim, and according to the latter lishna it is not subject to bishul goyim - for even though wheat is fit to chew, we require eating as it is, raw'.
The Meiri there also brought both approaches in his words: 'And even though they said "coming up to accompany", and daisa is not fit for kings to accompany - for they said "foolish Babylonians, who eat bread with bread" - it appears to me that by means of mixtures and seasonings they make it fit, and in any case it is the ikar; or perhaps "to accompany" was said only for emphasis, that is to say, even to accompany, and all the more so when it comes up to be eaten on its own .. And there is one who explained regarding them that they are not eaten as they are, raw, and that they do not come up on the table of kings, because their version reads "anything that does not come up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it", and daisa is not included in this - for it was said of the Babylonians "foolish Babylonians, who eat bread with bread"; evidently he called them foolish because they would eat bread and daisa. And in any case we explain it as both to be eaten on its own and to accompany, and we do not read in it "to accompany the bread with it" etc.; and even according to the one who reads it so, we explain it as even to accompany, and all the more so to be eaten on its own; and daisa does come up on the table of kings to be eaten on its own - and so it appears to us from the Talmud of the West, as we have explained'.
Therefore we have seen that the Rishonim differed as to the law with regard to an important food that comes up on the table of kings at a seudah, but is not something eaten with bread.
The Tur and the Mechaber did not write explicitly the law of these foods, which are the ikar of the seudah but do not come to accompany the bread. And they wrote3 only that it is forbidden when it comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it or as a parperes.
[And simply their intent by "parperes" is something that comes before or after the seudah as a kinuach, and we will see the views on this in the next halacha; but the Chasam Sofer wrote on the words of the Mechaber there: 'In the Shas only "to accompany the bread with it" is mentioned, and the Rambam mentioned this expression "as a parperes"; and his intent is that the Shas speaks for emphasis - that even something over which a person does not invite his fellow on its own, but only to accompany the bread with it, is forbidden; all the more so that which is eaten on its own for a full seudah, such as legumes and the like, over which a person establishes a seudah even without bread - is it not all the more so that it is forbidden? And this is what the Rambam calls a parperes'].
But the poskim held that their intent is like the view of the Rashba, to forbid anything of importance that comes at a seudah, even if it is not eaten with bread. And as is written in the Aruch HaShulchan4: 'It appears that their view is so - that this which Chazal said "to accompany the bread with it" is not specific5, and he speaks of the usual way of the matter - that something which is not important is not brought up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it; but the essential point depends upon something of importance that comes up on the table of kings, even though it is eaten on its own and not with the bread'.
And so too appears the view of the Rema6, who wrote that if rice bread comes up on the table of kings, it is forbidden on account of bishul goyim.
And so too the poskim held as a practical ruling7 that even something which is not eaten with the bread, but which comes up on the table of kings, is subject to the law of bishul akum.
--------------
Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Toras HaBayis HaAruch bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 94a ↩
3 The beginning of siman 113 ↩
4 YD siman 113 se'if 7 ↩
5 And see the wording of the Mechaber, OC siman 177 se'if 1: 'Items over which it is usual to establish a seudah, to accompany the bread with them, such as: meat, and fish, and eggs, and vegetables, and cheese, and daisa, and kinds of salted foods'. And see Sha'ar HaTziyun s"k 2. And indeed the Alter Rebbe distinguished and wrote in siman 177 se'if 1: 'Whether to accompany the bread with them, such as meat and fish and vegetables and cheese and eggs and kinds of salted foods, or for sustenance and to satiate, such as cabbage and beets and daisa and every pot-cooked dish, which do not come to accompany but rather as a cooked dish and for sustenance' ↩
6 Siman 112 se'if 1, and see also in the Beis Yosef there ↩
7 See Shu"t Panim Me'iros vol. 2 siman 62. And what is indicated in the Kaf HaChaim siman 113 os 8; but to note from the words of מהריט"ץ siman 60 ↩
[16] (Halacha 577)
Question: What is the law with regard to something eaten as kinuach seudah?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1: 'Rav Beruna said in the name of Rav: an akum who kindled a fire in the marsh - all the chagavim in the marsh are forbidden .. Rather on account of bishul akum: in such a case is it forbidden? .. His intent is to clear the marsh! Actually, where he does not know which is tahor and which is tamei; and the incident that occurred - it was with an akum'.
We thus learn from the words of the Gemara that chagavim which the non-Jew intended to cook are forbidden on account of bishul akum.
And the Rambam2 wrote, based on this Gemara, that even though chagavim are in the category of a parperes and are not the ikar of the seudah, even so they are subject to bishul akum - and so it is with every parperes; and these are his words: 'An akum who cooked and did not intend to cook - this is permitted. How so? An akum who kindled a fire in the marsh in order to clear away the grass, and chagavim were cooked in it - these are permitted, and even in a place where they come up on the table of kings as a parperes'. And so too he wrote there3: 'Polin and afunim and lentils and the like, which the akum boil and sell - they are forbidden on account of bishul akum in a place where they come up on the table of kings as a parperes ..'.
Except that the commentators differed as to what the Rambam intended when he wrote 'parperes': there are those who understood that its meaning is something that is tofel to the seudah, like a kinuach and the like; and there are those who understood that it is something eaten together with the bread, as follows:
The Tur4 wrote: 'And they forbade only something that is not eaten as it is, raw, and which also comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it or as a parperes ..'.
And the Beis Yosef wrote there that the source of the Tur's words is in the words of the aforementioned Rambam: 'And that which our rabbi wrote, "or as a parperes" - so it appears from the words of the Rambam ..'.
And accordingly it comes out that the Tur, who mentioned in addition to accompanying the bread also 'parperes' - therefore, according to the Beis Yosef's understanding that his source is in the Rambam, it is understood that they held that for the Rambam 'parperes' means something like kinuach seudah5.
And see also in the Ritva6, who wrote with regard to dates: 'The bitter ones you need not ask about, for they are certainly forbidden. The explanation: and even according to the lishna of the people of Nehardea, for these too come up on the table of kings for kinuach seudah; and not like the words of the Ramban z"l, who brought a proof from here that the halacha is not like the lishna of the people of Nehardea7.
Also in the Issur V'Heter8, brought in the Toras Chatas9, and in the Shach10, he wrote that kemehin and pitriyos come up as parperaos and are subject to bishul akum; and it is proven in the Shas11 that they come up as a kinuach - and in any case their view is that it is forbidden on account of bishul akum.
But the Pri Chodosh wrote12 that the Rambam's intent is to items that come with the bread, and not to items that come as a kinuach; and these are his words: 'And that which the Rambam called the polin and chagavim as coming on account of a parperes - he does not mean a parperes in general, that is, for kinuach seudah, but rather he means to say liftan, to accompany the bread with them. And you should know this, for behold the Rav in the Peirush HaMishnayos to Maseches Brochos, in perek Keitzad Mevorchin [ch. 6 mishnah 5], wrote, and these are his words: "parperes" is a term for liftan and all kinds of delicacies with which one eats the bread13, end of quote'14.
Therefore we have seen that the Beis Yosef understood that the parperes in the Tur means a kinuach; and if so, in the Shulchan Aruch15, where he wrote: 'It comes up on the table of kings to accompany the bread with it or as a parperes' - his intent is that a kinuach too is subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. And we have seen that so held the Ritva, and so held the Issur V'Heter, the Rema in the Toras Chatas, and the Shach, according to the Pri Chodosh's understanding.
But the Pri Chodosh, consistent with his view as above in the words of the Rambam, wrote: 'Items that come for kinuach seudah, which are not made to accompany the bread with them and also do not come in the manner of a food - it is obvious that they are not subject to bishul goyim, for a person does not invite his fellow over them'.
There are among the Acharonim who wrote like the Pri Chodosh, as the Chasam Sofer wrote16: 'But the parperaos that are eaten for kinuach seudah in general - there is no hava amina at all that they should be forbidden, and so too the Pri Chodosh wrote, and therefore he permitted kemehin and pitriyos, unlike the Issur V'Heter HaAruch brought in the Shach s"k 2; and therefore chestnuts are to be permitted .. and so too the afunim and the cooked legumes that are called אוי"ז גשוועלט do not come up on the table of kings as a parperes, as above, but only for a kinuach - one is not to rely on them as a parperes or to accompany; and not like the מנח"י, for they certainly do come up on the table of kings when actually cooked, not in the aforementioned manner'.
But in practice most of the Acharonim17 held that items eaten for a kinuach too are subject to the prohibition of bishul akum.
Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros perek 7 halacha 19 ↩
3 Halacha 18 ↩
4 YD siman 113 ↩
5 And see Beis Yosef OC siman 176 ↩
6 Avodah Zarah 38b ↩
7 We saw in the previous halacha that the Ritva wrote with regard to daisa that it is not subject to bishul akum, since it is not to accompany the bread. And it is possible that even so he holds that a kinuach is forbidden. See Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp), Bishul Akum, perek 2 note 16, p. 60 ↩
8 Issur V'Heter sha'ar 43 din 2 ↩
9 Klal 75 din 16 ↩
10 Siman 113 s"k 2 ↩
11 Brochos 47b and in Rashi there ↩
12 YD s"k 3 ↩
13 And see Rambam Hilchos Brochos perek 4 halacha 6, and Hilchos Ishus perek 12 halacha 10 ↩
14 And the words of the Tur the Pri Chodosh explained as holding like the Rashba brought in the previous halacha, that his intent is to important foods that are not liftan, such as rice and the like. And so the Chasam Sofer, further on, explained in the Rambam ↩
15 YD siman 113 se'if 1 ↩
16 Chiddushim to YD siman 113. And see further what is indicated in the Mishmeres HaBayis there, perek 2 note 16 ↩
17 See the Pri To'ar s"k 3, and Panim Me'iros vol. 2 siman 62; and see further Shu"t Yechaveh Da'as vol. 4 siman 42, Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 2 siman 43, Piskim U'Teshuvos siman 113 os 6 and what is indicated there. And in particular according to the words of the Arizal with regard to kelayos (it will be explained b'ezras Hashem in the next halacha). Except that there are Acharonim who wrote that although a kinuach too is forbidden, they did not consider every confection to be a kinuach parperes; see Toras Chaim, Avodah Zarah 38a, brought by R' Akiva Eiger, YD siman 113 se'if 1 ↩
[17] (Halacha 578)
Question: What is the law with regard to a food that is not eaten as an actual seudah but rather as a snack and the like, such as roasted legumes¹?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'Wheat which he made into kelayos - so too they should be forbidden! And if you say indeed so - but it is taught: wheat which he made into kelayos - they are permitted'. And further on the Gemara2: 'Tanu Rabbanan: the kaprisin, and the kaplutos, and the matlia, and the chamin, and their kelayos - are permitted'.
And the Rambam3 wrote: 'And so too kelayos of an akum are permitted, and they did not decree upon them, for a person does not invite his fellow over kelayos. Polin and afunim and lentils and the like, which the akum boil and sell, are forbidden on account of bishul akum in a place where they come up on the table of kings as a parperes'.
And the Knesses HaGedolah4 and the Maaseh Rokeach5 explained that the difference between the kelayos and the polin and afunim is that the polin are boiled and not roasted, and therefore they are considered a parperes and are forbidden6.
And as a practical ruling the Beis Yosef wrote7: 'And on the basis of these words they practiced leniency with regard to roasted afunim that the non-Jews roast, and no one raised any doubt about them'. And the Rema wrote in the Darkei Moshe8: 'And so too I found in the glosses of מוהר"ר Avraham of Prague, who permitted legumes that are called in the Ashkenazi tongue ערבי"ס, which the non-Jews roast in their vessels, that they are not subject to bishul goyim; and he wrote that so it is implied in the Semag, Hilchos Yom Tov siman 75 (Asin 25 amud 3), that they practice leniency with regard to the turmus of non-Jews ..'.
And so too the Rema wrote in the Shulchan Aruch9: 'And it is permitted to eat roasted afunim of an akum, and so too the legumes that are called ערבשי"ן, roasted, since they do not come up on the table of kings'10.
But R' Chaim Vital wrote in the name of the Arizal11 that the kelayos do come up on the table of kings: 'One who wishes to be a chassid must conduct himself with additional stringencies even though he is not obligated in them according to the law; and I shall write a little of that which my teacher z"l cautioned me about, and among them are matters of stringency alone and matters that are according to the law .. The afunim are by law forbidden, because their kelayos come up on the table of kings, and the ministers of those places make them into kelayos; and it is not specifically kings, but rather since they come up on the table of the ministers they are forbidden'.
And there are those who wrote12 that nowadays too it is something of importance, and it is common that people invite guests and set kelayos before them - and kinds of roasted pitzuchim - and therefore such items too are forbidden on account of bishul akum.
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the law with regard to cornflakes and the like, which are served at a light meal that is not the main seudah?
Answer: There are those who wrote13 that cornflakes, which the king eats for a light meal (which is not for satiation and the like), are not subject to bishul akum - for since they do not come up for the main seudah, they are therefore not considered as coming up on the table of kings, and a person does not invite his fellow over them, and consequently they are not under the prohibition of bishul akum.
And in Teshuvos V'Hanhagos14 he wrote that by the essence of the law it is permitted, but it is fitting to be scrupulous: 'I received his kuntres, that breakfast cereals which were cooked by an akum are to be permitted, since they are not eaten among kings for the satiating seudah, but rather are generally eaten in the morning as a light seudah to quiet the hunger. And so too I remember that in chutz la'aretz they practiced leniency .. However, in Eretz Yisroel, under the hashgacha of the Eidah HaChareidis, they are particular that a Yisroel kindle the oven. And the reason of those who are stringent is that they hold that anything eaten among kings for a seudah, even if it is not the main seudah, is likewise forbidden; and if so, since breakfast cereals are of importance among kings too for the morning seudah, it is to be forbidden. And moreover, there is room to weigh that even if it were eaten by kings not at a seudah at all, but merely incidentally (like delicacies and the like), it would likewise be forbidden on account of bishul akum .. And by the essence of the law it appears that it is to be permitted; and in any case there is room to be scrupulous, and therefore in a place where it is possible to obtain it in bishul Yisroel, it is fitting to be scrupulous in this'.
But there are those who wrote15 that with regard to something that comes up on the table of kings it is forbidden even when it is not served at the main seudah, and therefore cornflakes and the like, which are eaten only for a light meal, are also forbidden. [And it would appear that also from the words of the aforementioned R' Chaim Vital regarding kelayos it appears so, that even when it is not a satiating seudah it is forbidden16].
Therefore we have seen that the Acharonim differed with regard to items that do not come up for the main seudah, but are foods that come up on the table of a king or a minister; and in practice it is fitting not to eat them if they are not bishul Yisroel.
--------------
Notes:
1 With regard to the law of the roasted legumes discussed below there are possibly further grounds for leniency: a) if they are eaten raw. b) there are those who say that only something nishtaneh mibriyaso is forbidden (we will learn the details of this in the next halacha b'ezras Hashem); the matter discussed below is whether they are considered as 'coming up on the table of kings' ↩
2 37b ↩
3 38b ↩
4 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17 halachos 17 - 18 ↩
5 YD siman 113, Hagahos Beis Yosef os 19 ↩
6 On the Rambam there, halacha 17 ↩
7 But see what the Aruch HaShulchan wrote, YD siman 113 se'if 16. And Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp), Hilchos Bishul Akum, perek 2, p. 84, note 51 ↩
8 YD siman 113 ↩
9 Os 3 ↩
10 YD siman 113 se'if 2 in the hagahah ↩
11 And also according to the words of the Mechaber that a parperes is forbidden - and it was explained in halacha number 577 that his intent is to a kinuach - if so, ostensibly he forbade even something over which a person does not invite his fellow for the main seudah; see the Pri To'ar s"k 3, who explained: 'For anything which has a good taste, the name liftan applies to it, and it comes with the establishment of a seudah - to exclude kelayos, which are not of the category of liftan. And the parperes, even though those who eat at the king's table do not accompany the bread with them, even so they are of the category of liftan, for others, commoners, do accompany the bread with them'. And there are those who emphasized (see Mibeis HaLevi 5758, 12, p. 102) the first point - that because it is part of the seudah it is forbidden, even though it is only a kinuach ↩
12 Sha'ar HaMitzvos Parshas Vayeilech. And see also in the Knesses HaGedolah there, end of os 17. And see also os 19, what is written from the Drashos of the Mahari"l ↩
13 See Neharos Eisan (Rubin) 3, 41, 1; Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 10 siman 124. Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp) perek 2 din 38 and note 52 ↩
14 See Taharas Mayim (Telushkin) p. 328. And Shu"t Machazeh Eliyahu vol. 2 siman 41 os 2. And see Shevet HaKehasi 6, 274, 4 ↩
15 Vol. 5 siman 249 ↩
16 See Neharos Eisan 3, 41, 1, and see Shulchan Melachim sha'ar 3, 7, 2. And see also Kashrus HaMa'achalim (Chazan) siman 113 s"k 10 ↩
17 And indeed one may still distinguish nowadays between kelayos, over which people invite one another, of which the Arizal spoke, and cornflakes, over which people do not invite one another. But the reason given by those who wrote to be lenient - that it does not come up for the satiating seudah - ostensibly does not fit with the words of the Arizal. And to hold that as a practical ruling it is determined only according to what it is usual to invite one another over is ostensibly questionable, for although it is brought in the Rambam, the Rema changed and wrote only 'comes up'. And it still requires further examination ↩
[18] (Halacha 579)
In the previous halachos we learned that there are two conditions required in order for a food item to be subject to the prohibition of bishul akum: a) that it is not eaten raw. b) that it comes up on the table of kings.
Question: Is there a third condition with regard to bishul akum - that it be changed from its natural state by the fire?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1: 'And the boiled foods. Whence are these matters? R' Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: the pasuk states: אוכל בכסף תשבירני ואכלתי ומים בכסף תתן לי ושתיתי, like water .. just as water is not changed from its natural state by the fire, so too food which is not changed from its natural state by the fire. Is "fire" written at all? Rather, it is mid'rabbanan, and the pasuk is a mere asmachta. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that is eaten as it is, raw - is not subject to bishul ovdei kochavim. In Sura they taught it thus. In Pumbedisa they taught it thus: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: anything that is not eaten on the table of kings to accompany bread with it - is not subject to bishul ovdei kochavim.
Rashi, further on in the Gemara2, mentions this principle, and wrote: 'And the chamin - hot water, for they are not changed from their natural state by the fire'.
And the Ran3 wrote: 'And the upshot of the matters is that anything which has one of these three characteristics, that it is eaten as it is raw, or that it does not come up on the table of kings, or that they were not changed from their natural state by the fire, is not subject to bishul akum; except that I have not seen it stated explicitly in the Rishonim that anything which was not changed from its natural state by the fire should be permitted'.
If so, according to the words of the Ran, even according to the conclusion of the Gemara only something which was changed from its natural state is forbidden.
And the Beis Yosef4 wrote with regard to kelayos: 'And the Ran wrote that the reason is because they were not changed from their natural state; but the Rambam wrote in ch. 17 of Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros (halacha 17) that the reason they did not decree upon them is because a person does not invite his fellow for kelayos. And on the basis of these words they were accustomed to permit roasted peas which the non-Jews roast, and no one voiced any doubt about them ..'.
And the Rema wrote in the Darkei Moshe5 on the words of the Ran: 'And so it is in the Hagahos Ashiri, ch. 2 of Avodah Zarah (siman 28), and therefore they are accustomed to eat קומפש"ט of non-Jews even though they cook it, end quote. And in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch klal 43 (din 1), that one should not distinguish between changed and not changed, end quote'.
The Mechaber in the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this condition, that it must be changed from its natural state by the fire, and the Shach6 wrote: 'Since the Mechaber did not stipulate that it must be changed from its natural state by the fire, it is evident that he holds that even if it was not changed it is forbidden, and this is like the view of the Rambam which he cited in the Beis Yosef; and so too is the view of the Rav in the Darkei Moshe, and in the Toras Chatas klal 75 din 16. And this is his view in the gloss on se'if 2, that he permitted the peas only for the reason that they do not come up on the table of kings, and not for the reason that they were not changed from their natural state, as he wrote in the Darkei Moshe and in the Toras Chatas there. But in truth the essential [view] in the Shas (Avodah Zarah, end of daf 37) appears to be like the Ran and Rashi, that it is forbidden on account of bishul akum only when it was changed from its natural state by the fire; and so it is ruled in the Hagahos Ashiri, פא"ט, from the Or Zarua, and so too appears the view of the Rif, as the Ran wrote, and so too appears the view of the Ravan siman 303. However, the view of the rest of the Poskim appears to be that one should not distinguish in this'.
But the Pri Chodosh7 wrote: '.. and it does not sit well with me, for if so, why is a roasted egg forbidden? And also the words of the Ran are not clear to me, for ahinei merirei and metzia'ei, which are forbidden [ibid. 38b], do not imply that they were changed from their natural state by the fire in roasting; and likewise most things which are roasted in fire are not changed from their natural state, and if so, come and let us permit the roasting of non-Jews8; and therefore the essential [view] appears to be as the Rashba wrote in Toras HaBayis daf 89 [bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 93b], and these are his words: just as water is not changed from its natural state by the fire, so too anything which is not changed from its natural state by the fire; that is to say, they forbade only that which was changed by the fire with regard to its fitness for eating, in something which was not originally fit for eating and became fit for eating by means of the fire, end quote. And according to this, food which was not changed from its natural state and something which is eaten as it is, raw, are all one matter9. And in accordance with this explanation, the Poskim did well in omitting it'.
The Chasam Sofer10 resolves the difficulty of the Pri Chodosh: 'And that which the Pri Chodosh objected, that all things which are roasted should be permitted, is not precise, for kelayos means things which do not release fat and gravy through their parching, and they are not changed at all, and in the language of Ashkenaz גרעס"ט; but roasting means fish and meat and anything which releases fat and moisture, or upon which one places fat and the like - these are things which are changed by the fire. Also that which he objected, what is the reason to forbid a roasted egg further on at the end of this siman, I wondered at him: do you have anything more changed by the fire than this, that the fire makes it food, whereas originally it is liquid and a matter of sipping'.
And in practice the Chasam Sofer explains that the reason of "it was not changed by the fire" applies only according to the hava amina that the prohibition of bishul akum is because he might feed him something non-kosher, and therefore there is nothing to forbid other than things which are changed by the fire and which it is possible to falsify; but according to the conclusion, that the reason is on account of the prohibition of intermarriage, one should not distinguish between changed and not changed.
If so, as a matter of halacha the words of the Ran, that there is a third condition, that it be changed by the fire, were not accepted11; and even something which is not changed, if it is not eaten raw and it comes up on the table of kings, is subject to the prohibition of bishul akum.
--------------
Notes:
1 37b ↩
2 38b ↩
3 15a of the pages of the Rif ↩
4 YD siman 113, and so too he wrote in the Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros ch. 17 halacha 17 ↩
5 YD siman 113 os 2 ↩
6 YD siman 113 s"k 1 ↩
7 YD siman 113 s"k 1 ↩
8 The Pri To'ar s"k 1 resolves the difficulty of the Pri Chodosh against the Ran and Rashi, and explains that the definition is that it must be evident that a cooking was performed upon the item; and therefore with an egg and the like one sees upon it that it is cooked, whereas with roasted kelayos it is not necessarily evident upon them. But as a matter of halacha he agrees with the Pri Chodosh, since the Rishonim disagreed with the Ran, and he explains that the Rif too disagrees. And if so, the Rif, the Rambam and the Rosh, and the Rashba; and therefore we hold to forbid ↩
9 But see the Beis Meir YD siman 113, who elaborated to explain not in accordance with the Pri Chodosh ↩
10 Chiddushim on YD siman 112 ↩
11 However, note the Shu"t 'Aleh Ezra' by R' Ezra Attiya, YD siman 8, who relied on those who are lenient in a pressing situation ↩
[19] (Halacha 581)
Question: What is the ruling in a case where a non-Jew cooked food without any intent to cook? (1)
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'The matter itself: Rav Chanan bar Ami said in the name of R' Pedas in the name of R' Yochanan: this oved kochavim who singed a head - it is permitted to eat from it, even from the tip of its ear. Ravina said: therefore, this oved kochavim who threw a peg into a furnace, and a Yisroel had buried a gourd in it from the outset - it is fine. It is obvious! What might you have said: he intends to cook the vessel; it teaches us: he intends to harden the vessel'.
That is to say, a non-Jew who singed the hairs of an animal, and in the course of the singeing the animal's ear was roasted, there is nothing in this of bishul akum, since the non-Jew did not intend to cook; and likewise a non-Jew who heated an oven and threw into it a piece of wood in order to dry it, and did not know that a Jew had buried a gourd there, and it became cooked - the gourd is permitted to be eaten.
But the Rishonim discussed what the ruling is if the non-Jew did know that there was food here, only that he did not intend the act of cooking but rather something else - for example, a non-Jew who operated an oven to dry a board and knew that there was also a piece of meat in the oven, as follows:
The Rif2 wrote: 'Ravina said: therefore, this akum who threw a peg into a furnace, and a Yisroel had buried a gourd in it from the outset - it is fine; at the end it is forbidden'. And the Rosh3 wrote: 'In the Halachos of Rav Alfas z"l he wrote: a Yisroel buried a gourd in it from the outset - it is fine; at the end it is forbidden. He does not mean "at the end" after the akum has heated the oven, for that is certainly permitted, that being a case of the akum kindling and a Yisroel baking. Rather this is what he means: "at the end" - after the akum threw the peg into the furnace, before (he applied) the fire to dry the peg; for since the Yisroel buried it in it in the akum's sight, even though at the end he did not intend to cook the peg, we are concerned that perhaps he intended to cook the gourd, since he knew of it. And we permit only where the Yisroel buried it in it from the outset and the akum did not know of it'.
If so, the Rosh understood in the words of the Rif that if the non-Jew knew in advance that there was food there, even though he lit the fire for another purpose, we are concerned that he intended to cook the food as well, and therefore it is forbidden on account of bishul akum.
And so too the Rashba4 wrote: 'Therefore, an akum who heated the oven in order to throw damp wooden pegs in there in order to dry them, and a gourd or the like was buried in the oven and the akum did not know of it - it is permitted, since the akum did not intend to cook either the gourd or the pegs, but only to strengthen the pegs'. And so too further Rishonim wrote - the Meiri and the Nimukei Yosef in Avodah Zarah there. And Rabbeinu Yerucham5. And the Ohel Moed6.
And so ruled the Tur7: 'And they forbade only when the akum intends it for cooking; but if he does not intend it for cooking .. it is permitted, since he did not intend it for cooking. But if he did intend it for cooking - for example, that he heated the oven in order to cook in it, and there was meat in it beforehand and it was roasted - even though he did not intend for this meat, since he did not know of it, even so it is forbidden. Therefore, if he knew that there was meat in the oven, even if he heated it to dry a vessel, it is forbidden; we are concerned that perhaps he intended it for cooking as well, since he knew of it'. And the Rema in the Toras Chatas8 brought his words as halacha.
However, the Beis Yosef9 wrote: 'And I have not seen any one of the Poskim who wrote so, for the Ran (15a, d"h kol) explained the version of the Rif, from which it is implied that at the outset the non-Jew intends to harden the vessel and thereafter to cook it, and he wrote that it is not sound'.
And on the basis of this, in the Shulchan Aruch10 he did not mention this ruling, and these are his words: 'An akum who cooked and did not intend to cook - it is permitted .. And likewise if he singed the head in order to remove the hair, it is permitted to eat the tips of the ears which were roasted at the time of the singeing. But if he did intend it for cooking - for example, that he heated the oven in order to cook in it, and there was meat in it beforehand and it was roasted - even though he did not intend for this meat, since he did not know of it, it is forbidden'.
The Pri Chodosh11 brought the view of the Rosh and the Tur, but concluded: 'And many of the Poskim differ in this, and where there is no hefsed merubeh it is fitting to be concerned for this'.
But the Pri To'ar12 objected to the Mechaber, and wrote: 'And since the words of the Rif are matters of reasoning, and the Talmud is thereby settled well, and we do not find any Posek who disagrees explicitly - and on the contrary, the Rosh and Rabbeinu Yerucham and the Tur tasted his taste and inclined after him - who is he that would turn his neck against them? And that which the Beis Yosef wrote, that this distinction is not found in the Poskim, I do not know to which of them he refers; for the Rambam z"l omitted this ruling of the peg .. and it is possible that had he written it he would have distinguished as the words of the Rif. And as for the rest of the Poskim too, we can say that according to what we have written, that they permitted specifically only in a case where he kindled the fire in the marsh, or singed a head, and the like; and consequently, in a case where he buried a gourd before the eyes of the non-Jew and thereafter the non-Jew lit the oven, which is not similar to the marsh and the head - it is forbidden. And therefore it appears that it is forbidden, in accordance with the view of the Rif and the Rosh and ר"י and the Tur'.
And so too Harav Refael Yaakov Menashe13 wrote: 'And Maran z"l in the Shulchan Aruch omitted this ruling because of what he wrote in the Beis Yosef .. And behold, that which Maran wrote, that he did not see any one of the Poskim who wrote so, is astonishing; for the Rashba and the Rosh and the Tur and Rabbeinu Yerucham - their view is clearly expressed, that whenever the akum knew of it, it is forbidden; and the view of the Ran too does not disagree with them, with these great ones z"l .. And to our poor understanding it appears clear that had Maran z"l seen in the Beis Yosef the words of the Rashba in the Toras HaBayis HaKatzar and the words of Rabbeinu Yerucham z"l, who wrote that this is the essential [view], he would certainly have ruled the halacha in accordance with it, for so he revealed his view explicitly, that he did not see any one of the Poskim who wrote so. And if so, we, who have merited and seen that the view of the Rashba and Rabbeinu Yerucham is like the view of the Rif and the Rosh and the Tur z"l, certainly the view of Maran z"l in this is that their view z"l is the essential one, and so it is proper; and so ruled the Pri To'ar z"l, and so is the essential [view]'.
If so, in practice, a non-Jew who cooked without having intended the act of cooking - the item is permitted to be eaten, unless he knew in advance that there is here something which could become cooked, in which case the item is forbidden on account of bishul akum.
--
Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Avodah Zarah 15a ↩
3 Avodah Zarah ch. 2 siman 31 ↩
4 Toras HaBayis HaKatzar bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 93b ↩
5 Toldos Adam V'Chavah nesiv 17 vol. 7, 161a ↩
6 Sha'ar Issur V'Heter derech 7 nesiv 9 ↩
7 YD siman 113 ↩
8 klal 75 se'if 22 ↩
9 YD siman 113 ↩
10 YD siman 113 se'if 5 ↩
11 Shulchan Aruch there s"k 11 ↩
12 Shulchan Aruch there s"k 8 ↩
13 Ein HaMayim s"k 6 ↩
[20] (Halacha 582)
In the previous halacha we learned that when the non-Jew has no intent to cook, there is no prohibition on account of bishul akum.
Question: What is the ruling when the non-Jew cooks, but the purpose of the cooking is not the cooking itself but rather an incidental purpose - for example, bringing to a boil in order to kill the bacteria, i.e. 'pasteurization'. (For example, the pasteurization of milk which is not approved to be sold fresh - must the pasteurization be done specifically by a Jew)?
Answer: The Ran1 wrote: 'And that which he asked: if the honey of the Mishnah means the honey of bees, how do we say in the Gemara "for what should we be concerned? If on account of bishul goyim - it is eaten as it is, raw"; for in any case it would be permitted, since they do not intend to cook it, but their intent is only to extract the wax, and it is like the non-Jew who singed a head, from which it is permitted to eat even from the tip of its ear - this is not a difficulty, for the non-Jew who singed a head does not intend to cook at all, but this one does intend to cook; and even though he does not want that cooking except for the sake of extracting the wax, in any event his intent is that the honey should become cooked, and since his intent is to cook, there is no difference between whether he intends it for its own sake or for the sake of another matter'.
And from his words it appears that whenever his intent is to cook, even if the purpose of the cooking is not for eating, the item is forbidden on account of bishul akum.
However, we find in the Shu"t of the Mahara"m of Rothenburg2 that he wrote: 'Smoked fish which a non-Jew smoked - there is nothing in them of bishul goyim. And that which you compared it to Shabbos, perek Klal Gadol, where we have the reading in the Yerushalmi (halacha 2) "one who roasts, one who boils, one who smokes - all of them are liable on account of cooking" - [this is not so, for] it says explicitly in perek Ein Ma'amidin (38a): this non-Jew who singed a head - it is permitted to eat even from the tip of its ear, for his intent is to remove the hair; so too here his intent is to dry them so that they should not become putrid, and not to eat it by means of his smoking of it. And it says there: this one who [threw] a peg into a furnace etc. - his intent is to harden and not to cook, and there is nothing in it of bishul goyim. And the reason is that with bishul goyim, which is mid'rabbanan, they decreed only [where] he intends to cook. And likewise small salted fish - there is nothing in them of bishul goyim (Avodah Zarah there); and one is liable in the salting of the old, even with mere rinsing, on account of cooking; and many such [cases], and I have wearied of writing. And if the halacha is loose in your hand, go out and see what the people do - to buy salted smoked fish such as בוקגינ"ש and the like from non-Jews'.
And there are those who learned from his words3 that so too with pasteurization there is no prohibition of bishul akum, since the purpose of the cooking in pasteurization is not to prepare the food for eating.
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the ruling when the non-Jew's intent is to cook something in which there is no prohibition of bishul akum, but without his knowledge, through his action, something which is forbidden on account of bishul akum also became cooked?
Answer: The Chaker Halacha4 wrote: 'And it appears to me simple that if the non-Jew intended to cook something which is eaten as it is, raw, or a food which was already cooked to the degree of ma'achal ben Drusai, it is as though he did not intend to cook'.
But the Chasam Sofer5 wrote: 'In the Shas it is explained that even if he heated it in order to cook in it something which is permitted as regards bishul nochrim, nevertheless that item belonging to the Yisroel becomes forbidden, for in the Shas it deals with the peg which he threw into the furnace, and were it not that he intends to harden the vessel, the Yisroel's gourd would have been forbidden, even though with regard to the peg bishul akum is not applicable'.
Notes:
1 Shu"t siman 5 ↩
2 Prague edition siman 58 ↩
3 One could say that it is because the pasteurization is not part of the process of preparing the food for the seudah; and some have written that it is because it is only to preserve the food (see Kovetz Mibeis Levi, Yoreh Deah matters, p. 69, in the name of Harav Wosner). And some have written that it is in order to remove the spoilage (see Shevet HaKehasi vol. 5 siman 135; Shulchan Melachim 2 sha'ar 12, 1, 2. And see also Chelkas Binyamin, 113, 1). But indeed it is possible to say that the words of the Mahara"m are stated only with regard to smoking which was not for the final preparation of the food, and where it was customary to cook it and give it its taste afterwards, and he does not disagree with the Ran. And note that in various cases there are further grounds to permit the pasteurization (Minchas Yitzchak vol. 10 siman 67), since one could say that even without the pasteurization it is considered fit for eating, or on the grounds that the pasteurization is done with steam - and this will be discussed in a separate halacha ↩
4 Aruch os beis, in the laws of bishul akum, end of s"k 3, brought in the Darkei Teshuvah siman 113 s"k 41 ↩
5 Chiddushim on YD 113 se'if 5 ↩
[21] (Halacha 583)
Question: What is the ruling with regard to something which was forbidden on account of bishul akum and became mixed into other food?
Answer: The Ramban1 wrote: 'And so the law appears with every prohibition of theirs which has no basis in the Torah .. and likewise all cases of bishul akum - all of them are nullified in a majority, similar to terumah and challah of chutz la'aretz, and similar to drawn water, for they are compared to them in the Gemara; except that nevertheless one may not mix and nullify it l'chatchilah'.
And so too the Ritva wrote there: 'From now on we have no proof to nullify even prohibitions of non-Jews, such as milk and butter and cheese, in less than sixty. However, with regard to their bread and their cooked foods, since their prohibition is not equal for all, as I explained in its place, it is possible that it is nullified one in two; and so is the essential [view] in my eyes, and so did הר"ם z"l concur with me'.
And so too the Nimukei Yosef2 wrote: 'However, as regards their bread and their cooked foods, since the prohibition is not equal for all, it is possible that it is nullified one in two; so does the essential [view] appear in my eyes, and so did our teacher הר"ב z"l and the Ritva z"l concur with me'.
And so too the Issur V'Heter3 wrote: 'And he wrote further: and if one mixed something which is eaten raw with something which is not eaten raw, we follow the ikar, whether to be lenient or to be stringent, end quote. And so too Rashi wrote: and with bishul Kena'ani they did not decree upon ta'am k'ikar, just as they did not decree upon a mixture of demai, end quote. And therefore, if a food which was already forbidden by bishul Kena'ani became mixed into a permitted food, and it is not discernible within it so as to separate it and remove it - whether it became mixed with its own kind or whether it became mixed with a different kind, whether in a liquid or in a dry [mixture] - it is nullified in an ordinary majority. And even an egg and a whole bird and other things which are not nullified in an ordinary [majority], with bishul Kena'ani it is properly nullified, even in a liquid, in an ordinary majority. And this is specifically where it already became mixed; but to add to it is certainly forbidden with bishul Kena'ani, as is stated above regarding things which are nullified'.
However, the Rashba4 disagreed with them and decided stringently, to require sixty, and these are his words: 'All the light prohibitions of theirs which have no basis in the Torah - such as challah of chutz la'aretz, and the cooked foods of akum, and the cheese of akum - there are some of the great teachers who said that they do not require sixty; rather, even if cheese of akum became mixed into kosher cheese, whether in a dry [mixture] or in a blended one, even one in two, it is kosher. But there are those who are stringent also with these prohibitions, to require sixty for them like the rest of the prohibitions of theirs; and so is it fitting to rule in all of them, except for challah of chutz la'aretz alone'.
And as a matter of halacha the Rema in the Toras Chatas5 decided like the Issur V'Heter, that it is nullified in a majority: 'And he wrote in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch klal 43 that the same law applies to something which is forbidden only on account of bishul akum, that it does not forbid its mixture and is nullified in an ordinary majority, whether with its own kind or not with its own kind, even if it is a davar chashuv which is not nullified elsewhere'6.
And so too the Shach7 wrote: 'And if it was cooked in them b'dieved, and there is a majority in the dish, it is permitted, for cases of bishul ovdei kochavim are nullified in a majority, as above in siman 112 s"k 23, and see below siman 115 s"k 17'.
On the other hand, the Pri Chodosh8 was stringent like the Rashba9: 'And know that the commentators disagreed in this: for there are among them who hold that all rabbinic prohibitions which have no basis in the Torah - such as the cheese of nochrim and bishul nochrim - their law is like the terumah of chutz la'aretz, that it is permitted to nullify them in a majority and to eat them. And some other commentators differ in this, and hold that it is specifically with the terumah of chutz la'aretz that they were more lenient than with the rest of the prohibitions, and one does not learn from it to nullify l'chatchilah with the rest of the prohibitions, or that a majority suffices; rather, l'chatchilah one may not mix them in order to nullify them, and sixty is required for their nullification, like the rest of the prohibitions of theirs, and as the Rashba wrote there and on daf 108; and this reasoning is the essential [view] .. And as regards the law, we have only the ruling of the Mechaber, who wrote without qualification: a prohibition of theirs - one may not mix it by hand in order to nullify it; that is to say, all kinds of prohibitions of theirs, both that which has a basis in the Torah and that which has no basis in the Torah at all. And one does not learn from the terumah of chutz la'aretz, which is lighter; and from this we understand that when he says in the latter clause that when it fell into a permitted [substance] one adds to it, he means his own addition, that is to say sixty, like the rest of the prohibitions ..'.
And so too it appears10 from the words of the Maharashda"m11, who mentioned in his wording, with regard to bishul akum, nullification in sixty: 'And this I say on condition that it be clear to the one who washed that pot together with the others that it was clean and that there was no fat stuck to it; for if there was fat stuck to it, it forbids the others according to the view of the Rashba and those who agree with his view. And if there was in the water sixty to nullify the fat stuck in the pot, then according to all opinions too the pots are permitted, and I have no leisure to elaborate further in this'. And so too the Minchas Kohen12 wrote.
But in practice most of the Acharonim13 wrote in accordance with the words of the Rema, that bishul akum is nullified in a majority.
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Notes:
1 Yevamos 82b ↩
2 Yevamos 26a ↩
3 sha'ar 43 siman 7 ↩
4 Toras HaBayis HaKatzar bayis 4 sha'ar 1, 13a ↩
5 klal 75 din 8 ↩
6 And in the Shulchan Aruch YD siman 112 se'if 14 the Rema brought the words of the Issur V'Heter with regard to bread of an akum: 'And likewise, wherever bread of an akum became mixed into other food, it is nullified in a majority, whether in a liquid or in a dry [mixture]. But it is forbidden to mix it in order to eat it'. And see there in the Shach s"k 23 ↩
7 YD siman 113 s"k 21 ↩
8 YD siman 99 s"k 17 ↩
9 See Ein HaMayim s"k 11. But the Chida in Ein Zocher, ma'areches beis os 46, noted that seemingly there is a contradiction in the words of the Pri Chodosh, and explained that it is possible that with bishul akum the Pri Chodosh too would concede; and these are his words: 'As to the nullification of prohibitions which are mid'rabbanan, our teacher Harav מהרי"ך zlh"h wrote in manuscript: the essential [view] is that they are not nullified except in sixty, whether they have a basis in the Torah or whether they do not. Such is the ruling of the Pri Chodosh siman 99 s"k 17. And with regard to half-measures in rabbinic prohibitions too he holds thus, as he wrote in siman 65 s"k 7 and siman 98 s"k 20. And it appears that this is with something which has a basis in the Torah. And a davar chashuv, even with rabbinic prohibitions, has no nullification - siman 101, regarding a piece, in the gloss. However, with regard to bishul goyim it is nullified, as Harav Pri Chodosh wrote in siman 112 s"k 25 in the name of the Toras Chatas. And according to his ruling above, one must consider how he left it unqualified. *And perhaps, since in the view of most of the Poskim it is very light - as one who looks will see in some of the Rishonim, that with the rest of the rabbinic prohibitions, even those which have no basis in the Torah, they judged its nullification in sixty, while with bishul goyim they were lenient in all such [cases] - therefore a davar chashuv, which is only mid'rabbanan, he too z"l saw fit to be lenient about; and of this it is said, take at least half; and it still requires further examination'* ↩
10 See Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos HaTur, siman 113 s"k 3. But see Shu"t Shoel U'Meishiv (Mazuz) YD siman 46 ↩
11 Shu"t, chelek YD siman 41 ↩
12 Sefer HaTa'aruvos vol. 1 ch. 1 os 6 ↩
13 See Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos HaTur, s"k 3. מנח"י klal 75 s"k 14. Lechem HaPanim s"k 23. Beis Lechem Yehudah s"k 21. Pri Megadim, Seder V'Hanhagos HaShoel Im HaNishal, seder 3 os 36. Chiddushei Rabbi Akiva Eiger siman 113 os 2. Chochmas Adam klal 66 os 11. Shu"t Pe'as Negev YD siman 27 (34, 3). Aruch HaShulchan YD siman 113 se'if 53. Mishnah Berurah siman 328 s"k 63. Kaf HaChaim s"k 91 ↩
[22] (Halacha 584)
We have learned that as a matter of halacha the Poskim held that cases of bishul akum are nullified in a majority.
Question: What is the ruling with regard to the vessel in which bishul akum was cooked - does the vessel require kashering?
Answer: The Rashba1 wrote: 'And with regard to vessels in which the akum cooked, in our presence, something which is subject to bishul nochrim - it stands to reason that they require kashering, for whatever the Chachomim forbade, its emission is forbidden like it .. And even though they forbade their cooked foods only on account of the decree concerning their daughters, one cannot say that there is nothing of intermarriage in their gi'ulim but only in their actual substance; for if so, we too would say that one should decree on account of intermarriage only where one eats in the house of a nochri, or also in a city but not in a field, or also where one buys and eats in the house of a Yisroel - not. .. And the reason is that whatever the Chachomim forbade, they forbade in a manner resembling that of the Torah. And therefore one must be careful with our maidservants, who are accustomed to cook for themselves in our pots, that a Yisroel should place it on the fire, or that he should turn it over before it reached ma'achal ben Drusai; for if not, the pot in which it was cooked and the bowl from which it was eaten are forbidden, since whenever the food is forbidden, the vessels which absorbed from it are forbidden; and if they are of earthenware they must be broken, and if they are of metal he must perform hagalah and libun, like the law of vessels which absorbed a prohibition ..'2.
But the Ra'ah3 objected to the Rashba and wrote: 'Further, I come to reason from this reason, that the Chachomim did not make their measures equal in this matter, and forbade in it only according to what appears that the reason of intermarriage would be drawn after it. And I say that a nochri who comes to cook for himself, whether on a weekday or on Shabbos, provided they are permitted items - that even though the dish is forbidden on account of bishul nochrim, the vessels are nevertheless permitted to be used after rinsing; for with regard to the gi'ulim of the vessels it does not stand to reason to say that they decreed and forbade them on account of bishul nochrim, for there is in them nothing of intermarriage, and nothing of a drawing close of the mind'.
The Ran4 forbade in practice, in accordance with the view of those who are stringent: 'But in practice I forbid, since I have seen some of the great ones who disagreed with the Ra'ah z"l and forbade the emission of vessels which have absorbed from bishul goyim, even though they are permitted items, and required hagalah for the vessels - and if they are of earthenware, they must be broken; and the Rav, the author of the Terumah, is of this view. And therefore it is fitting to institute a prohibition בדב"ס שלכם, [ופורץ גדר ישכנו נחש], and peace be upon you'.
But the Ritva5 brought the dispute of his teachers and wrote that it stands to reason as the words of the Ra'ah, that it is permitted, but that where it is possible it is good to perform hagalah: 'And whatever is forbidden on account of bishul goyim, my teacher the Rashba נר"ו says that the vessels too are forbidden along with it, like the rest of the rabbinic prohibitions, for they have absorbed a prohibition; but my teacher the Ra'ah z"l used to say that since they were lenient in several matters with bishul goyim, [it also stands to reason] that the decree was only upon the dish itself and not upon its absorption, which is far weaker than something which does not come up on the table of kings; and this is a reason which stands to reason, except that with a vessel for which hagalah is possible, it is good to perform hagalah upon them'.
And more than that, we find Rishonim who held so as a matter of halacha and in practice, and testified that such is the minhag, to be lenient, as the Rosh6 wrote: 'And I say that according to all opinions the vessels in which the non-Jew cooked are permitted and do not require hagalah; for the Chachomim were not so stringent as to forbid the emission of bishul goyim, since the matter of intermarriage is not applicable at all. And more than this the Chachomim said, that a mixture of demai is permitted, in the first perek of Chullin (6a) - and all the more so the emission of bishul goyim; and even though most amei ha'aretz do tithe, it appears more [fitting] to be lenient with bishul goyim, for the Chachomim were lenient with them in several leniencies .. And from all these reasons one may learn a fortiori that the emission of bishul goyim was not forbidden .. And so too the minhag is widespread, that the non-Jewish maidservants who dwell in the houses of Yisroel, on their days of affliction, make fires and cook their dishes, and we have not heard of any of the great ones of Ashkenaz who separated themselves from their vessels; and in a place where the halacha is loose, follow the minhag - and all the more so where there is no looseness here'. And so too the Tur7 wrote in the name of his father the Rosh.
And so too the Meiri8 wrote - he brought the two views and concluded: 'And in this too we are accustomed to be lenient'.
And more than that, Rabbeinu Yerucham9 wrote: 'And most of the Poskim agreed with what the Rosh wrote in a responsum10'. And so too the Issur V'Heter11 wrote.
As a matter of halacha the Mechaber12 wrote: 'Vessels in which the akum cooked, in our presence, items which are subject to bishul akum, require kashering; and there are those who say that they do not require it. And even according to the words of those who require kashering, if it is an earthenware vessel he performs hagalah upon it three times, and that is sufficient, because this prohibition has no basis mid'Torah'.
And according to the rules of psak in the Mechaber, that where he writes an unattributed view and 'there are those who say', the halacha is like the unattributed view - if so, he held as a matter of halacha that the essential [ruling] is that one must kasher the vessel13.
If so, we have seen that as a matter of halacha, vessels in which a non-Jew cooked something which is forbidden by bishul goy - one must kasher the vessel; except that there are various leniencies in this, as we shall see in the coming halacha b'ezras Hashem.
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Notes:
1 Toras HaBayis HaAruch bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 95b ↩
2 However, as we learned in halacha 583, the Rashba is stringent and holds that it is not nullified in a majority. And on the basis of this, seemingly, according to the views which hold (and so is the essential ruling as a matter of halacha) that it is nullified in a majority - since in every cooking there will always be a majority against the taste, consequently in practice one could say that from the outset there is no prohibition to use these vessels without kashering them. (And see Shu"t Divrei Dovid vol. 2 YD 20). Except that this is still not compelling, since it is possible that with frying and the like there is no majority against the vessel. And see Kashrus HaMa'achalim (Chazan), Biurim, end of siman 113. And see in Hora'ah Berurah, in the long Biur Halacha to siman 112 ↩
3 Bedek HaBayis 94a ↩
4 Shu"t siman 5 ↩
5 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
6 Tosafos HaRosh, Avodah Zarah 40a ↩
7 YD end of siman 113 ↩
8 Avodah Zarah 38b ↩
9 Toldos Adam V'Chavah nesiv 17 vol. 7, 160d ↩
10 The Beis Yosef in the Bedek HaBayis noted on his words: 'He wrote that in a responsum it is written so, and I searched in the responsa which we have and did not find it. And he wrote further that most of the Poskim agreed with the view of the Rosh; and from what I have written you will see that he did not speak correctly in this, for on the contrary, most of the Poskim agreed with the view of the Rashba'. However, it should be noted: a. that although we have not seen the responsum, we have seen that the Rosh wrote so in his Tosafos, and b. now that more Rishonim have been printed, we see as the words of Rabbeinu Yerucham ↩
11 sha'ar 43 siman 8 ↩
12 YD siman 113 se'if 16; and from the words of the Rema in the Toras HaChatas klal 75 din 14, it appears that he agreed with the Beis Yosef ↩
13 And see what the Chida wrote in the Shiurei Bracha YD siman 113 s"k 19: 'I have seen that Harav Minchas Kohen, in HaTa'aruvos vol. 1 ch. 1, wrote that Maran did not decide with regard to vessels in which the non-Jew cooked, whether they require kashering, and that he ruled leniently. See there. And it is already known that Maran rules in accordance with the reasoning which he brings unattributed. However, the aforementioned Rav read it as "he did not decide", since he brought another reasoning. And see what I wrote in this kuntres above siman 55 (os 2). See there' ↩
[23] (Halacha 585)
We have learned that as a matter of halacha one must perform hagalah on a vessel which became forbidden through bishul goyim.
Question: In the laws of issur v'heter it is ruled that an earthenware vessel which absorbed a prohibition has no remedy through hagalah; what is its ruling when something which became forbidden on account of bishul akum was cooked in it?
Answer: The Baal HaItur1 wrote: 'And with an earthenware vessel hagalah is of no avail, for it never emerges from its defect. And were it not that I fear the great ones, I would say that even an earthenware vessel, with a pot which is not ben yomo - since it is forbidden mid'rabbanan, he may perform hagalah on it three times'.
And the Rashba2 wrote that this applies only to a rabbinic prohibition which has no basis, and these are his words: 'These matters which we have said are where it absorbed one of the prohibitions of the Torah. But if it absorbed one of the prohibitions of theirs - he performs hagalah on it three times and that is sufficient. And it is possible to say that they permitted only with prohibitions of theirs which have no basis in the Torah, such as terumah and challah in chutz la'aretz, and likewise bishul akum. But with the rest of the prohibitions of theirs they were stringent with them as with a matter of Torah. And it is fitting to be concerned not to be lenient with them'.
The Tur3 brought their words, and the Beis Yosef4 wrote: '(According to the view of the Rashba,) who forbids a vessel in which bishul goyim was cooked, nevertheless one may be more lenient with it than with the rest of the prohibitions; for whereas an earthenware vessel which was used with one of the prohibitions while hot has no remedy other than breaking or returning it to the kiln, an earthenware vessel which is forbidden on account of bishul goyim - he performs hagalah on it three times and that is sufficient, because this prohibition has no basis mid'Torah; and so too our teacher wrote in siman 121'.
The Rema in the Toras HaChatas5 brought the Beis Yosef: 'And the Beis Yosef wrote that even though the Rashba forbids the vessels, nevertheless even for an earthenware vessel hagalah three times suffices for it'.
And the Vikuach Mayim Chaim wrote on the words of the Rema: 'My heart hesitates over this ruling, to perform hagalah on any earthenware vessel; for one who sees that they perform hagalah on earthenware vessels will think that it absorbed an actual prohibition, and will kasher every earthenware vessel by means of hagalah. Also, that which he requires him to perform hagalah three times - there is no proper reason in this6'.
And as a matter of halacha the Mechaber7 ruled: 'And even according to the words of those who require kashering, if it is an earthenware vessel he performs hagalah on it three times, and that is sufficient, because this prohibition has no basis mid'Torah'.
★ ★ ★
Question: Must one wait until the vessel is not ben yomo before the hagalah, as with the rest of the hagalos?
Answer: In this ruling there are three views, as follows:
a) There are those who wrote that after me'es l'es there is no need for hagalah, as the Erech HaShulchan8 wrote: 'that most of the Acharonim hold that a vessel which is not ben yomo, with a rabbinic prohibition, is permitted l'chatchilah'. But they objected9 to his words from the words of the Pri Megadim10, who wrote: 'It is a widespread halacha in Yisroel that even a rabbinic prohibition which was absorbed in a vessel - nosen taam lifgam is of no avail'.
b) There are those who say that although hagalah is required even after me'es l'es, nevertheless with this prohibition there is no need to wait me'es l'es before the hagalah, as the Darkei Teshuvah11 wrote: 'See in the Shu"t Minchas Yehudah, chelek YD siman 36, where the questioner wonders at that which they are accustomed to do with vessels of bishul akum used for the needs of a sick person on Shabbos, to perform hagalah on them immediately on motzei Shabbos; for granted that they are lenient to perform hagalah even on an earthenware vessel three times, but from where do we know to be lenient that this hagalah is of avail even within me'es l'es? And in any event he should have waited until after me'es l'es. And he answered that this minhag - they practised in it in accordance with the law, for it is not similar to the other hagalos of the other prohibitions, even with a rabbinic prohibition, where one must wait me'es l'es; for there, as the reason is explained, since there must be sixty in the water to nullify it, we are concerned that perhaps there was not sixty, and therefore, in order to emerge from this concern, they require that it be not ben yomo. Whereas in our case, where we hold that bishul akum is nullified in a majority, one need not be particular that it be not ben yomo'.
c) And there are those who wrote that with this prohibition too one must wait me'es l'es, as the מנח"י12 wrote: 'hagalah three times suffices for it, and this is specifically after me'es l'es, when it has become not ben yomo, as is explained in the Tur siman 121; and see there in the Derishah s"k 17'.
And in practice, seemingly, on the basis of the words of the Rema13 in Shulchan Aruch OC siman 452 se'if 2, and similarly in the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe14, who wrote: 'they were accustomed not to perform hagalah on any vessel which is ben yomo', the Acharonim15 wrote that a vessel too which became forbidden through bishul akum should be given hagalah only after me'es l'es.
If so, l'chatchilah one should wait me'es l'es before the hagalah of a vessel which became forbidden through the absorption of bishul akum16.
Notes:
1 sha'ar 1, Hechsher HaBasar, 14c ↩
2 Toras HaBayis HaKatzar bayis 4 sha'ar 4, 37a ↩
3 YD siman 121 ↩
4 YD siman 113 ↩
5 klal 75 din 14 ↩
6 And see Derishah siman 121 s"k 6: 'And with this one could say that these three times which he mentions mean that he should heat water separately for each time, in order to make a remembrance that the law of an earthenware vessel is stringent, that even with a pot which is not bas yomah, three waters are required for their hagalah'. And in the Gilyon Maharsh"a YD siman 113 se'if 16 s"k 9 he wrote: 'And if so, one could say that when he has performed hagalah three times, it is established for all kinds of hot foods' ↩
7 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 16 ↩
8 siman 113 s"k 22 ↩
9 See Ben Ish Chai, shanah 2, Chukas, se'if 24, and Kaf HaChaim YD siman 113 s"k 90 ↩
10 YD, Siftei Da'as, siman 93, s"k 3 ↩
11 siman 113 s"k 92 ↩
12 Soles L'Mincha klal 75 se'if 14 ↩
13 Shulchan Aruch OC siman 452 se'if 2 ↩
14 siman 452 se'if 15 ↩
15 See Shu"t Machazeh Eliyahu vol. 2 siman 46 os 29 onwards ↩
16 But in a time of need, upon asking a rav, there is room to be lenient; for as we have seen, there are those who wrote that there is no need to perform hagalah at all, and there are those who wrote that in a case of hefsed merubeh one may rely on their words, and there are also those who wrote that even l'chatchilah there is no need to wait me'es l'es ↩
[24] (Halacha 586)
It is a halacha in the laws of Shabbos1 that a sick person who is not in danger, but who has taken to his bed or who is in such distress that his whole body is weakened - his needs, even baking and cooking, are performed by a non-Jew.
Question: Why is there no problem of bishul akum for a sick person who eats food that the non-Jew cooked for him, and what is the din of the food on motzaei Shabbos?
Answer: In explaining the heter for a sick person to eat something that a non-Jew cooked we find several explanations among the Rishonim, and there is a practical difference between them, as follows:
a) The Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayis2 explained that it is on account of the fact that in cooking on Shabbos there is no concern of intermarriage, and these are his words: 'I too say that a non-Jew who comes to cook for a sick person, and it is on Shabbos, at a time when it is forbidden for us to cook, that they did not forbid it on account of bishul nochrim at all, for intermarriage is not relevant here, and moreover it is permitted to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos'.
If so, according to his words, something that was cooked on Shabbos - since there is no concern of the prohibition of intermarriage, consequently this food is not included at all in the decree of bishul akum, and this food is permitted to everyone after Shabbos.
b) But the Rashba in Mishmeres HaBayis3 objected to him, and explained that the reason is on account of the fact that it is impossible in any other manner, and these are his words: '.. the din on Shabbos, that whenever it is impossible today by means of a Yisroel - and where it is possible we do not rely on his cooking - the prohibition of Shabbos itself testifies concerning it, and therefore they permitted it to him; and specifically for a sick person and on Shabbos, since it is impossible for him, and they were lenient with him in this even though its beginning and its completion are in the hand of a non-Jew, whereas the like of it on a weekday it is forbidden to do even for a sick person, and in any event they did not permit it entirely, but only what was necessary for him, that is, on Shabbos itself and for the sick person himself; but on motzaei Shabbos it is forbidden even for a sick person, and even the pot in which he cooked is forbidden to the sick person on a weekday, for we do not find a prohibition, even one of their words, where the exchange of its vessels is not forbidden like it, for whatever the Rabbanan enacted, they enacted in the likeness of Torah law'4.
If so, according to his words the entire heter is only on account of the fact that on Shabbos we have no other way; consequently this is a heter limited to Shabbos, and immediately after Shabbos, when there is already another way, this food is forbidden to be eaten according to all opinions on account of bishul akum.
c) The Ran in his Chiddushim5 also disagreed with the Ra'ah and wrote an additional reason, on account of the fact that its prohibition is not from its own substance: 'And there is no proof for this reasoning, for even if we say that included in the needs of a sick person that are performed by an oved kochavim on Shabbos is something subject to bishul oved kochavim - as the minhag has spread - it is still possible that this is specifically for a sick person, because they permitted for him everything done by an akum whose prohibition is not from its own substance; but to permit it to a healthy person we have no [grounds]'.
If so, according to his words, since the decree of bishul akum is not defined as one whose 'prohibition is from its own substance', therefore for this sick person it is entirely permitted, but not for a healthy person.
The Beis Yosef6 brought the words of the Ran in a teshuvah7, and these are his words: 'And the Ran brought all this in perek Ein Ma'amidin, and these are his words in a teshuvah: the Ra'ah wrote that a non-Jew who came to cook for a sick person on Shabbos - it is permitted to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos, and there is nothing on account of bishul goyim or on account of intermarriage, for in all such cases there is a distinguishing mark; he further permitted .. the vessel .. but in practice I forbid it, since I have seen some of the gedolim who disagreed with the Ra'ah z"l, and the Ba'al HaTerumah is among them. End quote'.
[And in the Divrei Chamudos8 he expounds at length that the conclusion of the Ran's words, 'and in practice I forbid it', was said not only with respect to the latter clause, regarding the prohibition of the vessel, but also concerning the opening clause, regarding the din of eating on motzaei Shabbos Kodesh. And the Shach9 and the Taz10 disagreed about this].
And l'halacha the Rema11 wrote the reason of the Ra'ah, and on this basis permitted the food even to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos: 'An akum who cooked for a sick person on Shabbos - it is permitted for motzaei Shabbos, even to a healthy person, and there is nothing in it on account of bishul akum, for in every such case there is a distinguishing mark'. And so ruled the Erech Lechem12, and the Levush13.
But the Mechaber in YD omitted this halacha, and in OC14 he wrote: 'A sick person who is not in danger is permitted bishulei א"י'. And he did not explain what the din of the food is on motzaei Shabbos, for a sick person or for a healthy person.
And the Beis Hillel15 wrote concerning the Mechaber: 'And he omitted this din, whether it is permitted to a healthy person for motzaei Shabbos; it is implied that he does not hold like the Ra'ah, but Mor"m here decided like the Ra'ah, and this requires study'. And see also the Knesses HaGedolah16. [And indeed, even if nothing is to be learned from the Mechaber's omission, and he inclined to the words of the Ra'ah that he mentioned in the Beis Yosef, nevertheless there are among the Acharonim who argued17 that the Beis Yosef did not see the words of the Rashba in Mishmeres HaBayis, who was stringent, and that had he seen them he would certainly have mentioned them, and been stringent].
If so, we have seen that the Rishonim disagreed as to the definition of the heter of bishul nochri for a sick person on Shabbos, and the practical difference is whether it is permitted on motzaei Shabbos Kodesh: the Rema wrote to be lenient, and there are those who wrote that the view of the Mechaber is to be stringent.
In tomorrow's halacha we will see, b'ezras Hashem, the words of the rest of the poskim, and the view of the Alter Rebbe in this.
Notes:
1 See the words of the Mechaber that will be brought below. And Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe siman 328 se'if 19 ↩
2 Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 94a ↩
3 Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 93b ↩
4 And like his words, that the vessel must be kashered, is written in the Ohel Mo'ed, Shaar Issur V'Heter, derech 10 nesiv 10 ↩
5 Avodah Zarah 9a of the pages of the Rif ↩
6 YD siman 113, and siman 123 ↩
7 siman 5 ↩
8 Chullin perek 1 siman 20 ↩
9 YD siman 123 s"k 50 and in the Nekudos HaKesef ↩
10 ibid. s"k 18 ↩
11 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 16 in the Hagahah ↩
12 ibid. se'if 16 ↩
13 ibid. se'if 16 ↩
14 328 se'if 19 ↩
15 YD siman 113 s"k 2 ↩
16 Hagahos Beis Yosef YD siman 113 os 79 ↩
17 See Taz YD siman 123 s"k 15, and in the Shach there ↩
[25] (Halacha 587)
In the previous halacha we saw that the Rishonim disagreed with regard to bishul akum for a sick person on Shabbos, whether it is permitted on motzaei Shabbos; there are those who wrote that the view of the Mechaber is to be stringent, and that the Rema wrote to be lenient.
The Shach1 wrote like the words of the Rema, and these are his words: 'In the Beis Yosef he brought the teshuvah of the Ran, that there is nothing in this on account of intermarriage, and on this the Ra'ah relied in the case of an akum who cooked for a sick person on Shabbos, that it is permitted to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos, for there is nothing in this on account of intermarriage ..'.
But the Taz2 disagreed with the Rema, and wrote: an akum who cooked for a sick person, etc. These are the words of the Ran in the name of the Ra'ah, and the Beis Yosef brought them; and behold, in the sefer Bedek HaBayis of the Ra'ah, daf 89, he wrote likewise, and the author of the Mishmeres HaBayis, who is the Rashba, wrote concerning this: and Heaven forbid, for it was not permitted even to the sick person himself except at the time of need alone, that is, on Shabbos, whereas for motzaei Shabbos it returns to its prohibition, and all the more so to a healthy person; and it is similar to neveilah for a sick person whose illness involves danger, which is permitted to him on Shabbos, and if he became healthy it is forbidden, for whatever the Rabbanan enacted, they enacted in the likeness of Torah law. End quote. And his words are correct .. and had the Beis Yosef3 and the Rema4 seen the sefer Mishmeres HaBayis they would not have ruled leniently like the Ra'ah in this5; and what is even more astonishing is that in siman 123, at its end, the Beis Yosef wrote the teshuvah of the Ran, that we do not hold like the Ra'ah6 in this; and see what I have written there on the words of the Rema'.
In practice many Acharonim agreed with the words of the Taz, as the Knesses HaGedolah7 wrote, the Pri Chodosh8, and the Pri To'ar9, Be'er Sheva10. מנח"י11. And many more of the Acharonim12.
Question: What is the shitah of the Alter Rebbe in this matter?
Answer: The Alter Rebbe wrote13: 'And even though all forbidden foods, even those of Divrei Sofrim, were not permitted to a sick person whose illness does not involve danger, nevertheless they permitted to him the prohibition of bishul nochrim on Shabbos, where it is impossible in any other manner, since it is permitted of itself, only that the act of the non-Jew causes the prohibition for him'.
And in siman 31814 he wrote: 'But one who cooked or performed any other melacha for a sick person whose illness involves danger - it is forbidden on Shabbos to a healthy person or to a sick person whose illness does not involve danger, a decree lest he do more melacha on his account .. and even if it was done by means of a non-Jew, whether for the need of a sick person whose illness involves danger or for the need of a sick person whose illness does not involve danger, it is forbidden to a healthy person on Shabbos, a decree lest he do more on his account; but for motzaei Shabbos it is permitted to a healthy person immediately, and there is no need to wait the time it takes to do it, since the non-Jew acted permissibly for the need of a sick person. Of what are these words said? With regard to the other melachos, apart from baking and cooking; for if a non-Jew baked or cooked on Shabbos for the need of a sick person, it is forbidden to a healthy person even on motzaei Shabbos on account of bishul nochrim, as is written in YD siman 113'.
If so, the Alter Rebbe wrote in siman 328 the reasons of the Rashba and the Ran, and in siman 318 he wrote that it is forbidden to a healthy person even on motzaei Shabbos.
But there is room to examine in his words what the din of the sick person himself is, whether he may eat from this on motzaei Shabbos (and as above in the previous halacha, that according to the Ra'ah it is permitted to everyone on motzaei Shabbos, and according to the shitah of the Rashba it is forbidden to everyone on motzaei Shabbos), for in siman 318 he wrote 'it is forbidden to a healthy person even on motzaei Shabbos', and the implication of his words15 is that for the sick person himself it remains permitted; however in siman 328 he wrote 'they permitted the prohibition of bishul nochrim on Shabbos, where it is impossible in any other manner', which implies16 that after Shabbos it is forbidden even to this sick person?
And in practice, in the view of the Alter Rebbe we find several approaches:
1) There are those who wrote17 that the Alter Rebbe decided that in the case of a sick person, who had a time of permissibility, he relied on the Ra'ah, whereas in the case of a healthy person, who never had a time of permissibility - for even on Shabbos itself it was forbidden to him to eat it - he was stringent like the Rashba.
2) There are those who wrote18 that the Alter Rebbe is based on the words of the Ran, from the precision of whose language it appears that for a sick person it is always permitted, for in his words concerning the Ra'ah he wrote ' .. this is specifically for a sick person, because they permitted for him everything done by an akum whose prohibition is not from its own substance, but to permit it to a healthy person we have no [grounds]'.
3) It may be said19 that in siman 318 he spoke also of a sick person whose illness involves danger, for whom the heter is not based on the fact that it is impossible in another manner, but rather that it is permitted to him like everything that is permitted to a sick person whose illness involves danger, and therefore he did not write here a prohibition of eating for the sick person; whereas in siman 328 he deals with a sick person whose illness does not involve danger, and therefore he wrote that the heter would be only on Shabbos itself.
4) It may be said20 that the Alter Rebbe comes to teach us that there is in this food a prohibition of bishul akum, and consequently it is obvious that to a healthy person it is forbidden; but with regard to a sick person this will depend on the measure of the need, and whenever there is a need it is permitted, and therefore when Shabbos has gone out and there is a possibility of cooking something else, it is not to be permitted to him. But in a case where at the conclusion of Shabbos there is still no other food for the need of the sick person and he requires this, it will be permitted to him. Whereas for a healthy person there is no heter at all on motzaei Shabbos. And consequently in siman 318 he wrote only the clear matter, that to a healthy person it is forbidden even on motzaei Shabbos (because for a healthy person there is no heter whatsoever). But he did not mention a sick person, since there are cases in which it will be permitted to him (even where there is no danger).
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Notes:
1 YD siman 123 s"k 50 ↩
2 ibid. s"k 15 ↩
3 See Shu"t Pnei Yehoshua vol. 1 YD siman 11: 'And it is clear that the Beis Yosef z"l did not see the sefer Mishmeres HaBayis, for had he seen it he would have brought a proof from it that he intended his words, and so it is proven in several places' ↩
4 See in the introduction to Toras HaBayis, Mosad HaRav Kook edition, p. 11 ↩
5 The Shach in the Nekudos HaKesef siman 113 se'if 16 replied: 'And what he wrote, "and had the Beis Yosef and the Rema seen" etc., is not so, for it is possible that even had they seen it they would have ruled thus, for in a matter of Divrei Sofrim one follows the lenient view, all the more so in the case of pas of an akum, which is very lenient ↩
6 And the Shach wrote there: 'And furthermore, the view of the Ran in the teshuvah is also like the Ra'ah, and what is written in the Beis Yosef at the end of siman 123 is a scribal error ..' ↩
7 YD Hagahos Beis Yosef os 79. And the Shiyurei Knesses HaGedolah, OC siman 318, and see what is written in Shu"t Ba'ei Chayei YD siman 154 at its end ↩
8 ibid. siman 113 s"k 26 ↩
9 siman 113 s"k 19 ↩
10 Shu"t siman 24 ↩
11 klal 75 s"k 29 ↩
12 And in the view of the Mishnah Berurah there is confusion, for at first glance his words contradict one another: in siman 318 s"k 14 he wrote in the name of the Gra that it is permitted to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos, but in siman 328 s"k 63 he wrote that it is forbidden both to a sick person and to a healthy person on motzaei Shabbos. However, his son הרא"ל wrote (Michtevei Chofetz Chaim, in the brief history of his life, p. 42): 'And the reason for the matter is that in siman 318 it is from the composition of my father, and he held the shitah of the Ra'ah, as the Rema ruled in YD at the end of siman 113, whereas in siman 328 it is my own handwriting, and I copied l'halacha the shitah of the Rashba, who disagrees with the Ra'ah; see there in siman 113 in the Taz and the Nekudos HaKesef'. But see what is written in Shu"t Divrei Yatziv YD vol. 1 siman 30. Teshuvos V'Hanhagos vol. 3 siman 102. Shemiras Shabbos K'Hilchasah ch. 38 note 47 ↩
13 Shulchan Aruch OC siman 328 se'if 19 ↩
14 se'if 5 ↩
15 As the Tehillah L'Dovid inferred, siman 328 se'if 19 os 25; Nimukei Shabbos p. 224; Ravid HaShulchan siman 318 os 15, and 328 os 25. Shulchan Aruch HaRav Im Bi'urim V'Ha'aros (Cohen) p. 430. Shulchan Aruch HaRav HaMevu'ar 'Kenishta D'Bei Rav' with additional explanation p. 871. (And not as written in Shulchan Aruch HaRav - 'Da'as L'Yisroel' siman 328 note 183) ↩
16 See Nimukei Shabbos there. Shulchan Aruch HaRav - Kenishta D'Bei Rav there ↩
17 Pri HaGan siman 328 on the Mishbetzos Zahav s"k 14; Sha'arei Halacha p. 165 ↩
18 Nimukei Shabbos siman 328 se'if 5 p. 224, Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe Im Bi'urim V'Ha'aros - (Cohen) p. 431 os 17a. Machon L'Shivtecha, Bi'urim siman 5 ↩
19 Nimukei OC there ↩
20 Shulchan Aruch Im Bi'urim V'Ha'aros (Cohen) there, os 2 ↩
[26] (Halacha 588)
Question: What is the din in a case where a non-Jew assisted a Jew in cooking?
Answer: The Gemara in maseches Avodah Zarah1 says: 'ר"י said in the name of Shmuel: If a Yisroel placed meat on coals and an akum came and turned it over, it is permitted. What is the case? If we say that had he not turned it over it would have cooked - that is obvious! Rather, is it not that had he not turned it over it would not have cooked - why is it permitted? They are the cooking of an akum! No, it is necessary: that had he not turned it over it would have cooked in two hours, and now it cooks in one hour. Lest you say: hastening the cooking is a significant matter - this comes to teach us [otherwise] .. So too it is taught in a beraisa: A Yisroel places meat on coals, and an akum comes and turns it over until the Yisroel comes from the beis haknesses or from the beis hamedrash, and he need not be concerned; a woman places a pot on the kirah, and an akum comes and stirs it until she comes from the bathhouse or from the beis haknesses, and she need not be concerned. It was asked of them: If an akum placed it and a Yisroel turned it over, what is the din? ר"נ bar Yitzchok said: a kal v'chomer - its completion by the hand of an akum is permitted, its completion by the hand of a Yisroel - is it not all the more so? It was also stated: רבב"ח said in the name of R' Yochanan .. whether an akum placed it and a Yisroel turned it over, or whether a Yisroel placed it and an akum turned it over, it is permitted, and it is not forbidden unless both its beginning and its completion are by the hand of an akum'.
If so, we have seen in the Gemara that when a Jew placed food to cook and a non-Jew assisted him in the cooking, if the non-Jew's assistance is only in order to hasten the cooking, this is permitted.
But the Gemara concludes: 'and it is not forbidden unless both its beginning and its completion are by the hand of an akum', and the poskim disagreed about this:
The Rambam2 wrote: 'And anything of whose cooking a Yisroel cooked a little, whether at the beginning or at the end, is permitted. Therefore, if the akum placed meat or a pot on the fire and a Yisroel turned over the meat or stirred the pot, or if a Yisroel placed it and the akum completed it, this is permitted'.
In the words of the Rambam (and likewise in the Tur) no condition was mentioned, that when the Yisroel placed it and the non-Jew assisted, this is permitted only in a case where it would have cooked even without the non-Jew. And so it appears in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch3.
But the Beis Yosef4 raised a difficulty against the Rambam and the Tur from the words of the Gemara, and these are his words: 'And in any event one must wonder at the Rambam and Rabbeinu, who did not write that this - that it is permitted where a Yisroel placed it and a non-Jew turned it over - is specifically where the non-Jew did nothing but hasten the cooking, as we say in the Gemara; but where, had the non-Jew not turned it over, it would not have cooked, it is forbidden. And it may be said that Rabbeinu relied on what he wrote afterwards regarding where a Yisroel placed it on dying coals, and as for the Rambam, it is possible that it appeared to him to be an obvious matter, and therefore he did not need to write it'. And the Beis Yosef concludes that therefore one must be careful with 'meat that is roasted on a spit: even though a Yisroel placed the spit with the meat stuck in it close to the fire, in the place of its roasting, it is forbidden to give it to a non-Jew to turn it over so that it should roast'.
But the Rema wrote5 concerning the words of the Beis Yosef: 'But according to what has been explained, that mere stirring of the coals is effective, all the more so that in such a case it is effective b'dieved'.
And l'halacha the Mechaber6 wrote: 'Anything of whose cooking a Yisroel cooked a little, whether at the beginning or at the end, is permitted. Therefore, if an akum placed meat or a pot on the fire and a Yisroel turned over the meat or stirred the pot, or if a Yisroel placed it and the akum completed it, this is permitted'. And he added7: 'If a Yisroel placed it on dying coals, upon which it was not fit to be cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai, and an akum came and turned it over and it became cooked - it is forbidden8.
But the Rema9 disagreed, and wrote: 'And even if it would not have cooked without the assistance of the akum'.
The Shach and the Taz wondered at the Issur V'Heter and the Rema, that this is against the aforementioned Gemara, and the Taz explained10: 'And it appears to my humble opinion that they hold that when the Gemara says afterwards that it is not forbidden unless both its beginning and its completion are by the hand of an akum, it retracted this reasoning; and even though without the akum it would not have cooked, nevertheless, since the Yisroel assisted at the beginning or at the end, it is permitted'.
And the Shach11 wrote: 'And it appears that the Issur V'Heter and the Rav hold that although by the law of the Shas it is forbidden in such a case, nevertheless stirring the coals and a wood chip are also forbidden by the law of the Shas, for it would not have cooked without the assistance of the akum, and even so we permit it .. but rather that we rely on what is written in Chilufei Minhogim, that between the people of Eretz Yisroel and the people of Bavel it is effective, and leave the Yisroel be, that they should be unwitting, etc., and as the Rosh and the Tur wrote in siman 112; if so, the same applies to bishul akum ..'.
And in practice the Acharonim disagreed: the Vikuach Mayim Chaim12, the Pri Chodosh13, and the Gra decided like the Mechaber. The Shach remained requiring study as to the halacha. And the Taz was lenient specifically in the home of a Yisroel14. On the other hand the Levush15 decided like the Rema, and on condition that it could have been cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai; but the מנח"י16, and the Chasam Sofer17, and the Teshuvah MeAhavah18 decided like the Rema; and see Aruch HaShulchan19, Darkei Teshuvah20.
If so, since several of the Acharonim wrote to be stringent, it is proper to be concerned l'chatchilah21 that when a Jew places food on a fire, he should place it in a place where it can cook without the assistance of the non-Jew; but b'dieved the food is not rendered forbidden.
(It is important to clarify that these words do not apply where the Jew kindled the fire and the like, or where the non-Jew nullified the beginning of the Yisroel's cooking - the details of this we will see in the coming halacha).
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Notes:
1 38a ↩
2 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros ch. 17 halacha 16 ↩
3 Shaar 43 siman 9 ↩
4 YD siman 113 ↩
5 Toras Chatas klal 75 din 19 ↩
6 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 6 ↩
7 se'if 10 ↩
8 In explaining the words of the Mechaber, who holds that when a Jew stirs a pot that the non-Jew cooked this is effective, whereas when a Jew placed the meat on the fire in a manner in which it would not have succeeded in cooking, that this is not even considered like stirring and it is forbidden, see Ran, Avodah Zarah 15b of the pages of the Rif, who explained: 'That hastening the cooking is [not] effective except where there is a fire fit to cook; for if you do not say so, how do we say above 'but rather that when he does not turn it over it does not reach [being cooked], why is it permitted', for it is certainly impossible that there should not be a hastening of the cooking in the Yisroel's placing; rather certainly, since when the Yisroel did an act it was not fit to be cooked, there is nothing at all in the Yisroel's hastening of the cooking'. And see also Be'er Sheva Shu"t siman 24. Pri To'ar s"k 10. And see Mahara"m Schick, Avodah Zarah 38b ↩
9 se'if 6; and see in the Shach s"k 8, that the reason the Rema did not object to the Mechaber in se'if 10 is because he relied on what he wrote earlier ↩
10 s"k 6 ↩
11 s"k 8 ↩
12 on the Toras Chatas there ↩
13 YD siman 113 s"k 13 ↩
14 And the בל"י wrote, s"k 10: 'And we practice like Mor"m b'dieved, and l'chatchilah like what the Taz wrote' ↩
15 se'if 7, and se'if 11. And see also Be'er HaGolah os 9 ↩
16 klal 75 s"k 41 ↩
17 in the Chiddushim to YD siman 113 ↩
18 ילק"מ on the Shulchan Aruch ↩
19 se'ifim 30 - 43. However, in a case where, when the Jew placed it, it could not have reached even ma'achal ben Drusai, in this the Aruch HaShulchan remained requiring study ↩
20 YD there, s"k 47 ↩
21 And especially since the Rema wrote so in the Toras Chatas, and it is possible that this is also his intention in the Shulchan Aruch ↩
[27] (Halacha 589)
Question: What is the din when the Jew kindles the fire and the non-Jew cooks on the fire that the Jew kindled?
Answer: The Gemara in maseches Avodah Zarah1: 'It was also stated: רבב"ח said in the name of R' Yochanan, and some say it was Rav Acha bar bar Chanah who said in the name of R' Yochanan: whether an akum placed it and a Yisroel turned it over, or whether a Yisroel placed it and an akum turned it over, it is permitted, and it is not forbidden unless both its beginning and its completion are by the hand of an akum. Ravina said, the halacha is: this bread that an akum heated [=he heated the oven. Rashi] and a Yisroel baked, or also a Yisroel heated and an akum baked, or also an akum heated and an akum baked and a Yisroel came and stirred the coals in it - it is well'.
And from the words of the Gemara we learn that in the din of the baking of pas akum, when the Jew kindles the fire or when the Jew stirs the coals, this is considered as the baking of the Jew; only that the Rishonim disagreed whether this din was said specifically with regard to pas, or also with regard to bishul akum. And likewise the Rishonim disagreed as to the meaning of 'a Yisroel turned it over', which permits the cooking - whether this is turning over the coals or turning over the meat, as follows:
a) The Ran wrote2: 'Or also, a Yisroel heated and an akum baked - it is permitted. However, this is specifically with regard to pas, since the heating of the oven is a melacha particular to it; but with regard to other cooked foods it is not so. And thus the entire sugya proves, for we say "a woman places a pot", and we say "a Yisroel placed meat on coals", and it is implied that the kindling of the fire alone is not effective. And so the Rishonim z"l wrote, and there is no doubt in the matter at all'. And so Rabbeinu Yonah wrote3, and so the Rivash wrote4.
It is explained in these Rishonim that the kindling of the fire is not effective with regard to bishul akum.
b) The Ritva5 wrote: 'And a Yisroel buried a gourd in it from the outset. Explanation: for had he buried it after the non-Jew made the fire, it is obvious that it is permitted, even though the non-Jew knew of it, since once the Yisroel placed it in the fire it is the cooking of a Yisroel; for the making of the fire neither adds nor detracts with regard to bishul goyim, but rather everything follows the one who turns it in the fire6, or the one who turns it over, or the one who stirs, as is stated nearby; and they did not consider the making of the fire a melacha except with regard to pas alone, as is stated further on nearby'.
Only that in his view there7 (in the name of the Ramban8), even with regard to pas the stirring of the coals that permits is 'specifically a stirring that makes an impression on the baking of the pas, in a manner that his actions are recognizable in it'. [And see also Orchos Chaim9, who wrote in the name of the Ra'ah: 'And the Ra'ah z"l wrote that when we permitted pas by means of stirring the coals, we permitted only with a stirring that makes a recognizable impression on the cooking, that it receives the cooking thereby. When we said that the heating of the oven by a Yisroel is a significant melacha, to remove it from the category of bishul goyim, they said this only with regard to pas, for the heating of the oven with regard to pas is a significant melacha and the work of a craftsman; but the kindling of the fire with regard to other cooked foods is not significant and is nothing at all'.]
It is explained in his words that the kindling of the fire is not effective with regard to cooking, but turning over10 [=stirring the coals] in the fire is effective11, (only that with stirring one requires a stirring that makes a recognizable impression12).
c) Rabbeinu Peretz wrote13: 'If the akum placed it in the oven but a Yisroel heats the oven, this too is permitted; and not specifically a complete heating, for mere stirring of the coals suffices, or throwing in a wood chip, as people are accustomed'.
And in this manner his student the Mordechai wrote14: 'And it is not forbidden unless both its beginning and its completion are by the hand of an akum, and so is the halacha, that stirring the coals suffices.. The minhag that people have practised, to throw a wood chip into the oven, is a dispute between the people of Bavel and the people of Eretz Yisroel: the people of Bavel practised to permit pas by means of a wood chip, and the people of Eretz Yisroel say that this wood chip neither adds nor detracts, and we hold like the people of Bavel. And if the pas was baked in an oven of an akum without stirring the coals and without a wood chip'. And from the continuation of his words it appears that he equates the din of the stirring of the coals and of the wood chip in cooking with baking.
And in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch15 he wrote: '.. And even if the Yisroel does not turn the food at all but only assists in adjusting the fire alone, and even if he shook the fire a little or damped down the fire - since he participated in the melacha of the cooking or of the baking, it is permitted; and even if the Yisroel only threw a wood chip into the fire it suffices, even though it cooks also without a wood chip and without stirring the coals .. And it is written in the Semak that there is no distinction in the heter of stirring the coals between pas and another food. End quote. But he should be careful, when he stirs the coals, that that stirring should be effective in adjusting the fire and effective in hastening its cooking by the hand of a Yisroel'.
It is explained in these Rishonim that they permit even when the Yisroel did only the kindling and adjusting of the fire, or the stirring of the coals, or the throwing in of the wood chip16, also with regard to cooking.
If so, we have seen the shittos of the Rishonim with regard to the action of the Jew that is required in order to permit the cooking of the akum, and in the coming halacha we will see the conclusion of the poskim in practical halacha.
Notes:
1 38b ↩
2 15b of the pages of the Rif ↩
3 Igeres HaTeshuvah os 38 ↩
4 in siman 514. The Beis Yosef brought them, siman 113 ↩
5 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
6 And see Rashba, Mishmeres HaBayis, Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 94a. And see Tur YD siman 113 and what the Beis Yosef wrote: 'It appears that Rabbeinu explains that the turning over of which we speak refers to the coals' ↩
7 38b d"h pas ↩
8 See Ramban, Avodah Zarah 35b. And see also Rashba in Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 93a. And see also Orchos Chaim, who wrote: 'And the Ra'ah z"l wrote that when we permitted pas by means of stirring the coals, we permitted only with a stirring that makes a recognizable impression on the cooking, that it receives the cooking thereby' ↩
9 Hilchos Issurei Ma'achalos os 63. 6. And see Bedek HaBayis of the Ra'ah, Bayis 3 Shaar 7 ↩
10 And seemingly it is obvious that their intention with stirring the coals is when the food is standing on the fire ↩
11 And see also in the Ran there, 9a, that although he holds as above that the kindling is not effective, nevertheless he wrote: 'And with regard to boiled foods they permitted with the assistance of a Yisroel, such as where he stirs the coals' ↩
12 And if so, seemingly the throwing of a wood chip will not be effective; and see also Ritva there ↩
13 Hagahos Semak mitzvah 223 hagahah 3; and see also in the Kol Bo siman 100, cited also in Orchos Chaim there ↩
14 Avodah Zarah remez 831; only that in the Mordechai he did not write explicitly with regard to the kindling, only with regard to the stirring of the coals, and the Darkei Moshe wrote on this, s"k 4: 'and all the more so that the making of the fire' ↩
15 Shaar 43 siman 9-10 ↩
16 Seemingly their words apply even before the placing of the cooked food, and therefore the Rema learned from this all the more so the making of the fire; see the previous note ↩
[28] (Halacha 590)
In the previous halacha we saw that the Rishonim disagreed whether the kindling of the fire is effective with regard to bishul akum, and that in general there are three shittos: a. There are those who wrote that the kindling of the fire is not effective. b. There are those who wrote that although the kindling of the fire is not effective, the stirring of the coals is effective. And c. There are those who wrote that even if the Yisroel did only the kindling of the fire, or stirring the coals, or throwing in a wood chip, this is effective.
Question: What is the practical halacha - do we rely on the kindling of the fire, or must one perform a more significant action?
Answer: The Beis Yosef1 brought the words of the Ran, Rabbeinu Yonah and the Rivash, who are the first shitah, which forbids [relying on] the kindling of the fire. And so the Maharsha"l wrote2.
[And the Beis Yosef wrote that it is forced to say that according to their words the stirring of the coals beneath the pot would be effective, for indeed: 'It can be rejected and said that they said this only with regard to the kindling of the fire, since, as it is done before he places the meat to roast, it is no proof that he is kindling it in order to roast meat, but rather to warm himself with it, or to cook in it things that do not come up on the table of kings or that are eaten raw; which is not the case with an oven, whose ordinary purpose is only to bake in it. But when he stirs the coals while the meat is upon them and hastens its cooking, it is certainly permitted even according to the view of the Ran3, and it is forced4'.]
But the Rema in the Darkei Moshe there5 brought the Rishonim who hold the third shitah, and wrote: 'It is implied that it is obvious to permit by means of stirring the coals, and so it is ruled in the Aruch6, to permit by means of stirring the coals and throwing in a wood chip .. And so it is in the Mordechai, perek Ein Ma'amidin (daf 386b)7, that stirring the coals is effective, and all the more so8 that the making of the fire is effective'9.
And likewise they disagreed about this in the Shulchan Aruch l'halacha, for the Mechaber10 wrote: 'The heating11 of the oven is effective only with regard to pas; but with regard to other things that are cooked, neither the heating of the oven nor the kindling of the fire adds or detracts, but rather the placing specifically. Therefore one who wishes to cook in a pan in an oven of an akum needs a Yisroel to put the pan into the oven, in a place fit for it to be cooked in'.
But the Rema wrote in the Hagahah: 'And there are those who disagree and hold that the kindling of the fire, or stirring the coals, is effective with regard to cooking just as with regard to pas, and so is the practice. And even stirring the coals without intention is effective and avails. And there are those who say that even if the Yisroel did not stir the coals and did not throw a wood chip there, but only that the non-Jewish woman kindled the fire from a fire of a Yisroel, it is permitted'.
If so, l'halacha, according to the view of the Mechaber the kindling of the fire or stirring the coals is not effective [unless the non-Jew set the food on the place of cooking and afterwards the Jew kindled the fire12], but according to the view of the Rema the kindling of the fire, stirring the coals, or throwing in a wood chip is effective13.
In practice there are poskim who wrote like the words of the Rema, as the Pri Megadim wrote14: 'And see further on, in the Rav in the Hagahah, that even for boiled foods stirring the coals and a wood chip are effective, and so is the halacha'. But there are poskim15 who wrote that it is proper to be stringent and not to rely on being lenient freely like the words of the Rema, as the Taz wrote16: 'And it appears to my humble opinion, with regard to halacha, that specifically in the home of a Yisroel one may rely on this leniency of the yeish cholkin of the Rema nearby, since there is an opinion at the beginning of this siman in the Tur in the name of HaRav Avraham that in the home of a Yisroel there is no prohibition of boiled foods; even though Rabbeinu Tam disagrees with him, nevertheless in such a case it would be permitted. But in the home of an akum one should not be lenient, except that the Yisroel should place the pot in a place fit for it to be cooked'.
In actual practice many are lenient in the home of a Jew like the words of the Rema; but one must be careful in restaurants and in public places where those who follow the shitah of Maran the Mechaber also come to be hosted, that they be careful that the cooking be in a manner permitted also according to the view of the Shulchan Aruch.
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Notes:
1 YD siman 113 ↩
2 Yerios Shlomo on the Semag, lo ta'aseh 65, 219, d. And see his words cited in note 4 ↩
3 And seemingly the matter fits the view of the Ran, 15b d"h v'af ↩
4 And so the Rema wrote in the Darkei Moshe, that indeed according to the words of these Rishonim stirring the coals would not be effective; but to note that, as above, there is the second shitah among the Rishonim - the Ritva, who indeed forbade the kindling but permitted the stirring of the coals (and see also what the Maharsha"l wrote on the Hagahos Sha'arei Dura siman 75). And seemingly his intention is specifically stirring the coals beneath the pot, and not stirring the fire before the pot is there, in which case it is certainly no better than the making of the fire. And see also in the Bi'ur HaGra s"k 18-20 ↩
5 s"k 4 ↩
6 klal 43 din 9 ↩
7 siman 831 ↩
8 Seemingly this kal v'chomer can be learned from the words of the Rivash, Shu"t siman 514: 'For it is evident that the making of the fire alone is not effective. There is no need to say that throwing in a wood chip alone is not effective'. Only that, as above, the Beis Yosef held that it is not a kal v'chomer, since it may be said that they permitted stirring the coals (and some permitted a wood chip) only while the meat is upon them. And in the shitah of the Rema it may be said that he held it is proven that they permitted even where the meat is not upon them (see halacha no. 589; and according to this they properly learned from this also for the discussion concerning that which cooks without the assistance of the akum, and not as the Shach wrote, s"k 8), or that he learned that even if we find that they permitted stirring the coals only where the meat is upon them, nevertheless, if this is effective even though he occupies himself only with the fire, all the more so it will be effective when he makes the fire ↩
9 This shitah, that the making of the fire is effective, we find in further poskim of Ashkenaz, as the Mahar"a Stein and the Mahara"z Zak wrote (of the chachomim of Ashkenaz in the generation after the Mahari"l and the Terumas HaDeshen), and Mahar"i of Kremnitz (a student of the Rema), in their commentaries on the Semag, lo ta'aseh 65, 219, d. And as the Be'er Sheva wrote in Shu"t siman 24: 'Nevertheless we find several of the famous poskim, the earliest of the early ones and the later ones z"l, who disagree with them and hold that the kindling of the fire is effective even with regard to boiled foods; and they are the Mahara"f in the Semak siman 223 and the Kol Bo in siman 100. And greater than this they wrote, that even throwing in a wood chip is effective to remove us from bishul akum, just as with pas, see there; and so it is explicitly implied in the Mordechai, perek Ein Ma'amidin. And in addition to all this it is written in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch in the name of Mahara"m that if the non-Jewish woman kindled the fire from a fire of a Yisroel and cooked the food in it, it is permitted, and all the more so if he made the fire himself, that it is permitted. And likewise the gaon Mahar"i Molin, the head and father of all the Acharonim, ruled that even blowing with the mouth or with a bellows is effective to remove us from bishul akum, and the Agur cited him for a ruling of halacha'. (Only that the Be'er Sheva himself disagreed with the commentators on the Semag, and raised difficulties against them, see there) ↩
10 YD siman 113 se'if 7 ↩
11 And they wrote in explanation: it means kindling. ובערו והשיקו (Yechezkel 39:9), which Targum renders ויהון שגרין ↩
12 And see Shach s"k 12, who also wrote that we hold that if he kindled or threw in a wood chip it is permitted. (And if so, his words in s"k 8, that it requires study to permit like the words of the Rema, are specifically where he placed it in a place where it would not have cooked. And not as several Acharonim wrote (see Kashrus Ma'achalim s"k 52, and in Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp) ch. 2 note 79) [only that, as above in note 8, it seems that the view of the Shach (in s"k 8, where he brought, with regard to the Rema in se'if 7, the words of the Ran) is that he learned that the stirring of the coals and the wood chip that are to be permitted are only that which is beneath the pot, which is a hastening of the cooking] ↩
13 As the Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos Beis Yosef, YD siman 113 s"k 33 wrote: 'However, the matter is clear, that if a non-Jew placed the meat on the fire and it would not have cooked had the Yisroel not turned over the coals, it is permitted, since he caused the cooking; see in the Perishah'. And see also Shu"t Avnei Nezer, Chelek YD siman 96: 'Certainly, where a Yisroel heated the oven after the placing of the pot, it is effective also according to the Mechaber' ↩
14 Siftei Daas siman 112 s"k 6 ↩
15 Chochmas Adam, Shaar Issur V'Heter klal 66 se'if 8. Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 7 siman 133. Teshuvos V'Hanhagos vol. 3 siman 247 ↩
16 s"k 6. That although at first he wrote: 'In truth, even without this we hold like the yeish cholkin that the Rema brought nearby, that the kindling of the fire or stirring the coals is effective' ↩
[29] (Halacha 591)
Question: What is the din when the non-Jew kindled the fire and the Jew only raised the degrees of heat a little, on the stovetop or in the oven? According to the views that permit stirring the coals or throwing in a wood chip, must the stirring be one that is effective?
Answer: It is explained in the Shulchan Aruch, in simanim 112 and 113, that there is a halachic difference between pas akum and bishul akum, in that with pas they are more lenient than with bishul akum; but we learned in the previous halacha that the view of the Rema is that with cooking too one may be lenient, as they are lenient with pas akum with regard to the kindling of the fire or stirring the coals, and likewise with throwing in a wood chip.
And with regard to the baking of pas the Rambam wrote1: 'And even if he threw only a piece of wood into the oven, he permitted all the pas in it, for the matter is only that there should be a distinguishing mark that their pas is forbidden'.
And from the plain sense of the Rambam's words it is understood that the entire matter is a distinguishing mark, and therefore the size and quantity of the wood makes no difference, and there is no need for there to be a significant addition of fire that is effective for the cooking, as follows.
And so the Rosh wrote2 with regard to the permitting of the pas: 'At first glance it is proven from the entire sugya that we require that the Yisroel hasten the cooking. And it is astonishing at that which they have practised nowadays, to be lenient with throwing a wood chip into the oven; and in the Halachos of the differences between the people of Eretz Yisroel and the people of Bavel it is written: the people of the East throw a wood chip into the oven, and the people of the West say, a wood chip - what does it add and what does it detract? .. And the Rambam z"l wrote that even if the Yisroel threw only one piece of wood into the oven, he permitted all the pas in it, for the matter is only that there should be (the matter) a distinguishing mark that pas of an akum is forbidden. And the language of the Gemara does not imply so. And leave Yisroel be, that they should be unwitting'.
On the other hand, we saw in halacha 589 that several Rishonim wrote that there must be a stirring of the coals that is effective. And as the Ramban wrote3: 'A non-Jew heated and a non-Jew baked, and a Yisroel stirred the coals - it is permitted. Explanation: because in turning over the coals their heat comes out; so Rashi z"l explained. And it is like that which we say in the Gemara, that originally it would cook in two hours and now it cooks in one hour, and the actions of the Yisroel are recognizable in it, for he completed it, and they will recognize that had he not stirred the coals it would not yet have been completed; and for this reason it is permitted. But if he turned them over a little and did not bring out fire from them, but only a mere turning over, it is forbidden, for its placing and its completion are by the hand of a non-Jew; and this is a great principle: whatever its placing and its completion are by the hand of a non-Jew is forbidden. And therefore I say that one who throws a piece of wood into the purni of a non-Jew in order to permit his pas on account of bishul goyim - there is no substance in his actions, and it is forbidden, for without his wood too it cooks in one hour, and his wood accomplished nothing at all'. And the Ritva wrote4 with regard to pas: 'The matter appears like the words of the Ramban z"l, that it is specifically a stirring of the coals that makes an impression on the baking of the pas, in a manner that his actions are recognizable in it'. And so the Orchos Chaim wrote5 in the name of the Ra'ah.
And so it is written in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch6: 'But he should be careful, when he stirs the coals, that that stirring should be effective in adjusting the fire and effective in hastening its cooking by the hand of a Yisroel'7.
And so Shu"t Mahari"l wrote8: 'But all that I have written, I wrote only with regard to where by blowing he kindles the extinguished pieces of wood and they are kindled by his power; but if there are here glowing coals and burning pieces of wood, and by blowing he adds heat - even though everything is burning without this, as the blacksmiths do - then it is not called his cooking, since without this there is heat sufficient for this piece, and by the heat its cooking will not be hastened even a little; and of this we did not speak'.
And the Rashba wrote9: '.. And so my teacher the Rav z"l also wrote, that by the law of the Gemara we have no [basis] to permit by throwing a wood chip into the oven .. but rather thus the matter appears: that in places where they practised to eat pas of non-Jews from the palter, they were lenient with pas of a Yisroel by throwing a wood chip into the oven, in order to keep distance from them; but in places where they did not practise to eat their pas, they required one of three melachos. Thus far the words of my teacher. And it is reasonable that you have no wood chip at all that does not add to the heat of the oven and hasten the cooking. And all this is of the leniencies of pas; and the minhag of Yisroel is Torah'.
If so, we have seen that according to the view of the Rambam (and the Rosh, who wrote that such is the minhag) any addition to the fire renders the food permitted, since only a distinguishing mark is required, and an addition of fire that is effective for the baking of the pas is not needed; however, there are Rishonim who wrote that it must be a fire that is effective for the baking, [and there are those who wrote that an addition of fire that is not effective for the baking is permitted only with pas of a Yisroel that the non-Jew baked, for those who practise to eat pas palter].
And the Beis Yosef wrote10: 'And with regard to halacha, since the Rambam and the Rashba agree to permit by throwing in a piece of wood, and the reason that the Rambam wrote is a reason that is well founded, and the minhag of Yisroel, which is Torah, supports them - thus we take'.
And the Rema wrote concerning his words11: 'And so the Mordechai ruled, perek Ein Ma'amidin (386b), and so the Mahara"i wrote in his She'arim, shaar 25, and so it is in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch klal 43, and so it is in the She'arim of Dura, and in the Agur, in the name of Mahar"i Molin, that if he blew on the fire it is effective like stirring the coals. End quote. And so it is further on, siman 113'.
And like the words of the Rambam the Mechaber ruled in the Shulchan Aruch12 with regard to pas, and the plain sense of his words is that any piece of wood permits.
And we have already learned in the previous halacha that according to the view of the Rema, with cooking too one may be lenient, as they are lenient with pas, with the kindling of the fire, with stirring the coals, or with throwing in a wood chip13. And on this basis the Rema wrote14 with regard to cooking as well: 'It appears to me that since he wrote that blowing is as though he did it by hand, if so, for us, who hold that stirring the coals or throwing in a wood chip is effective even though it is not effective at all to hasten the cooking, the same din applies to blowing, as above'.
If so, according to the view of the Rema, that with cooking stirring the coals or throwing in a wood chip is effective, this is so even where it is not recognizable that he assisted in the cooking15; and therefore in a case where the Jew raised the heat in the oven or the fire on the stovetop a little, this is effective.
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Notes:
1 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros ch. 17 halacha 13 ↩
2 Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 33 ↩
3 Avodah Zarah 35b ↩
4 Avodah Zarah 38b ↩
5 Hilchos Issurei Ma'achalos os 63 ↩
6 Shaar 43 din 10; and see also in the Hagahos on the Issur V'Heter at the end of the sefer, on se'if 10 ↩
7 Cited in the Taz siman 113 s"k 4 and in the Shach there, s"k 9. And see what is written in Shevet HaLevi vol. 7 siman 133, that at first glance this contradicts what the Issur V'Heter wrote there in din 9 ↩
8 siman 193 ↩
9 Toras HaBayis HaAruch, Bayis 3 Shaar 7, 93a - b ↩
10 YD siman 112 s"k 9 ↩
11 Darkei Moshe os 6 ↩
12 YD siman 112 se'if 9 ↩
13 But see Teshuvos V'Hanhagos 3 siman 247, that the Rema was precise in writing with regard to bishul akum that the kindling of the fire or stirring the coals is effective just as with baking, and did not add that heat that remains for 24 hours is also effective, because this leniency they permitted only with pas akum, whose prohibition is essentially tenuous, and therefore anything at all in which the hand of a Yisroel is involved suffices .. but with bishul akum, even according to the Rema, they permitted only the kindling of the fire and a wood chip, and no more ↩
14 Darkei Moshe YD siman 113 s"k 6 ↩
15 And see also Piskim U'Teshuvos siman 113 os 16 ↩
[30] (Halacha 592)
Question: What is the din when a non-Jew cooked on a fire that he kindled from a fire that a Jew kindled, such as a Jew requiring nursing care who needs a non-Jew to cook for him in his home, and the Jew cannot kindle it himself — is there a heter for the non-Jew to take fire from the home of a Jewish neighbor and kindle with it and cook?
Answer: The Issur V'Heter HaAruch wrote1: 'The Mahara"m responded that it is permitted b'dieved, since she made the fire from the fire that remained from yesterday, and in that fire the Yisroel stirred the coals, even though in this one he did not stir. End quote. And even if she brought the fire from another house, such is the practice'.
And it appears from his words that this heter, that the non-Jewish woman kindled from a fire of a Yisroel, applies only b'dieved.
And the Mahari"l wrote2: 'And even if a coal (chashiv) remained for him from a fire of a Yisroel, and the non-Jew kindled a new fire from that coal, our Rabboseinu z"l permitted it because (this) the practice was difficult in their eyes, the practice among the non-Jewish women that maidservants make a fire in the house of their Jewish masters and no Yisroel stirs anything at all, and they found this pretext, that something remained from yesterday's fire, and on the strength of this they permitted it; and is there no greater distinguishing mark than this, [that] the blowing that kindles is the main thing'.
And l'halacha the Rema wrote3: 'And there are those who say that even if a Yisroel did not stir and did not throw a wood chip in there, but only that the non-Jewish woman kindled the fire from a fire of a Yisroel, it is permitted'.
And behold, although the Rema did not note explicitly that the matter is permitted only b'dieved, such is the case in the Issur V'Heter as above4. And in the language of the Rema too, some have inferred precisely that he did not rely on this l'chatchilah5 , for concerning the leniency that he brought before this with regard to the kindling of the fire and the stirring of the coals he wrote 'and such is the practice', and afterwards he wrote this din in the name of 'there are those who say', and did not add that such is the practice. And so too several Acharonim wrote that it is not fitting to rely on this heter except b'shaas hadchak, and in the home of a Yisroel. And as the Aruch HaShulchan wrote6: 'The yeish omrim hold that even without the throwing of a wood chip, [but] merely with the kindling from a fire of a Yisroel, it is permitted .. but in truth these are great leniencies, and it is not fitting to rely on this except b'shaas hadchak and in the home of a Yisroel'.
And behold, in the past it was common in ovens that a small concealed flame burned, and when they would light one of the burners the fire would come from the small flame; and the poskim discussed whether, according to the view of the Rema, it would suffice for a Jew to light the small flame, and it would be considered that all the lightings in that oven are from a fire that the Jew kindled, and it would be permitted. And some wrote that even b'shaas hadchak one may not rely on that flame for a length of time; rather one must kindle the fire each day, as the Mishneh Halachos wrote7: 'And there is somewhat to be inferred from the language of the Issur V'Heter, who wrote there, and these are his words: "And a Yisroel who has a maidservant etc., and at the very least he should be careful to make it fit once a day, for Rabbeinu Tam etc." — and what appears from the language of the Issur V'Heter is that in any event he must make it fit once a day. And it is possible that here too, in the case before us, with a fire of a Yisroel from the pilot, that he must at least kindle it once a day, and afterwards the akum may cook by himself in reliance on the aforementioned fire all that day. And although there is room to distinguish between them, nevertheless, since the heter of kindling a fire from a fire of a Yisroel is only b'shaas hadchak, and it also requires study whether after several days or several months this is still called a fire from a fire of a Yisroel, for in such a case there is certainly no distinguishing mark at all, for this was the essence of the takanah, and it is possible that the decree of Chazal on account of intermarriage returns, as above. And what emerges l'halacha is that l'chatchilah one must certainly be careful that a Yisroel kindle at least once a day .. and as for those who have already eaten, one should not trouble them at all regarding the past, that they did not do so, and it shall be considered inadvertent'.
And some were more stringent8, and held that the heter to rely on the small flame that the Jew lit applies only to one burner, that is to say, that from the fire that the Jew kindled the non-Jew may kindle a new fire only once.
However, in a great shaas hadchak, when there is no other solution, there is room to be lenient, as the Mishneh Halachos wrote9: 'Even though one may not rely on this to permit l'chatchilah for every person in such a case, nevertheless in the case of such a sick person, than which you have no greater shaas hadchak, and it falls under the prohibition of bishul akum, which is a light one, it appears to my humble opinion that one may rely amply and be lenient in this for we have here a s'feik s'feika, many doubts: a doubt whether we rule like the Raavad, that in the home of a Yisroel there is no prohibition; and even if [we rule] like Rabbeinu Tam, nevertheless in such a case, where he kindles the fire from a Yisroel's, it is possible that even Rabbeinu Tam concedes to the Mahara"m; and even if we say that he disagrees in this too, perhaps in this the Acharonim concede to the Mahara"m, and only where the akum kindled the fire did they rule like Rabbeinu Tam; and even if we say that they disagree, it is possible that kindling the fire from a Yisroel's is forbidden only in the home of an akum, but in the home of a Yisroel it is not; and even if we say that they disagree with the Mahara"m, nevertheless it is possible [that this is] specifically where he stirred the coals and did not kindle the fire at the outset, but where he kindled the fire at the outset, perhaps all agree that whenever he kindled the fire from a fire that a Yisroel kindled at the outset, and in the home of a Yisroel, in such a case the essence of the fire is a Yisroel's .. and it is also for the need of a seriously ill person, and it is very difficult to maintain him in the home of his children; wherefore, in my humble opinion, in such a case it is permitted for the nurse to cook, and there is no prohibition in this on account of bishul akum, as appears to my humble opinion'.
If so, we have seen that although the Rema brought the heter that a non-Jew may cook on a fire that he kindled from a fire that a Jew kindled, several of the poskim wrote that it is not fitting to rely on this heter except b'shaas hadchak and in the home of a Yisroel. For example, a person who is ill, Rachmana litzlan, who requires a non-Jew to cook for him, and cannot place the pot on the fire or kindle the fire himself, and there is no Jew who can assist him in this, may light a candle from which the non-Jew will kindle the fire that is under the pot.
--------------
Notes:
1 Sha'ar 43 siman 13 ↩
2 Shu"t siman 193 ↩
3 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 7 in the Hagahah ↩
4 See Shu"t Mishneh Halachos vol. 9 siman 159: 'And were it not that I am afraid, it would appear to my humble opinion to infer somewhat a change of language in what the Rema wrote from what is explained in the Issur V'Heter .. and behold, the Issur V'Heter did not write that it was a fire of a Yisroel, and also wrote only that b'dieved it is permitted, whereas the Rema z"l .. and it is implied that even l'chatchilah it is permitted according to the view of the yeish omrim. And we find, seemingly, a stringency and a leniency in the words of the Rema: the stringency of the Mahara"m, who wrote 'since she made it from a fire that remained from yesterday and in that fire a Yisroel stirred', and he does not require a fire that a Yisroel made, whereas the Rema was stringent in requiring that she kindle from a fire of a Yisroel, while for the Mahara"m a fire in which a Yisroel stirred suffices; and the leniency of the Mahara"m and the Issur V'Heter, that they permitted only b'dieved, whereas the Rema permits even l'chatchilah. And it may be said that the Rema deliberately changed his holy language, for since a Yisroel kindled the first fire, it follows that the essence of the fire comes from the Yisroel, and in such a case the essence of the first never departs, and it is properly permitted even l'chatchilah. It emerges that his stringency is his leniency, for that in which he is stringent, requiring that the fire be a Yisroel's, permits even l'chatchilah; and the Mahara"m, who is lenient even with a fire in which a Yisroel merely stirred, his leniency is his stringency, in that he permits only b'dieved. And this may be explained, as is understood' ↩
5 See Pesakim U'Teshuvos siman 113 os 18. Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp), Bishulei Goyim perek 2 note 80. But see Shu"t Mishneh Halachos brought in the previous note ↩
6 YD siman 113 se'if 44 ↩
7 Shu"t vol. 10 siman 100 ↩
8 See Minchas Shlomo, Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, perek 3, Orchos Halacha os 11. Teshuvos V'Hanhagos vol. 5 siman 249 ↩
9 Shu"t vol. 9 siman 159 ↩
[31] (Halacha 593)
Question: Is there bishul akum in pickling or salting?
#Pickled and salted#
Answer: The Mishnah in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'These are the things of non-Jews that are forbidden .. and pickled items into which it is their manner to put wine .. These are permitted for eating .. and pickled items into which it is not their manner to put wine'.
It appears from this mishnah that although with regard to many dinim it is said that that which is pickled has the din of that which is cooked, nevertheless with regard to bishul akum that which is pickled was not forbidden.
And with regard to salted [food], in the Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah2 it is stated: 'Salted fish - Chizkiyah permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade. A roasted egg - Bar Kappara permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade. When Rav Dimi came, he said: with regard to both salted fish and a roasted egg - Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara permitted, and Rabbi Yochanan forbade. R' Chiya Parva'ah happened to come to the house of the Reish Galusa. They said to him: what is the law of a roasted egg? He said to them: Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara permitted, and R' Yochanan forbade, and the words of one do not stand in the place of two. Rav Zvid said to them: do not listen to him; thus said Abaye: the halacha is like Rabbi Yochanan. They gave him a draught of vinegar to drink and he passed away'.
And Rashi explained: Salted fish - that the idolater salted it, and through its salting it is eaten without cooking. Chizkiyah permitted - for this is not a cooking. And R' Yochanan forbade - for this is its cooking.
And the Rishonim differed in the explanation of the dispute between Chizkiyah and R' Yochanan. Some explained that they differed in the very din of the prohibition of a non-Jew's salting, that according to Chizkiyah it is permitted and according to R' Yochanan it is forbidden3. And some wrote4 that according to all opinions a non-Jew's salting does not render [the food] forbidden.
And the Rif wrote5: 'And a Gaon said that the halacha was not decided like R' Yochanan except with regard to a roasted egg, but with regard to salted fish the halacha is like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara, who permitted, for they are many against an individual'.
That is to say, the Rif ruled in the name of a Gaon that salted [food] is permitted with regard to bishul akum.
#Smoked#
It is stated in the Talmud Yerushalmi in Maseches Nedarim6: 'The Rabbanan of Kisrin asked: smoked [foods] - are they subject to bishul goyim? Are they subject to tavshilei Shabbos? Are they subject to basar b'cholov? Are they subject to becoming obligated in ma'asros? One who takes a neder against smoked [food] - is he permitted [to eat] a cooked dish? Rabbi Ba bar Yehudah in the name of the house of Rav: אחי חביצא is not subject to bishul goyim, and one fulfills with it [the obligation of] eiruvei tavshilin. Rabbi Yosi bei Rabbi Bun in the name of Rav Chuna: any food that is eaten raw as it is is not subject to bishul goyim, and one fulfills with it [the obligation of] eiruvei tavshilin'.
And the Rashba wrote7: 'From what we say in the Gemara8 concerning the boiled foods, 'Whence are these matters?', and it entered our minds at the outset that it is mid'Torah, and it is brought from what is written אוכל בכסף תשבירני ואכלתי ומים בכסף תתן לי ושתיתי - just as water is not changed from its natural state by the fire, so too anything that is not changed from its natural state by the fire; it is evident that they forbade only [that which is] by way of the fire. And although we asked 'is "fire" written at all?', that is not to say that even that which is not by way of the fire is forbidden, but rather to push it off from being mid'Torah and to establish it as mid'rabbanan, and it is always by way of the fire; for they certainly knew well the essence of the matter, whether it is specifically by way of the fire or even not by way of the fire, for in this they did not differ. And since at the outset they were explaining 'just as water is not changed by way of the fire, so too anything that is not changed by way of the fire', we learn from this that the essence of the decree is with regard to that which is changed by way of the fire alone. And in any event, when you come to say that the salting of a nochri is a dispute, the halacha is like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara, who permitted, as we have written nearby. And in the Yerushalmi of Nedarim, perek HaNoder Min HaMevushal, they said with regard to smoked [food] that it is not subject to bishul nochrim9. And with regard to the ruling of the halacha: in the dispute of Chizkiyah and ר"י with regard to salted fish and with regard to a roasted egg, and Abaye ruled like him with regard to an egg, the halacha is like him. But with regard to salted fish the halacha is like Chizkiyah and Bar Kappara, who permitted, for they are many'.
And the Rambam wrote10: 'A fish that an akum salted, and fruits that he smoked until he made them fit for eating - these are permitted; salted is not like hot with regard to this decree, and that which is smoked is not like that which is cooked'.
And l'halacha the Mechaber wrote11: 'A fish that an akum salted, and fruits that he smoked until he made them fit for eating, these are permitted, for salted is not like hot with regard to this decree, and that which is smoked is not like that which is cooked'.
And the Rema wrote in the Hagahah: 'Also that which is pickled is not like that which is cooked, for they forbade only a cooking of fire'.
If so, we have seen that l'halacha the prohibition of bishul akum was stated only with regard to a cooking of fire, and not where the non-Jew prepared the food by way of salting, pickling or smoking. And in the coming days we shall see with regard to cooking in other manners, such as in a microwave and the like.
Notes:
1 Perek 2 mishnah 6 - 7 ↩
2 38b ↩
3 And see the Ran 15b of the pages of the Rif, who explained in the view of Rabbi Yochanan that the pickled items that we learned in our mishnah [refer] specifically to those that do not come up on the table of kings ↩
4 See at length in halacha 568 ↩
5 Avodah Zarah 15b ↩
6 Perek 6 halacha 1 ↩
7 Toras HaBayis HaAruch bayis 3 sha'ar 7 ↩
8 Avodah Zarah 37b ↩
9 And some wrote that it is a question that was not resolved, and as is written in the Ben Ish Chai, Shanah 2, Chukas se'if 20: 'And the same law applies to smoked [food], that if the non-Jew cooked it by way of smoking it is permitted, since smoked [food], with regard to the din of bishul goyim, is a question in the Talmud Yerushalmi that was not resolved; and since bishul goyim is mid'rabbanan, the poskim ruled to permit, and as the Rav HaMaggid z"l wrote, and so too wrote the Pnei Moshe in his explanation of the Yerushalmi. And see Mateh Yosef YD siman 7 os 1, and מחב"ר YD siman 87 os 12, see there' ↩
10 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17 halacha 17 ↩
11 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 13 ↩
[32] (Halacha 594)
Question: Is there bishul akum with steam?
Answer: Cooking with steam divides in general into two types: there is a manner in which the steam cooks the food directly, and there is a manner in which the steam heats the pot in which there is water, and from this heat the water cooks the dish.
a. With regard to the first manner, there are among the poskim who wrote that on account of two reasons there is no prohibition of bishul akum in this food1: a) that it is like smoked [food], concerning which, as we have learned, there is no bishul akum. b) that this is a novel manner of cooking that did not exist in the time of Chazal, and therefore it was not included in their decree.
And as the Zer Zahav wrote2: 'See in Shu"t Shem Aryeh siman 22, that one rav, that is to say, .. that they are not subject to bishul goyim, because they do not cook the juice .. upon an actual fire, but rather that it is done by way of steam and the hevel of boiling water that enters into the cauldron in which the juice is placed by way of pipes; and if so, the hevel of the water is no worse than smoked [food], which is not subject to bishul goyim, for what difference is there to me between the hevel of the fire itself, which is the smoke, and the hevel of the water; end of the content of his words. And in truth these are correct words. And what the Rav HaMechaber rejected of his words, bringing proofs from the obligations of Shabbos, that toldos ha'ur are like fire, in truth it is no proof, according to the view of Rabbeinu that bishul goyim is a light [prohibition]; and especially since the matter of cooking by way of steam machines is something that has been newly introduced only recently, and if so it may be said that this was not included in the decree of Chazal when they decreed concerning bishul goyim'.
And so too wrote the Ben Ish Chai3: 'That the reason for the heter that Harav Avraham Yaakov z"l wrote, which the Gaon Shem Aryeh cited in siman 22, is a weighty reason upon which it is fitting to rely; for he wrote that this is not cooked by fire but only by hevel, and just as they said that there is no prohibition of bishul goyim in smoked [food], so too it may be said with regard to hevel; end of his words .. the hevel has no substance to it, and it is only an airy heat, and there is no difference between hevel and smoke, for the hevel too is smoke, except that the hevel's heat is stronger and greater than that of the smoke'.
But some disagreed and wrote that: a) steam is not similar to smoking. b) it is included in the decree of Chazal. And as the Levushei Mordechai wrote4: 'The words of the Shem Ary[eh] are astonishing in my eyes, for he reckons דאמפ"ף as smoke, and therefore he made the aforementioned kal v'chomer. But to my humble opinion דאמפ"ף is not included in smoke, and it is not so, for certainly the hevel that rises from the water is zei'ah .. And see the Rema at the end of siman 92 se'if 8, that the manner of cooking is that it raises zei'ah, and it is all from the hevel of the heat of the fire, and this is the essence in all cookings; but actual smoke never sweats. And I have seen in the Aruch, the entry הבל, that he renders it רוי"ך, דאמפ"ף; it is possible that hevel too is called רוי"ך, but it is obvious that actual smoke, or smoked [food], is not called by the name דאמפ"ף, and it has never been heard that they hang meat inside the דאמפ"ף and it not be fit for any eating. Therefore the aforementioned heter is of itself non-existent, as is understood. And see in the Yerushalmi .. that there it is a question that was not resolved with regard to actual smoked [food]; all the more so that we should not derive with regard to this matter .. And with regard to what was written, to rely upon what was written .. that in the days of the Chachomim there was not yet such a cooking by way of zei'ah, and they did not decree upon this matter: behold, this is a reasoning without proof, and it was already included in the decree, as written above, for it is toldos ha'esh, since in the days of Chachomeinu z"l too there was cooking as stated above. And further, according to the words of the aforementioned Rema siman 92 [se'if 7], the essence of cooking is in this manner, namely the rising of the zei'ah; and shall we say, on account of a change in the oven, that it was not included in the decree'5.
b. With regard to the second manner, steam that does not cook in a direct fashion but rather heats the vessel in which the food is cooked, Acharonim wrote6 that it is more stringent, for the steam is only another manner of heating the vessel so that it should cook, like the cooking that was forbidden.
And as is written in Shu"t Cheshev HaEphod7: 'A further reason to permit was voiced .. inasmuch as the method today is that these cans are cooked by the hevel that rises from boiling water. That is to say, that they fill cans by the hundreds and seal them, and place them in a large vat, and in another place they boil water, and the hevel from the water enters into the vat by way of pipes and cooks the food that is inside the cans. And they say that this is similar to smoked [food] .. which is not subject to bishul nochrim. However, when this matter came up for discussion at the session of the Bada"tz שליט"א, a claim was voiced that the food inside the cans is not cooked by the hevel; rather the hevel brings to a boil the water inside the cans, and the food inside the cans is cooked by the water in the cans, and this is not smoked [food] but actually cooked .. And behold, [as for] the claim that cooking in this manner did not exist in the days of the Chachmei HaTalmud, and that cooking in this manner was not included in the decree, it is possible that there is room in this to be lenient also in such a manner, where the hevel heats the water in the cans, and in this manner the food inside the cans is cooked'.
And in Teshuvos V'Hanhagos8 he wrote: 'And there are among the Acharonim who inclined to be lenient b'dieved with regard to cooking in the smoke of steam, that it is not considered cooking and is comparable to smoked [food]; but their words are astonishing, for there it speaks of smoked [food] that is not cooked, and therefore they did not decree; but here, where the steam brings to a boil the water that cooks the dish, it is obvious that there is no distinction between the hevel that issues from the fire and the hevel that issues from the smoke of the steam, for the action of cooking performed by both is the same; for the water, there is certainly a prohibition of bishul akum in this, and as is written in Shu"t Achiezer vol. 4 siman 36 straightforwardly, and so too he cited in the name of Shu"t Shem Aryeh, that the prohibition of bishul akum does not depend specifically on cooking from fire. And if we were to say that they decreed only with regard to cooking actually upon the fire, as it was in their times, then with electric too we would have to permit, according to most of the poskim, that a fire of metal is not fire; but it is simple that when the thing is called cooked it is forbidden, and just as Chazal stated anonymously that 'bishul akum is forbidden' and did not distinguish how the cooking was done, therefore there is no practical difference how it was cooked, and therefore with steam it is certainly fitting to forbid'.
And in practice the inclination of the poskim9 is not to rely on the heter of cooking with steam alone, not even in the first manner mentioned above; but they have used it as an auxiliary support where there are further grounds for a heter.
-
Notes:
1 Shu"t Mishneh Halachos vol. 12 siman 17: 'And so I heard from my dear friend the Gaon מהרמ"פ זצלה"ה, who ruled to permit; and with a prohibition that is mid'rabbanan one should not be overly stringent'. And so ruled the Gaon R' Ovadia Yosef in Shu"t Yabia Omer vol. 5 YD siman 9 os 2 ↩
2 On the Issur V'Heter, sha'ar 43 os 4 ↩
3 Shanah 2, Chukas se'if 22 ↩
4 Shu"t YD, mahadura telisai, siman 10 ↩
5 And see what Harav L. Y. Halperin wrote in his sefer Kashrus V'Shabbos B'Mitbach HaModerni pp. 174 - 175, that: a) the heter of smoked [food] is not the change in the action but the change in the result; and if by way of steam it becomes cooked, it is actual cooking and is not like smoking. b) he is in doubt whether one can say that it was not included in the decree, for what difference is there to me between cooking in hot water and cooking in (steam, which is) exceedingly hot water. (And this reasoning applies more to cooking with electricity) ↩
6 See Pesakim U'Teshuvos YD siman 113 note 243 at its end. Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp), Bishulei Goyim perek 2 os 41 and note 57 ↩
7 Vol. 3 siman 29, 2 ↩
8 Vol. 3 siman 247 ↩
9 See the aforementioned poskim, and see also Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 9 siman 156, and more - they are noted in what is cited in note 6. And see Shu"t Cheshev HaEphod there ↩
[33] (Halacha 595)
Question: Is there bishul akum in cooking in a microwave?
Answer: We learned in the previous halacha that the Acharonim differed with regard to cooking with steam; and if so, according to those who hold that cooking by way of steam was not forbidden, certainly cooking by way of a microwave too would not be forbidden. But we saw that in practice, with regard to cooking with steam, the inclination of the Acharonim is to forbid; and on this basis there is room to discuss cooking by way of a microwave, which was newly introduced in the last several decades, since the microwave does not cook in the usual fashion by way of a source of heat. And the poskim of our generation differed in this, as follows:
Some wrote1 that the microwave is a new manner of cooking that certainly is not included in the decree of Chazal; and even those who are stringent with regard to steam, for the reason that it is considered as cooking with fire or with toldos ha'esh, have grounds to permit with a microwave (which is not similar to the decree of Chazal, who forbade cooking by way of a source of heat), and its din is to be compared to one who cooks with toldos chamah. (And some added that in the quality of the cooking too a difference is discernible between cooking by way of a source of heat and cooking in a microwave).
But some wrote that any form of preparing food in the manner that is usual at that time, which causes the food to become cooked, is forbidden, and there is no difference in which manner the cooking came about. And as is written in the Shevet HaLevi2 : 'That which he asked as a practical halacha concerning the ovens that operate by way of short waves, what their din is with regard to bishul akum. And he wrote in the name of those who incline to be lenient, that the cooking in [such an] oven is not similar to a cooking of fire at all, neither in its essence nor in the quality of the cooking: not in its essence, for in this the cooking is done by way of a concentration of waves that pass through the hard parts and reach the soft parts of the item being cooked, and through this they cook very quickly; and also in the quality of the cooking it is not entirely similar to something cooked in actual fire. And his honored excellency wrote that there are those who are lenient in this, and also kosher restaurants that are mehadrin in other matters are not particular about refraining from cooking in this by way of an akum.
And in answer to this matter I say that the matter is simple, that this thing is forbidden on account of bishul akum; for whether according to the reason of the decree, on account of intermarriage, or according to the reason of the decree, on account of lest he feed him things that are tamei, as Rashi wrote, Avodah Zarah 38a, or according to the initial assumption of the Gemara there, 37b, that we derive from the pasuk אוכל בכסף תשבירני ואכלתי ומים בכסף תתן לי ושתיתי, that just as water is not changed from its natural state by the fire, all of this applies to this cooking of a microwave. For if the prohibition were [on account of] the melacha of cooking, we would have to investigate the nature of the action of the melacha of cooking of a microwave, with which we now have no dealings; but the decree of a non-Jew's cooking was on account of intermarriage, and they decreed to keep apart from them, to distance oneself from their cooked foods, since the cooking of a seudah brings about closeness, as the Rishonim wrote. If so, what does the form and quality of the cooking matter, so long as it was cooked and prepared for a seudah in the manner usual in this period, and people eat this food as something cooked; that is the decree that Chazal decreed'.
And so too is written in Teshuvos V'Hanhagos3: 'In the Darkei Teshuvah4 he brings from the Acharonim that cooking in the sun and in toldos chamah is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. If so, according to the view of those who hold that cooking in a microwave has the din of toldos chamah, the same law applies, that bishul akum in a microwave is permitted. But I have not heard that they are lenient to say that there is no bishul akum in this, chas v'shalom; for it appears that even if we were to say that according to din Torah the cooking of a microwave is not considered cooking, and one is exempt for it on Shabbos, in any event with regard to bishul akum it does not depend on what is considered cooking according to the Torah; rather, since among people cooking in a microwave is regarded and accepted like any other cooking with fire, surely the reason of the decree applies to it like any food cooked by way of fire (that is, that the akum should invite the Yisroel to him for a seudah, and they should come to the closeness of intermarriage between them, or that he should feed him something forbidden); and chas v'shalom to be lenient in this.
And although experts claim that the action of cooking in a microwave is not like cooking with fire, in any event, since to people the difference between them is not discernible, and it is regarded and accepted among them like cooking with fire, it is included in the decree of bishul akum. And if we were to permit with a microwave, we would also say that bishul akum with electric is permitted; for according to the view of the Raavad5 that a coal of metal is not fire, if so, with one who cooks with electric there is here no cooking with fire or with its toldos. And although with regard to Shabbos we are stringent like the view of the Rambam, who holds that it is fire, nevertheless with regard to the prohibition of bishul akum, which is mid'rabbanan, we are lenient to rely on the view of the Raavad. And therefore, as was written, that whatever is regarded and accepted like cooking with fire is included in the decree; and although there is room to distinguish that the action of cooking with electric is exactly like the action of cooking with fire, which is not so with something cooked in a microwave, it appears the main point is that it does not depend on the action of the cooking, but rather on whether it is regarded and accepted by people like cooking with fire, as was written. And as for that which the Darkei Teshuvah permits, bishul akum with toldos chamah, this is not because according to din Torah it is not considered cooking, but rather because it is not the manner to cook for a seudah with the sun and with toldos chamah, and the reason of the decree of bishul akum does not apply to it'.
If so, we have seen that some wrote that with a microwave too there is a prohibition of bishul goyim, and therefore it is fitting to be stringent.
[It is important to mention that these words are stated only with regard to cooking, and not with regard to heating and the like of something that is fit for eating, as we have seen the details of this in the previous halachos].
Notes:
1 See Revavos Ephraim vol. 8 siman 511, Ma'archei Lev (Lev, Ze'ev) p. 447, and see also Mishmeres HaBayis (Karp) perek 2 note 61 ↩
2 Vol. 8 siman 185. And so too he wrote in vol. 9 siman 162 ↩
3 Vol. 5 siman 249 os 2. And see also Shu"t Shraga HaMeir vol. 6 siman 52 os 3 ↩
4 Siman 113 s"k 16 ↩
5 Perek 12 of Shabbos halacha 1 ↩
[34] (Halacha 596)
Question: What is the din when a Jew placed food on the fire¹ to cook it, but at the beginning of the cooking it was taken off the fire, and afterwards a non-Jew returned it to cook it?
Answer: The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah1 states: 'R' Assi said in the name of R' Yochanan: anything that is like ma'achal ben Drusai is not subject to bishul akum. Then, [if] it is not like ma'ab"d [=like ma'achal ben Drusai], it is subject to bishul akum! There it is such as where he placed it b'silsa, and an akum took it and placed it in the oven'.
We see from this Gemara that where the Jew began the cooking and afterwards the Jew's act of cooking was interrupted, and a non-Jew continued the cooking, if the food had not been cooked through the Jew's cooking to [the measure of] ma'ab"d, this is forbidden. Except that the commentators differed in the explanation of the Gemara and in what emerges from it as a matter of din.
Some explained that the meat was in a place where it was not fit to become cooked, and the non-Jew moved it to a place fit for it to become cooked2. And some explained that it was placed in a place fit for cooking, except that the Jew removed the meat from the place of the cooking and the non-Jew returned it. And some explained that so it is even where the non-Jew removed it, as follows:
The Gemara further on brought a beraisa: 'A Yisroel may place meat upon coals, and an akum may come and turn it over until the Yisroel comes from the beis haknesses or from the beis hamedrash, and he need not be concerned; a woman may set a pot upon a stove, and a non-Jewish woman may come and stir it until she comes from the bathhouse or from the beis haknesses, and she need not be concerned'.
And the Rashba, Toras HaBayis HaAruch, wrote3: 'And where a Yisroel placed [meat] upon coals and a nochri came and turned it over, and he does not know whether he removed it from upon the fire and returned it or not, it stands to reason that we need not be concerned for that ..'.
And from his words it appears that if it is certain that the non-Jew took it down from the fire (before it became cooked to [the measure of] ma'ab"d) and returned it, it is forbidden.
But the Bach wrote4: 'And to my humble opinion it appears that where the non-Jew removed it of his own accord before it became cooked to ma'ab"d and returned it, there is no prohibition in it; for who asked it of him that he should remove it and return it? Behold, had the non-Jew not removed it, it would have become cooked of itself. And in the Gemara they said only 'such as where he placed it b'silsa and a non-Jew took it and placed it in the oven', that is to say, that the Yisroel removed it from upon the fire and placed it in a basket, and a non-Jew came and returned it upon the fire; and so the Rashba explained explicitly in Toras HaBayis HaAruch bayis 3 sha'ar 7. And the same din certainly [applies] if the non-Jew removed it at the command of a Yisroel and the non-Jew returned it of his own accord, it too is forbidden, and there it is that it is forbidden; but where a non-Jew removed it of his own accord and then returned it, there is no prohibition there .. And it is astonishing that in Toras HaBayis HaAruch he wrote that where a non-Jew removed it and returned it it is forbidden, and he brought no proof at all for his words; and in the Gemara it is implied explicitly that where a non-Jew removed it and returned it there is no prohibition, but only where a Yisroel removed it and a non-Jew returned it, as I have explained .. It appears to my humble opinion that the main point is that l'halacha we hold that where a non-Jew removed it of his own accord and returned it there is no prohibition, even if he removed it before it reached ma'ab"d; and examine it well'.
And l'halacha the Mechaber5 wrote: 'If a Yisroel placed a pot on the fire and removed it, and an akum came and returned it, it is forbidden, unless it had reached ma'ab"d, which is a third of its cooking, when he removed it'.
And although the Mechaber wrote that a Yisroel removed it, nevertheless, from the fact that he brought in se'if 11 also the Rashba, it appears that he ruled that even where the non-Jew removed the food and returned it, this is forbidden.
And the Taz explained6: 'It is not specifically that the Yisroel removed it; rather the same din applies if an akum removed it for some need that he has in this and returned it, that it is forbidden, as is proven from se'if 11, that if it is certain that an akum removed it before it reached ma'achal ben Drusai, it is forbidden. And it appears to me that it is all the more so forbidden where an akum removed it, since the akum himself nullified the act of the Yisroel and did everything anew; of itself he uprooted the name of the Yisroel from this melacha, and this is worse than where it was uprooted of itself by a Yisroel'. And he elaborated at length to object to the Bach7.
But the Shach8, although he disagreed with the Bach with regard to the words of the Mechaber, wrote that according to the view of the Rema this is permitted, and these are his words: 'According to that which we hold, that even if a Yisroel kindled the fire or threw in a wood chip it is permitted, there is no practical difference at all in this, for it is obvious that it is permitted .. here, since it was not the Yisroel who removed it but only the akum, it appears that it is at any rate similar to a wood chip and the like'9.
And some wrote that even according to the view10 of the Shulchan Aruch, in a case where the non-Jew removed it and returned it, if he removed it with the intention of returning it, we do not say that the Jew's act has been removed, and it is permitted. And as the Meiri wrote11: 'And there is no concern lest he remove it entirely before it reaches the category of ma'ab"d, for it is not common to do so unless it is for the need of the cooking; and whatever one does for the need of the cooking is not called a removal. And this, in my opinion, is what they said in this sugya, 'that he placed it b'silsa', that is to say in a basket, a place where one does not do so for the need of the cooking'12.
If so, in a case where a non-Jew kindled the fire and a Jew placed a pot upon it and took it down (before it reached ma'achal ben Drusai), and the non-Jew returned the pot and it became cooked, the food is forbidden [and therefore it is worthwhile that the Jew should always also kindle the fire].
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Notes:
1 The case under discussion is where the non-Jew kindled the fire, since we have already learned in halacha 590 that according to the Rema, where a Jew kindled the fire it will always be permitted ↩
2 38a ↩
3 And see the discussion of this in halacha no. 588 ↩
4 Bayis 3 sha'ar 7, 95a ↩
5 YD siman 113 se'if 3 ↩
6 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 8 ↩
7 There s"k 9. And he wrote that so too wrote the Prisha and the Levush ↩
8 And see also in the Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos Tur, os 7. And the Pri Chodosh s"k 17. מנח"י klal 75 s"k 39. But see the Pri To'ar s"k 12. And in the Hagahos Yad Shaul that is in the ילק"מ, and Harav S. Kluger in his sefer Avodah Avodah on Maseches Avodah Zarah 38a d"h V'Hinei. What he wrote to resolve the words of the Bach ↩
9 There s"k 12 ↩
10 And see in the ל"י s"k 14. And the Lechem HaPanim s"k 17. Also from the Kaf HaChaim siman 113 s"k 55 it appears that he agrees with the Shach with regard to the view of the Rema ↩
11 And so too wrote the Pri To'ar YD siman 113 s"k 12. Harav S. Kluger in Avodah Avodah on Maseches Avodah Zarah 38a d"h V'Hinei. And in Shu"t Zechus Avos siman 24 os 7. Brought in the Yad Shaul in the ילק"מ. And in the Darkei Teshuvah s"k 57. And see also the Avnei Nezer, Shu"t chelek YD siman 99. Shu"t Emek HaTeshuvah vol. 9 siman 84 ↩
12 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
13 But some noted (see Mishmeres HaBayis perek 2 note 69, Pesakim U'Teshuvos siman 113 os 19) that it appears from the words of the Beis Yosef that even where the non-Jew turns it over for the need of the cooking, if he removed it from the fire it becomes forbidden ↩
[35] (Halacha 597)
In halacha 596 we learned that when a Jew began to cook a food, if it was cooked to the measure of ma'ab"d [=ma'achal ben Drusai], then even if the Jew stopped the cooking and the non-Jew continued to cook it, there is no prohibition of bishul akum in this.
Question: What is the law in the reverse case, in which the non-Jew began to cook the food, and after it was cooked by the non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai a Jew came and continued the cooking — such as frozen chips, which in a non-Jewish factory they already cook somewhat so that home cooking should be easier?
Answer: a) The Rashba wrote1: 'And Rabbeinu Chananel z"l wrote on our sugya: a non-Jew who took meat of a Jew and placed it over the fire — if it was cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai it is forbidden, even though it was finished by the hand of a Jew; but if it was not cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai it is permitted. And there are those who permit even where it reached ma'achal ben Drusai in the hand of a non-Jew, for they said "like ma'achal ben Drusai" only to be lenient and not to be stringent; and their proof is from that which we say without qualification, a non-Jew placed it and a Jew turned it over — it is permitted, and if it were as the words of Rabbeinu Chananel z"l it should have said, a Jew turned it over before it reached ma'achal ben Drusai. And it appears to me as the words of Rabbeinu Chananel z"l'.
Accordingly, the Rashba ruled like Rabbeinu Chananel, that from the moment a food has been cooked the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai by a non-Jew the food becomes forbidden; and so wrote the Ran2. And the Rivash3.
b) And Rabbeinu Yerucham wrote4: 'And all this speaks of where it was lying in a basket; for if it were lying in the coals, I have already written that whether a non-Jew began and a Jew finished, or a Jew began and a non-Jew finished, it is permitted, and the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai has no bearing on this'.
That is to say, according to the words of Rabbeinu Yerucham, even the Rashba would agree that so long as the food stands on the fire — even though it was cooked by the non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai — if a Jew finishes the cooking this will be permitted.
c) But the Rosh5 disagreed with the Rashba, and wrote: 'I have seen one who forbade a dish that a non-Jew cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai and a Jew finished. And his proof is from that we permit where a Jew cooked it to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai and a non-Jew finished it, and it is not subject to bishul akum — evidently it is considered as cooked, and there is no cooking after cooking. And it appears to me that they made it as cooked in order to be lenient and not to be stringent'. Accordingly, according to the words of the Rosh, even though a non-Jew cooked it to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai, it still helps for a Jew to continue the cooking.
And so wrote the Semag6. Rabbeinu Peretz7. Mordechai8. Kol Bo9. Orchos Chaim10 in the name of the Mahara"m of Rothenburg. Agudah11. Ra'ah12. Ritva and Meiri13. Tzeidah LaDerech14. And the Knesses HaGedolah15 wrote that so it appears from the view of the Rambam16.
d) The Tur17 cited the words of his father the Rosh and concluded: 'Therefore, even if they cooked it to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai and a Jew came and stoked it and finished it, it is permitted'. And the Beis Yosef wrote: 'And that which Rabbeinu wrote, therefore even if they cooked it to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai and a Jew came and stoked it and finished it, it is permitted — he goes according to his own reasoning, for he holds that the stoking of the coals helps to remove it from bishul goyim, and I have already written that this is not the view of the poskim'.
But the Perishah18 wrote: 'It appears to my humble opinion that the Rosh too concedes in this, since the beginning of its cooking, up to ma'achal ben Drusai, was in the hand of a non-Jew; if the completion of its cooking were also in the hand of a non-Jew, the stoking in between would not help'.
e) In Drashos Mahara"ch Or Zarua19 he wrote20: 'And how much must it be cooked such that the stoking will not help? There are those who wished to say, up to a third of ma'achal ben Drusai, and it is not so: even if it has been cooked sufficiently, so long as the stoking still benefits it, it is permitted. And there was an incident where a non-Jewish woman roasted meat without a Jew's stoking, and R' Eliezer instructed that a Jew should stoke and permitted it, even though it was almost entirely roasted; and he did not state that reason, that the fire remained from yesterday'.
Accordingly, according to his words, even where the non-Jew cooked a food and the food is already fit to be eaten, if additional cooking will improve the food, it will help for a Jew to do this in order to permit the food.
The Beis Yosef21 cited the words of the Rashba and wrote: 'And so we hold, that the words of Rabbeinu Chananel are words of tradition, and all the more so since these great authorities agreed with him, and the Rosh is a lone opinion. However, if it is a sha'as hadechak — such as that it is Erev Shabbos or Erev Yom Tov, or that there is a hefsed merubeh in the matter — since it is a matter of the Rabbanan, these great authorities who permit are worthy to be relied upon'. And in Bedek HaBayis he also cited the words of Rabbeinu Yerucham.
But the Rema in Darkei Moshe22 wrote: 'And I wonder at him, that he wrote that the Rosh is a lone opinion in this matter, after he himself wrote that many agreed with him to permit it23, and all the more so since the Mahara"m and R' Peretz and the Mordechai, whose way it is to be stringent everywhere, are here lenient, and they are the later authorities, upon whom one may rely in the prohibition of bishul goyim, which is mid'rabbanan. And so ruled the Issur V'Heter HaAruch24, that so is the practice'.
Accordingly, we have seen that there are five views in this regarding a food that was cooked by the non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai: a) Some say that the thing becomes forbidden, and it will not help for a Jew to finish the cooking. b) Some say that if it is still on the fire, and a Jew finishes the cooking, it is permitted. c) Some say that even when it is not on the fire a Jew may return it to the fire and finish the cooking, but it is necessary that the Jew perform a significant act, such as returning it to the fire (and it is not enough for the non-Jew to return it and the Jew only to stoke). d) Some say that even stoking after a state of ma'achal ben Drusai permits it to be considered as the cooking of a Jew. e) And some added that even after the completion of the cooking, if the cooking still improves the food ('mitztamek v'yofeh lo'), it will be permitted when the Jew assists in this cooking, such as to stoke beneath the pot.
Tomorrow we will see the words of the poskim in practice
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Notes:
1 Toras HaBayis HaAruch bayis 3 shaar 7, 94b - 95a ↩
2 Avodah Zarah 15b d"h V'Eino Assur ↩
3 Shu"t siman 514 ↩
4 Toldos Adam V'Chavah nesiv 17 vol. 7, 161a ↩
5 Avodah Zarah perek 2 siman 32 ↩
6 Lavin 148 ↩
7 Hagahos Semak mitzvah 223 hagahah 3 ↩
8 Avodah Zarah remez 831 ↩
9 siman 100 ↩
10 Issurei Ma'achalos os 63 ↩
11 Avodah Zarah siman 30 ↩
12 Bedek HaBayis bayis 3 shaar 7, 94b ↩
13 Avodah Zarah 38a ↩
14 maamar 2 klal 3 perek 1 ↩
15 Hagahos Beis Yosef YD siman 113 os 50 ↩
16 Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros perek 17 halacha 16 ↩
17 YD siman 113 ↩
18 os 8 ↩
19 siman 25 ↩
20 And see also the words of the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayis there, (except that he did not explicitly mention the ruling that stoking too would help then) ↩
21 YD siman 113 ↩
22 os 8 ↩
23 And so the Knesses HaGedolah wondered there, os 53 ↩
24 klal 43 din 9 ↩
[36] (Halacha 598)
In the previous halacha we learned that there are five views in a case where a food was cooked by the non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai: a) Some say that the thing becomes forbidden, and it will not help for a Jew to finish the cooking. b) Some say that if it is still on the fire and a Jew finishes the cooking, it is permitted. c) Some say that even if it is not on the fire the Jew may return it to the fire and finish the cooking, but it is necessary that the Jew himself perform a significant act, such as returning it to the fire (and it is not enough for the non-Jew to return it and the Jew only to stoke). d) Some say that even stoking after ma'achal ben Drusai permits this to be considered as the cooking of a Jew. e) And some added that even after the completion of the cooking, if the cooking still improves the food ('mitztamek v'yofeh lo'), it will be permitted when the Jew assists in this cooking, such as to stoke beneath the pot.
Question: What is the law in all this in practice?
Answer: a. The Mechaber wrote1: 'If a non-Jew cooked it to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai2 and a Jew finished it, it is to be forbidden3, unless it is Erev Shabbos or Erev Yom Tov or there is a hefsed merubeh in the matter'.
But the Rema wrote: 'And there are those who permit in every case, and so is the practice'.
And the Shach wrote4: 'And there are those who permit. And so is the agreement of most of the poskim, and not like the Maharsha"l in his Issur V'Heter5'. And so wrote the Beis Hillel6. And the Tiferes L'Moshe.
And indeed the Pischei Teshuvah wrote7: 'And in the Shelah, daf 76, he wrote that one should be stringent like the Maharsha"l, that it does not help after cooking of ma'achal ben Drusai, see there'. But the agreement of the Acharonim8 in practice is like the words of the Rema and the Shach.
b. The Mechaber in Shulchan Aruch did not distinguish between a case where the food that the non-Jew cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai is still on the fire and one where it is not on the fire; and the Pri Toar wrote9 that indeed according to the view of the Mechaber, anything that was cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai by a non-Jew becomes forbidden in any case, (like view a).
But the Pri Chodosh10 wrote that the main ruling is as the Beis Yosef wrote in Bedek HaBayis (like view b), and the Ben Ish Chai agreed with him11. And so was ruled in practice in Hora'ah Berurah12.
c. On the words of the Rema, Rabbi Akiva Eiger wrote13 in the name of the Derishah: 'And there are those who permit in every case. And we require an actual completion of its cooking, but not a mere turning over'. (Like view c).
But the Acharonim wrote that according to the view of the Rema stoking too is sufficient, as was written in Toras Chatas14: 'And they forbade only where the entire cooking was by a non-Jew; but if a Jew stoked the coals — even though it would have been cooked without the stoking, and even though it had already been cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai — it is permitted'. (Like view d).
d. The Darkei Teshuvah wrote15: 'See Shu"t Chinuch Beis Yehudah siman 69, who wrote that all this is specifically if the dish still needs its cooking to be completed, but when it has already been completed it does not help, see there; and the Gilyon Maharsh"a cited him. However, see the sefer Mekor Mayim Chaim at the end of this siman, who cited from the words of the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayis that even if it was cooked to its full requirement by the hand of a non-Jew, if it is still mitztamek v'yofeh lo and it was completed by the hand of a Jew it is permitted; and he brought a proof for his words, see there'.
And so wrote further Acharonim16, that even when the food was cooked to its full requirement, a Jew's stoking will still help so long as the food is improved through the cooking (like view e).
Accordingly, we have seen that when the non-Jew cooked half of its cooking and afterwards a Jew continued to cook it: for those who follow the view of the Mechaber (if it is still on the fire the Jew may assist in completing it, but if it was taken off the fire) and it was cooked by the non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai, the food is forbidden [unless it is Erev Shabbos or Yom Tov or a hefsed merubeh]. But for those who follow the view of the Rema, if it has not yet been fully cooked [or it was cooked but it is mitztamek v'yofeh lo], even if it was taken off the fire the Jew may assist in the cooking and it will be permitted17.
Therefore, in practice, chips that were cooked by the non-Jew more than ma'achal ben Drusai will be forbidden for Sephardim; but for those who follow the view of the Rema — and as is our minhag — it will be permitted.
Notes:
1 Shulchan Aruch YD siman 113 se'if 9 ↩
2 And in this law we go leniently, that is, when it has reached half of its cooking, as the Beis Hillel wrote in s"k 1. And the Darkei Teshuvah s"k 61 and s"k 66 ↩
3 See the Chasam Sofer on the Shulchan Aruch here, who wondered that seemingly the words of the Mechaber here contradict what he wrote in siman 112 se'if 12, and see what was written to explain in Shu"t Machazeh Eliyahu vol. 2 siman 45 ↩
4 s"k 14 ↩
5 מכונות ועטרת שלמה siman 75 end of os 3 ↩
6 s"k 1 ↩
7 s"k 4 ↩
8 See the Aruch HaShulchan se'if 46, who wrote that there is no room to cast doubt on this at all, and one who wishes to be stringent may be stringent for himself and not for others ↩
9 s"k 9. And so wrote the Knesses HaGedolah, Hagahos Beis Yosef s"k 54. And Zivchei Tzedek s"k 27 ↩
10 s"k 18 ↩
11 Rav Pealim YD vol. 3 siman 9 ↩
12 s"k 34, and see what was written in the Biur Halacha ↩
13 in the gloss to se'if 9 ↩
14 klal 75 din 18 ↩
15 siman 113 s"k 65 ↩
16 See Shu"t Shevet HaLevi vol. 2 siman 45. Machazeh Eliyahu there. (And see what they wrote to explain that so it is also in the view of the Issur V'Heter. And this is not the place to elaborate) ↩
17 However, even according to the view of those who are lenient, some say that it will be permitted only after the Jew has actually completed its cooking, as the Ra'ah wrote in Bedek HaBayis there, and the Ritva in Avodah Zarah there. And these are the words of the Issur V'Heter HaAruch shaar 43 siman 10: 'And specifically where he returns it next to the fire; but if he does not return it, even if it was no more than ma'achal ben Drusai, which is a third of its cooking, as was explained in בי"ד — it is forbidden, since he did not do anything to it that is recognizable. And also, since he eats it thus, its cooking is complete as far as he is concerned; and the Chachomim did not give a measure for its cooking, but rather forbade any cooking that the non-Jew did alone'. (But to note from what the Tiferes L'Moshe wrote, that even in such a situation it will be permitted, since in such a situation it does not come up on the table of kings), and see also Sdei Chemed אס"ד ma'areches בישולי א"י os 1, who wrote that according to the view of the Rosh it is permitted even without a continuation of the cooking by the Jew ↩
[37] (Halacha 599)
In the previous halacha we learned that the view of Maran the Mechaber is that when a non-Jew cooked a food to the measure of ma'ab"d [=ma'achal ben Drusai] the food becomes forbidden, and it will not help for a Jew to continue and cook it; but according to the view of the Rema, so long as the cooking has not been entirely completed the Jew may finish its cooking and it will not be rendered forbidden on account of bishul akum1.
Question: What is the law with a product that, after the non-Jew cooked it (more than ma'achal ben Drusai according to the Beis Yosef, or entirely according to the Rema), the food became dried out and the non-Jew's cooking is not so recognizable in it, such as noodles or ptitim?
Answer: Maran the Beis Yosef was asked in Shu"t Avkas Rochel2, cited by the Chida3: 'May our teacher instruct us: wheat that the non-Jews boil until it reaches ma'achal ben Drusai, and they then dry it again in order to make it into grits, and thereafter it is not eaten except by way of another cooking — do we establish it as ma'achal ben Drusai, or perhaps, since it was dried out to such an extent, it has reverted to its original permitted state?'. And the Beis Yosef answered them: 'Answer — and in any case, in a sha'as hadechak, such as that it is Erev Shabbos or Erev Yom Tov or that there is a hefsed merubeh in the matter, since it is a matter of the Rabbanan, these great authorities who permit are worthy to be relied upon, end of his words there. And in a like case it appears to say in our case at hand that, since it is a prohibition of the Rabbanan and there are those who permit this wheat — since it is dried out so much that it is not eaten except by way of another cooking, and the first cooking is not recognizable in it — it is permitted; and it is possible that even those who forbid in the case of a cooked dish would permit in the case of this wheat, since it is not eaten except by way of a fresh cooking. So says the young Yosef Karo'.
Accordingly, we see in the words of the Beis Yosef that even something that was cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai, if it afterwards became dried out and it is in a state in which it is not eaten now without a fresh cooking4, it is permitted when the Jew cooks it afterwards.
And in a similar vein it was written in the sefer Chukei Da'as5: 'I was asked regarding the הגרי"ץ שלמים that are made from oats by non-Jews, and they bring them to sell them in the market, and they are made in this manner: they take full and good oats and cook them in their pots until they have softened well, and afterwards they dry them well in ovens until they have hardened literally like stones, and they pound them in a mortar in which they pound kinds of groats, in order to remove their coverings from them; and when they bring them to sell they are very hard, like stones, and they require a fresh cooking more than the meat of an ox until they are fit for eating. The question is whether they are permitted to us for eating. And it appears to me to permit .. for our eyes see that they require a fresh, thorough cooking until they are fit to be eaten by means of it.. and therefore this matter requires no delay, and it is permitted from the outset to buy them and to eat them, as stated above'.
And the poskim wrote6 that even if the food was cooked entirely, if it afterwards became dried out in a manner that it needs to be cooked again in order to be eaten, the matter is permitted.
Accordingly, something that a non-Jew cooked and that underwent a process of drying, and now requires a fresh cooking in order to be eaten, is permitted if a Jew performs the second cooking; and therefore there is no problem in buying noodles or ptitim, even though they undergo a process of cooking in the factory before the packaging.
Tomorrow we will see what the law is with foods that do not require a second cooking, but rather soaking or the like is sufficient for them.
Notes:
1 And see what the Ra'ah wrote in Bedek HaBayis on Toras HaBayis bayis 3 shaar 7, 95a: 'Where the non-Jew cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai and a Jew finished it — and this is certainly permitted *and this is a prohibition that reverts to its permitted state*' ↩
2 siman 30 ↩
3 Shiyurei Berachah YD siman 113 s"k 13 din 9 ↩
4 Among his words he also mentioned 'the first cooking is not recognizable in them', but seemingly his intent is not that it is literally not recognizable in them, (for if it were not so, why would he cook them) but rather that it is not recognizable that they were cooked so much, and therefore they need to be cooked again ↩
5 YD os 2 s"k 41, and he also referred to this in his sefer Lechem HaPanim YD siman 113 s"k 4 ↩
6 The Gaon R' Ovadia Yosef in Yabia Omer vol. 10 YD siman 7 wrote this ruling as a straightforward matter even according to the view of Maran the Mechaber, who forbids where the non-Jew cooked more than ma'achal ben Drusai: 'that since the act of their cooking has been nullified, by their having been dried out entirely to the point that it is impossible to eat them, and the fresh cooking is done by a Jew, it is to be permitted'. But in Shevet HaLevi vol. 2 siman 45 he wrote that as a general matter the Mechaber is in doubt about the permission: 'for Rabbeinu the Beis Yosef in this goes according to his own approach, that he inclined in the dispute of the Rishonim to be stringent where it was already cooked by a non-Jew to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai; and if so there is an inclination to be stringent in this, lest it be like those who are stringent by way of a non-Jew's ma'achal ben Drusai .. and if so no completion helps, and the same law is that drying does not help, since even the two thirds of cooking that are lacking still do not help — and if so, seemingly the same law applies to drying; except that he then wrote that there are those who permit in the case of drying, for drying is different, in that we judge it as though it has entirely reverted to its original state, and as one for whom the first cooking has been nullified. And therefore it is a genuine doubt for the Beis Yosef; but for us, who hold as settled law, straightforwardly, like the ruling of the Rema and the Shach, that a repair helps after the beginning of a cooking of ma'achal ben Drusai — and according to what was written, even after the completion of the cooking, if it still improves with any improvement whatsoever — if so, the law of drying is all the more so to be permitted in a straightforward way and not by way of doubt'. However, we find that there are those who wrote to be stringent in this, and see what was written at length in Shulchan Melachim p. 261 onward. But seemingly, even if there is room for those who are stringent, it is mainly according to the view of the Mechaber, that after the non-Jew cooked to the measure of ma'achal ben Drusai there is no longer any permission, and it is possible that the drying does not render it as less than ma'achal ben Drusai — and if so, 'where has the prohibition in it gone?'. But according to the view of the poskim that even after it was cooked to its full requirement, if it is improved further the Jew may permit the food by improving it — and it is obvious that after the food has become dried out and the Jew repairs it afresh, this is better and more significant than the improvement that is permitted. And all the more so since the drying is done in the factory as part of the production, and perhaps the cooking of the non-Jew, which is not literally for the purpose of eating, may be compared to it ↩
[38] (Halacha 600)
Question: We learned that when the non-Jew began the cooking (according to the Mechaber, up to ma'achal ben Drusai; and according to the Rema, even after ma'achal ben Drusai), if the Jew finishes the cooking it will be permitted. What is the law when the non-Jew did not continue to cook, but rather continued with another action, such as pickling and the like?
Answer: The Nachalas Shiva wrote1: 'I was asked concerning cabbage that the Kuttim shred, and sometimes they place a whole cabbage among the shredded, and they say that at first they cook it a little and afterwards they place it among the shredded to be pickled together with them. And I answered: it appears to me that it is entirely permitted, that it is not forbidden on account of bishul goyim at all. For the reason that anything which is eaten as it is raw is not subject to bishul goyim is that their cooking is of no benefit whatsoever to us, since we are able to eat it as it is raw; if so, the same applies in reverse: if by that cooking we still cannot eat it as it is raw, but rather it needs to be pickled afterwards, then their cooking is of no benefit whatsoever to us, since in any event it needs to be pickled afterwards; if so, it is not forbidden at all on account of bishul goyim. As is stated in the Tur YD (siman 113) regarding meat or small fish that a non-Jew pickled or salted until they are fit for eating — they are permitted even if he cooked them afterwards, for the salting does not render them forbidden; and when he cooks them afterwards, he is cooking a thing that is eaten as it is raw, end of his words. And so I found in the responsum of Mahar"i Weil (siman 49), that in Nuremberg they were accustomed to permit whole cabbage that the Kuttim boil — it was cited in Toras Chatas (klal and siman 61 din 11) — and if so, here too it is thus'2.
Accordingly, when the non-Jew began to cook but did not finish rendering the food fit for eating by way of cooking, but rather continued to prepare it by way of pickling or salting and the like, this is permitted. (However, as to eating it by means of the initial cooking alone, without a repair, the poskim are divided in this3).
★ ★ ★
Question: What is the law with couscous or bulgur4 that are cooked entirely in the factory, and at home there is no need to cook them and soaking in hot water in a kli sheni is sufficient. Or even soaking in lukewarm water for a longer period of time?
Answer: We learned in the previous halacha that a food that was prepared by the non-Jew but became dried out, and in order to eat it, it needs to be cooked once again — if a Jew performs the second cooking this is permitted, since through the drying a part of the act of cooking that the non-Jew performed was nullified5. And so too will the law be with a food whose continued repair is done in the form of pickling or salting or another preparation.
And if so, also with regard to couscous and the like, which is cooked entirely in the factory — in any case, since after the drying it is not fit for eating, and the act of repair that is done by soaking the couscous in water renders it fit for eating, this act permits the couscous.
[And seemingly, even in a case where the non-Jew himself performs this soaking in lukewarm water, the couscous will be permitted; but if he does it by pouring hot water over the couscous from a kli rishon, or even in a kli sheni, it is proper to be stringent6].
To note that there are those who were stringent and wrote that it is proper that the Jew should cook the bulgur again, and only in that way does his cooking permit the couscous that the non-Jew made in the factory7.
Accordingly, seemingly8 also couscous and bulgur and the like that was cooked entirely in the factory by the non-Jew — in any case, after it became dried out, it will be permitted if its fresh repair for eating is done by the Jew9.
Notes:
1 Shu"t siman 71 ↩
2 And see also the Chasam Sofer YD siman 112 se'if 6 ↩
3 See halacha number 598 note 17 ↩
4 From the kashrus department of the Badatz — 'HaEidah HaChareidis' we were told that the couscous under their kashrus, its cooking in the factory is done by a Jew. But the bulgur under their kashrus — they are not particular that the cooking in the factory be done by a Jew ↩
5 However, we find that there are those who wrote to be stringent in this, and see halacha 599 note 6 ↩
6 See Pesakim U'Teshuvos siman 113 p. 475. And see Shulchan Melachim pp. 612-613 ↩
7 See Mishmeres HaBayis p. 118 note 91. But see above note 4, that with the couscous under the hechsher of the Eidah HaChareidis the beginning of its cooking is done by a Jew, and if so (even after the drying it is not that its entire act was nullified, for now it is sufficient to soak it, and seemingly it is considered more than where a Jew cooked a third of its cooking) and it is kosher even if the non-Jew finishes cooking it ↩
8 And see above note 5, that there are those who were stringent, but it is mainly for those who hold like the view of the Mechaber ↩
9 Or even by the non-Jew, but if he soaks it in lukewarm water ↩
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